Uniform Definability in Propositional Dependence Logic

Both propositional dependence logic and inquisitive logic are expressively complete. As a consequence, every formula with intuitionistic disjunction or intuitionistic implication can be translated equivalently into a formula in the language of propositional dependence logic without these two connectives. We show that although such a (non-compositional) translation exists, neither intuitionistic disjunction nor intuitionistic implication is uniformly definable in propositional dependence logic

Some Logical Notations for Pragmatic Assertions

The pragmatic notion of assertion has an important inferential role in logic. There are also many notational forms to express assertions in logical systems. This paper reviews, compares and analyses languages with signs for assertions, including explicit signs such as Frege’s and Dalla Pozza’s logical systems and implicit signs with no specific sign for assertion, such as Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics and the recent modification of the latter termed Assertive Graphs. We identify and discuss the main ‘points’ of these notations on the logical representation of assertions, and evaluate their systems from the perspective of the philosophy of logical notations. Pragmatic assertions turn out to be useful in providing intended interpretations of a variety of logical systems

On Affine Logic and {\L}ukasiewicz Logic

The multi-valued logic of {\L}ukasiewicz is a substructural logic that has been widely studied and has many interesting properties. It is classical, in the sense that it admits the axiom schema of double negation, [DNE]. However, our understanding of {\L}ukasiewicz logic can be improved by separating its classical and intuitionistic aspects. The intuitionistic aspect of {\L}ukasiewicz logic is captured in an axiom schema, [CWC], which asserts the commutativity of a weak form of conjunction. This is equivalent to a very restricted form of contraction. We show how {\L}ukasiewicz Logic can be viewed both as an extension of classical affine logic with [CWC], or as an extension of what we call \emph{intuitionistic} {\L}ukasiewicz logic with [DNE], intuitionistic {\L}ukasiewicz logic being the extension of intuitionistic affine logic by the schema [CWC]. At first glance, intuitionistic affine logic seems very weak, but, in fact, [CWC] is surprisingly powerful, implying results such as intuitionistic analogues of De Morgan's laws. However the proofs can be very intricate. We present these results using derived connectives to clarify and motivate the proofs and give several applications. We give an analysis of the applicability to these logics of the well-known methods that use negation to translate classical logic into intuitionistic logic. The usual proofs of correctness for these translations make much use of contraction. Nonetheless, we show that all the usual negative translations are already correct for intuitionistic {\L}ukasiewicz logic, where only the limited amount of contraction given by [CWC] is allowed. This is in contrast with affine logic for which we show, by appeal to results on semantics proved in a companion paper, that both the Gentzen and the Glivenko translations fail.Comment: 28 page

Five Observations Concerning the Intended Meaning of the Intuitionistic Logical Constants

This paper contains five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants: (1) if the explanations of this meaning are to be based on a non-decidable concept, that concept should not be that of 'proof'; (2) Kreisel's explanations using extra clauses can be significantly simplified; (3) the impredicativity of the definition of → can be easily and safely ameliorated; (4) the definition of → in terms of 'proofs from premises' results in a loss of the inductive character of the definitions of ∨ and ∃; and (5) the same occurs with the definition of ∀ in terms of 'proofs with free variables

Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication

C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication". Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with "idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years later