This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users
over a Gaussian interference channel. The usual information theoretic approach
assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection. In the
scenario investigated here, each user is willing to coordinate its actions only
when an incentive exists and benefits of cooperation are fairly allocated. The
users are first allowed to negotiate for the use of a simple Han-Kobayashi type
scheme with fixed power split. Conditions for which users have incentives to
cooperate are identified. Then, two different approaches are used to solve the
associated bargaining problem. First, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is
used as a tool to get fair information rates and the operating point is
obtained as a result of an optimization problem. Next, a dynamic
alternating-offer bargaining game (AOBG) from bargaining theory is introduced
to model the bargaining process and the rates resulting from negotiation are
characterized. The relationship between the NBS and the equilibrium outcome of
the AOBG is studied and factors that may affect the bargaining outcome are
discussed. Finally, under certain high signal-to-noise ratio regimes, the
bargaining problem for the generalized degrees of freedom is studied.Comment: 43 pages, 11 figures, to appear on Special Issue of the IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory on Interference Networks, 201