On Properties of Update Sequences Based on Causal Rejection

We consider an approach to update nonmonotonic knowledge bases represented as extended logic programs under answer set semantics. New information is incorporated into the current knowledge base subject to a causal rejection principle enforcing that, in case of conflicts, more recent rules are preferred and older rules are overridden. Such a rejection principle is also exploited in other approaches to update logic programs, e.g., in dynamic logic programming by Alferes et al. We give a thorough analysis of properties of our approach, to get a better understanding of the causal rejection principle. We review postulates for update and revision operators from the area of theory change and nonmonotonic reasoning, and some new properties are considered as well. We then consider refinements of our semantics which incorporate a notion of minimality of change. As well, we investigate the relationship to other approaches, showing that our approach is semantically equivalent to inheritance programs by Buccafurri et al. and that it coincides with certain classes of dynamic logic programs, for which we provide characterizations in terms of graph conditions. Therefore, most of our results about properties of causal rejection principle apply to these approaches as well. Finally, we deal with computational complexity of our approach, and outline how the update semantics and its refinements can be implemented on top of existing logic programming engines.Comment: 59 pages, 2 figures, 3 tables, to be published in "Theory and Practice of Logic Programming

A Brief History of Updates of Answer-Set Programs

Funding Information: The authors would like to thank José Alferes, Martin Baláz, Federico Banti, Antonio Brogi, Martin Homola, Luís Moniz Pereira, Halina Przymusinska, Teodor C. Przymusinski, and Theresa Swift, with whom they worked on the topic of this paper over the years, as well as Ricardo Gonçalves and Matthias Knorr for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions, which greatly helped us improve this paper. The authors were partially supported by Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia through projects FORGET (PTDC/CCI-INF/32219/2017) and RIVER (PTDC/CCI-COM/30952/2017), and strategic project NOVA LINCS (UIDB/04516/2020). Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.Over the last couple of decades, there has been a considerable effort devoted to the problem of updating logic programs under the stable model semantics (a.k.a. answer-set programs) or, in other words, the problem of characterising the result of bringing up-to-date a logic program when the world it describes changes. Whereas the state-of-the-art approaches are guided by the same basic intuitions and aspirations as belief updates in the context of classical logic, they build upon fundamentally different principles and methods, which have prevented a unifying framework that could embrace both belief and rule updates. In this paper, we will overview some of the main approaches and results related to answer-set programming updates, while pointing out some of the main challenges that research in this topic has faced.publishersversionpublishe

Suggestions for a non-monotonic feature logic

We use Scott's domain theory and methods from Reiter's default logic to suggest some ways of modelling default constraints in feature logic. We show how default feature rules, derived from default constraints, can be used to give ways to augment strict feature structures with default information

Extracting fictional truth from unreliable sources

A fictional text is commonly viewed as constituting an invitation to play a certain game of make-believe, with the individual sentences written by the author providing the propositions we are to imagine and/or accept as true within the fiction. However, we can’t always take the text at face value. What narratologists call ‘unreliable narrators’ may present a confused or misleading picture of the fictional world. Meanwhile there has been a debate in philosophy about so-called ‘imaginative resistance’ in which we are inclined to resist imagining (or even accepting as true in the fiction) what’s explicitly stated in the text. But if we can’t take the text’s word for it, how do we determine what’s true in a fiction? We propose an account of fiction interpretation in a dynamic setting (a version of DRT with a mechanism for opening, updating, and closing temporary ‘workspaces’) and combine this framework with belief revision logic. With these tools in hand we turn to modelling imaginative resistance and unreliable narrators