11,915 research outputs found
Intervention in Power Control Games With Selfish Users
We study the power control problem in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish
users. Without incentive schemes, selfish users tend to transmit at their
maximum power levels, causing significant interference to each other. In this
paper, we study a class of incentive schemes based on intervention to induce
selfish users to transmit at desired power levels. An intervention scheme can
be implemented by introducing an intervention device that can monitor the power
levels of users and then transmit power to cause interference to users. We
mainly consider first-order intervention rules based on individual transmit
powers. We derive conditions on design parameters and the intervention
capability to achieve a desired outcome as a (unique) Nash equilibrium and
propose a dynamic adjustment process that the designer can use to guide users
and the intervention device to the desired outcome. The effect of using
intervention rules based on aggregate receive power is also analyzed. Our
results show that with perfect monitoring intervention schemes can be designed
to achieve any positive power profile while using interference from the
intervention device only as a threat. We also analyze the case of imperfect
monitoring and show that a performance loss can occur. Lastly, simulation
results are presented to illustrate the performance improvement from using
intervention rules and compare the performances of different intervention
rules.Comment: 33 pages, 6 figure
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
A Game-Theoretic View of the Interference Channel: Impact of Coordination and Bargaining
This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users
over a Gaussian interference channel. The usual information theoretic approach
assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection. In the
scenario investigated here, each user is willing to coordinate its actions only
when an incentive exists and benefits of cooperation are fairly allocated. The
users are first allowed to negotiate for the use of a simple Han-Kobayashi type
scheme with fixed power split. Conditions for which users have incentives to
cooperate are identified. Then, two different approaches are used to solve the
associated bargaining problem. First, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is
used as a tool to get fair information rates and the operating point is
obtained as a result of an optimization problem. Next, a dynamic
alternating-offer bargaining game (AOBG) from bargaining theory is introduced
to model the bargaining process and the rates resulting from negotiation are
characterized. The relationship between the NBS and the equilibrium outcome of
the AOBG is studied and factors that may affect the bargaining outcome are
discussed. Finally, under certain high signal-to-noise ratio regimes, the
bargaining problem for the generalized degrees of freedom is studied.Comment: 43 pages, 11 figures, to appear on Special Issue of the IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory on Interference Networks, 201
Distributed Game Theoretic Optimization and Management of Multichannel ALOHA Networks
The problem of distributed rate maximization in multi-channel ALOHA networks
is considered. First, we study the problem of constrained distributed rate
maximization, where user rates are subject to total transmission probability
constraints. We propose a best-response algorithm, where each user updates its
strategy to increase its rate according to the channel state information and
the current channel utilization. We prove the convergence of the algorithm to a
Nash equilibrium in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks using the
theory of potential games. The performance of the best-response dynamic is
analyzed and compared to a simple transmission scheme, where users transmit
over the channel with the highest collision-free utility. Then, we consider the
case where users are not restricted by transmission probability constraints.
Distributed rate maximization under uncertainty is considered to achieve both
efficiency and fairness among users. We propose a distributed scheme where
users adjust their transmission probability to maximize their rates according
to the current network state, while maintaining the desired load on the
channels. We show that our approach plays an important role in achieving the
Nash bargaining solution among users. Sequential and parallel algorithms are
proposed to achieve the target solution in a distributed manner. The
efficiencies of the algorithms are demonstrated through both theoretical and
simulation results.Comment: 34 pages, 6 figures, accepted for publication in the IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, part of this work was presented at IEEE CAMSAP
201
Near-Optimal Deviation-Proof Medium Access Control Designs in Wireless Networks
Distributed medium access control (MAC) protocols are essential for the
proliferation of low cost, decentralized wireless local area networks (WLANs).
Most MAC protocols are designed with the presumption that nodes comply with
prescribed rules. However, selfish nodes have natural motives to manipulate
protocols in order to improve their own performance. This often degrades the
performance of other nodes as well as that of the overall system. In this work,
we propose a class of protocols that limit the performance gain which nodes can
obtain through selfish manipulation while incurring only a small efficiency
loss. The proposed protocols are based on the idea of a review strategy, with
which nodes collect signals about the actions of other nodes over a period of
time, use a statistical test to infer whether or not other nodes are following
the prescribed protocol, and trigger a punishment if a departure from the
protocol is perceived. We consider the cases of private and public signals and
provide analytical and numerical results to demonstrate the properties of the
proposed protocols.Comment: 14 double-column pages, submitted to ACM/IEEE Trans Networkin
Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games over the Gaussian Interference Channel
This paper tackles the problem of how two selfish users jointly determine the
operating point in the achievable rate region of a two-user Gaussian
interference channel through bargaining. In previous work, incentive conditions
for two users to cooperate using a simple version of Han-Kobayashi scheme was
studied and the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) was used to obtain a fair
operating point. Here a noncooperative bargaining game of alternating offers is
adopted to model the bargaining process and rates resulting from the
equilibrium outcome are analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the operating
point resulting from the formulated bargaining game depends on the cost of
delay in bargaining and how bargaining proceeds. If the associated bargaining
problem is regular, a unique perfect equilibrium exists and lies on the
individual rational efficient frontier of the achievable rate region. Besides,
the equilibrium outcome approaches the NBS if the bargaining costs of both
users are negligible.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, to appear in Proceedings of Forty-Eighth Annual
Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computin
Does Laboratory Trading Mirror Behavior in Real World Markets? Fair Bargaining and Competitive Bidding on EBay
We conducted a controlled field experiment on eBay and examined to what extent both social and competitive laboratory behavior is robust to institutionally complex real world markets with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. EBay’s natural trading system provides bridges between lab and field environment that can be exploited to explore differences in behavior in the two environments. We find that many sellers do not make use of their commitment power as predicted by standard theories of both selfish and social behavior. However, a concern for equity strongly affects outcomes and reputation building in bilateral bargaining, while buyer competition effectively masks this concern and robustly yields equilibrium outcomes. The dichotomy of behaviors mirrors observations in laboratory research. Furthermore, we find that behavioral patterns in the field experiment mirror fully naturally occurring trading patterns in the market.eBay, auctions, behavioral economics, trust, market design
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