Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV's profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements.D43, L13, L14, L22

Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV's profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements.joint ventures, strategic alliances, ownership structure, asymmetries

Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV's profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements.joint ventures, strategic alliances, ownership structure, asymmetries.

Joint venture healthcare system as common practice in developing countries : game changing on assessing health services

To explore the essence of game changing on applying joint venture (JV) approach for healthcare system improvement in developing countries. This is cross-sectional study exploring the factors influencing the successful implementation of JV for the healthcare services in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The study included: Qatar Statistical Authority, CIA fact book, Ministry of Health Annual Report, Hamad Medical Corporation Annual Report, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development information, and Qatar's healthcare system history. The research indicated that the LMIC healthcare system would benefit from affiliation with leading technology partner for healthcare reform. The findings support the view of LMIC healthcare systems' needs to incorporate joint venture approach in implementing JV concept for process improvement and knowledge transfer to contribute in country economic growth, development, and stability. Current study explored evidence supporting decision maker and management control of JV trends in different ways in comparison with developed countries. JV can also help the organization to share the risk and cost of large capital investment. The present study supports observations on expending the use of JVs as approach for improvement in LMIC healthcare system. The current study confirmed the advantages of JV which include helping businesses grow faster, increasing productivity, and generating greater profits, both parties sharing the risks and costs, accessing new markets and distribution networks. [Abstract copyright: Copyright: © 2020 International Journal of Preventive Medicine.

Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners’ effort is not obervable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV’s profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreementsJoint ventures, strategic alliances, ownership structure, asymmetries

Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI vs. Joint Ventures

We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or entering a joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection by encouraging a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.Joint Ventures, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology Transfer, R&D Spillovers, FDI Policy

Critical success factors influencing performance outcome of joint venture construction projects in South Africa: Comparison of first and second order models

Joint ventures (JVs) have become increasingly common, because of the complexity and challenges associated with the delivery of construction projects globally and in South Africa. However, it has been established that JV projects have experienced unsatisfactory performance leading to clients’ dissatisfaction. The purpose of this paper is therefore to determine the critical success factors (CSFs) influencing the performance of JV construction projects in South Africa. A positivist philosophy position was adopted using a structured questionnaire survey administered to the construction professionals. Prior to the main study, a content validity of the questionnaire was achieved using a pilot study. The data was collected from 115 conveniently sampled respondents, and analysed using principal component analysis and multiple regression analysis. The exploratory factor analysis revealed two empirical models to be tested; namely the first and second order factor models. The result of the first order model revealed that, management control influenced achievement of project objective of JV, whereas, the second order model established that understanding of contractual agreement, which was explained by six components of CSFs influenced achievement of project objective. It is suggested that stakeholders who prefer to be involved in JV projects should acquire good understanding of the contractual agreement in managing JV projects in order to successfully achieve the project objectives. This study adds to the discourse and literature on CSFs of JVs. It provides new empirical evidence of the CSFs that influence project performance outcome of JV in the context of South Africa which can also be replicated in other countries globally. However, the study may not be generalised because of the geographical setting and respondents

Josephson vortices and solitons inside pancake vortex lattice in layered superconductors

In very anisotropic layered superconductors a tilted magnetic field generates crossing vortex lattices of pancake and Josephson vortices (JVs). We study the properties of an isolated JV in the lattice of pancake vortices. JV induces deformations in the pancake vortex crystal, which, in turn, substantially modify the JV structure. The phase field of the JV is composed of two types of phase deformations: the regular phase and vortex phase. The phase deformations with smaller stiffness dominate. The contribution from the vortex phase smoothly takes over with increasing magnetic field. We find that the structure of the cores experiences a smooth yet qualitative evolution with decrease of the anisotropy. At large anisotropies pancakes have only small deformations with respect to position of the ideal crystal while at smaller anisotropies the pancake stacks in the central row smoothly transfer between the neighboring lattice positions forming a solitonlike structure. We also find that even at high anisotropies pancake vortices strongly pin JVs and strongly increase their viscous friction.Comment: 22 pages, 11 figures, to appear in Phys. Rev.