Ancient Wisdom and the Modern Temper. On the Role of Greek Philosophy and the Jewish Tradition in Hans Jonas’s Philosophical Anthropology

The question on the essence of man and his relationship to nature is certainly one of the most important themes in the philosophy of Hans Jonas. One of the ways by which Jonas approaches the issue consists in a comparison between the contemporary interpretation of man and forms of wisdom such as those conveyed by ancient Greek philosophy and the Jewish tradition. The reconstruction and discussion of these frameworks play a fundamental role in Jonas’s critique of the modern mind. In the first section I introduce the anthropological problem in Hans Jonas’s oeuvre. Moreover, I clarify why it becomes essential for Jonas to resort to different forms of traditional wisdom. In the second and third sections I try to give an account (as complete as possible) of the two generalisations which Jonas shapes in order to criticise the modern concepts of man and nature. In the last section I show how Jonas links these generalisations to his own philosophical assessment of modernity. Finally, I focus on his methodology, which exemplifies how critical thinking may arise from a reconsideration of traditional contents

The Jonas Short Site (41SA101), San Augustine County, Texas

The Jonas Short site (41SA101) is one of a few known and investigated Woodland period mounds in the Trans–Mississippi south (i.e., East Texas, Northwest Louisiana, Southwest Arkansas, and Southeast Oklahoma). In fact, the site is one of only four identified mound sites of possible Woodland period age—and Mossy Grove cultural tradition—in the Neches–Angelina and Sabine river basins in East Texas and Northwest Louisiana: Coral Snake (16SA48), Anthony (16SA7), Jonas Short, and Westerman (41HO15). The Jonas Short site was located on an alluvial terrace of the Angelina River. It was investigated in 1956 by archaeologists from the University of Texas and the River Basin Survey prior to its inundation by the waters of Lake Sam Rayburn

Columbanus, charisma and the revolt of the monks of Bobbio

The account of the revolt of the monks of Bobbio against Columbanus’ successor Attala by Jonas of Bobbio gives only some clues as to why it took place, but suggests that Attala was lacking charisma. Jonas fails to mention the subsequent introduction of the Benedictine Rule to Bobbio and its combination with Columbanian traditions in the Rule of the master; he is also reticent about the deve lopment of cells, or submonasteries, partly as a result of the revolt. It is suggested here that the monastic rule currently known as the Rule of Eugippius was compiled for these cells and that the Rules of the fathers, currently dated to an earlier period, might also be associated with attempts to pacify the monks’ revolt

Jonas, Hobbes e le forme della paura

This essay aims at clarifying the concept of Jonas’s heuristic of fear. Although it has been severely criticized, fear remains an aspect of his thought which has drawn little attention, particularly regarding the role it plays in the elaboration of the imperative of responsibility. Jonas elaborates a new concept of fear, moulded by the particular form of uncertainty brought about by the technological age. Although critics have interpreted Jonas’ attempt as an ethics founded on irrationality and emotion, the present analysis shows that Jonas affirms a cognitivist theory of fear. The concept of fear he discusses in The Imperative of Responsibility is not an emotion as an immediate physical and psychological reaction, but a form of evaluative thinking that is part of responsibility. In order to illustrate form and function of fear in Jonas thought, I will refer to the meanings of fear in Hobbes, an author Jonas himself refers to

Jewish Philosophies After Heidegger: Imagining a Dialogue between Jonas and Levinas

Emmanuel Levinas and Hans Jonas draw on their roots in phenomenology and Judaism to answer the ethical nihilism of Heidegger\u27s thought. Though both Levinas and Jonas aim to ground an imperative of responsibility in a Good-in-itself ultimately sourced in God, their disagreements are basic and revolve around three fundamental questions: (1) Can Jews after Auschwitz have a theology without lapsing into theodicy?; (2) Is the Good-in-itself within Being or otherwise than Being ?; and (3) Is ethics the completion of nature or against nature? I explore possibilities for integrating the apparently incompatible ideas of Levinas and Jonas