A New Approach for Jamming Attacks using -Packet-Hiding Methods

The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launch pad for mounting Denial - of - Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addressed under an external threat model. In this work, we address the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these attacks, the adversary is active only for a short period of time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack o n TCP and one on routing. We show tha t selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real - time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real - time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical - layer attributes. O ur methods and evaluate their computational and communication overhea

Randomized Differential DSSS: Jamming-Resistant Wireless Broadcast Communication

Abstract—Jamming resistance is crucial for applications where reliable wireless communication is required. Spread spectrum techniques such as Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) have been used as countermeasures against jamming attacks. Traditional antijamming techniques require that senders and receivers share a secret key in order to communicate with each other. However, such a requirement prevents these techniques from being effective for anti-jamming broadcast communication, where a jammer may learn the shared key from a compromised or malicious receiver and disrupt the reception at normal receivers. In this paper, we propose a Randomized Differential DSSS (RD-DSSS) scheme to achieve anti-jamming broadcast communication without shared keys. RD-DSSS encodes each bit of data using the correlation of unpredictable spreading codes. Specifically, bit “0 ” is encoded using two different spreading codes, which have low correlation with each other, while bit “1 ” is encoded using two identical spreading codes, which have high correlation. To defeat reactive jamming attacks, RD-DSSS uses multiple spreading code sequences to spread each message and rearranges the spread output before transmitting it. Our theoretical analysis and simulation results show that RD-DSSS can effectively defeat jamming attacks for anti-jamming broadcast communication without shared keys. I

REBUF: Jam Resistant BBC based Uncoordinated Frequency Division

One of the central tenants of information security is availability. One common form of attack against the availability of information in wireless networks is jamming. Currently, the most common techniques to provide jam-resistant communication, such as frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), are based on the use of a symmetric shared secret. However, there are theoretical approaches to jam resistance without a pre-shared secret. One theoretical approach using concurrent codes, called the BBC algorithm, was developed at the United States Air Force Academy. We developed and tested the effectiveness of REBUF, a Jam Resistant BBC based Uncoordinated Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM) system. REBUF is the first known implementation of the BBC algorithm in a simultaneous frequency division multiplexing system. The contributions of this paper include: demonstrating the practical use of a BBC based FDM system, the ability of such a system to jam traditional orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) systems, and the resilience of such a system to some common forms of jamming

A survey on cyber security for smart grid communications

A smart grid is a new form of electricity network with high fidelity power-flow control, self-healing, and energy reliability and energy security using digital communications and control technology. To upgrade an existing power grid into a smart grid, it requires significant dependence on intelligent and secure communication infrastructures. It requires security frameworks for distributed communications, pervasive computing and sensing technologies in smart grid. However, as many of the communication technologies currently recommended to use by a smart grid is vulnerable in cyber security, it could lead to unreliable system operations, causing unnecessary expenditure, even consequential disaster to both utilities and consumers. In this paper, we summarize the cyber security requirements and the possible vulnerabilities in smart grid communications and survey the current solutions on cyber security for smart grid communications. © 2012 IEEE

On the Security of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Protocol

Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is the communications protocol currently being rolled out as part of next generation air transportation systems. As the heart of modern air traffic control, it will play an essential role in the protection of two billion passengers per year, besides being crucial to many other interest groups in aviation. The inherent lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has long been a topic in both the aviation circles and in the academic community. Due to recently published proof-of-concept attacks, the topic is becoming ever more pressing, especially with the deadline for mandatory implementation in most airspaces fast approaching. This survey first summarizes the attacks and problems that have been reported in relation to ADS-B security. Thereafter, it surveys both the theoretical and practical efforts which have been previously conducted concerning these issues, including possible countermeasures. In addition, the survey seeks to go beyond the current state of the art and gives a detailed assessment of security measures which have been developed more generally for related wireless networks such as sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc networks, including a taxonomy of all considered approaches.Comment: Survey, 22 Pages, 21 Figure

They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: Non-Invasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices

Wireless communication has become an intrinsic part of modern implantable medical devices (IMDs). Recent work, however, has demonstrated that wireless connectivity can be exploited to compromise the confidentiality of IMDs' transmitted data or to send unauthorized commands to IMDs---even commands that cause the device to deliver an electric shock to the patient. The key challenge in addressing these attacks stems from the difficulty of modifying or replacing already-implanted IMDs. Thus, in this paper, we explore the feasibility of protecting an implantable device from such attacks without modifying the device itself. We present a physical-layer solution that delegates the security of an IMD to a personal base station called the shield. The shield uses a novel radio design that can act as a jammer-cum-receiver. This design allows it to jam the IMD's messages, preventing others from decoding them while being able to decode them itself. It also allows the shield to jam unauthorized commands---even those that try to alter the shield's own transmissions. We implement our design in a software radio and evaluate it with commercial IMDs. We find that it effectively provides confidentiality for private data and protects the IMD from unauthorized commands.National Science Foundation (U.S.). (Grant number CNS-0831244)National Science Foundation (U.S.). Graduate Research Fellowship ProgramAlfred P. Sloan Foundation. FellowshipUnited States. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Cooperative Agreement (90TR0003/01