Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce's Theory of Abduction

I examine and resolve an exegetical dichotomy between two main interpretations of Peirce’s theory of abduction, namely, the Generative Interpretation and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. According to the former, abduction is the instinctive process of generating explanatory hypotheses through a mental faculty called insight. According to the latter, abduction is a rule-governed procedure for determining the relative pursuitworthiness of available hypotheses and adopting the worthiest one for further investigation—such as empirical tests—based on economic considerations. It is shown that the Generative Interpretation is inconsistent with a fundamental fact of logic for Peirce—i.e., abduction is a kind of inference—and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation is flawed and inconsistent with Peirce’s naturalistic explanation for the possibility of science and his view about the limitations of classical scientific method. Changing the exegetical locus classicus from the logical form of abduction to insight and economy of research, I argue for the Unified Interpretation according to which abduction includes both instinctive hypotheses-generation and rule-governed hypotheses-ranking. I show that the Unified Interpretation is immune to the objections raised successfully against the Generative and the Pursuitworthiness interpretations

Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce’s Theory of Abduction

I examine and resolve an exegetical dichotomy between two main interpretations of Peirce’s theory of abduction, namely, the Generative Interpretation and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. According to the former, abduction is the instinctive process of generating explanatory hypotheses through a mental faculty called insight. According to the latter, abduction is a rule-governed procedure for determining the relative pursuitworthiness of available hypotheses and adopting the worthiest one for further investigation—such as empirical tests—based on economic considerations. It is shown that the Generative Interpretation is inconsistent with a fundamental fact of logic for Peirce—i.e., abduction is a kind of inference—and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation is flawed and inconsistent with Peirce’s naturalistic explanation for the possibility of science and his view about the limitations of classical scientific method. Changing the exegetical locus classicus from the logical form of abduction to insight and economy of research, I argue for the Unified Interpretation according to which abduction includes both instinctive hypotheses-generation and rule-governed hypotheses-ranking. I show that the Unified Interpretation is immune to the objections raised successfully against the Generative and the Pursuitworthiness interpretations

On Abduction in Design

The mechanism of design reasoning from function to form is addressed by examining the possibility of explaining it as abduction. We propose a new interpretation to some definitions of innovative abduction, to show first that the concept, idea, as the basis for solution must be present in the inference, and second, that the reasoning from function to form is best modeled as a two-step inference, both of the innovative abduction pattern. This double-abductive reasoning is shown also to be the main form of reasoning in the empirically-derived “parameter analysis” method of conceptual design. Finally, the introduction of abduction into design theory is critically assessed, and in so doing, topics for future research are suggested

Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce’s Theory of Abduction

I examine and resolve an exegetical dichotomy between two main interpretations of Peirce’s theory of abduction, namely, the Generative Interpretation and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. According to the former, abduction is the instinctive process of generating explanatory hypotheses through a mental faculty called insight. According to the latter, abduction is a rule-governed procedure for determining the relative pursuitworthiness of available hypotheses and adopting the worthiest one for further investigation—such as empirical tests—based on economic considerations. It is shown that the Generative Interpretation is inconsistent with a fundamental fact of logic for Peirce—i.e., abduction is a kind of inference—and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation is flawed and inconsistent with Peirce’s naturalistic explanation for the possibility of science and his view about the limitations of classical scientific method. Changing the exegetical locus classicus from the logical form of abduction to insight and economy of research, I argue for the Unified Interpretation according to which abduction includes both instinctive hypotheses-generation and rule-governed hypotheses-ranking. I show that the Unified Interpretation is immune to the objections raised successfully against the Generative and the Pursuitworthiness interpretations

Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce’s Theory of Abduction

I examine and resolve an exegetical dichotomy between two main interpretations of Peirce’s theory of abduction, namely, the Generative Interpretation and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. According to the former, abduction is the instinctive process of generating explanatory hypotheses through a mental faculty called insight. According to the latter, abduction is a rule-governed procedure for determining the relative pursuitworthiness of available hypotheses and adopting the worthiest one for further investigation—such as empirical tests—based on economic considerations. It is shown that the Generative Interpretation is inconsistent with a fundamental fact of logic for Peirce—i.e., abduction is a kind of inference—and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation is flawed and inconsistent with Peirce’s naturalistic explanation for the possibility of science and his view about the limitations of classical scientific method. Changing the exegetical locus classicus from the logical form of abduction to insight and economy of research, I argue for the Unified Interpretation according to which abduction includes both instinctive hypotheses-generation and rule-governed hypotheses-ranking. I show that the Unified Interpretation is immune to the objections raised successfully against the Generative and the Pursuitworthiness interpretations

Abduction in Well-Founded Semantics and Generalized Stable Models

Abductive logic programming offers a formalism to declaratively express and solve problems in areas such as diagnosis, planning, belief revision and hypothetical reasoning. Tabled logic programming offers a computational mechanism that provides a level of declarativity superior to that of Prolog, and which has supported successful applications in fields such as parsing, program analysis, and model checking. In this paper we show how to use tabled logic programming to evaluate queries to abductive frameworks with integrity constraints when these frameworks contain both default and explicit negation. The result is the ability to compute abduction over well-founded semantics with explicit negation and answer sets. Our approach consists of a transformation and an evaluation method. The transformation adjoins to each objective literal $O$ in a program, an objective literal $not(O)$ along with rules that ensure that $not(O)$ will be true if and only if $O$ is false. We call the resulting program a {\em dual} program. The evaluation method, \wfsmeth, then operates on the dual program. \wfsmeth{} is sound and complete for evaluating queries to abductive frameworks whose entailment method is based on either the well-founded semantics with explicit negation, or on answer sets. Further, \wfsmeth{} is asymptotically as efficient as any known method for either class of problems. In addition, when abduction is not desired, \wfsmeth{} operating on a dual program provides a novel tabling method for evaluating queries to ground extended programs whose complexity and termination properties are similar to those of the best tabling methods for the well-founded semantics. A publicly available meta-interpreter has been developed for \wfsmeth{} using the XSB system.Comment: 48 pages; To appear in Theory and Practice in Logic Programmin

CHR as grammar formalism. A first report

Grammars written as Constraint Handling Rules (CHR) can be executed as efficient and robust bottom-up parsers that provide a straightforward, non-backtracking treatment of ambiguity. Abduction with integrity constraints as well as other dynamic hypothesis generation techniques fit naturally into such grammars and are exemplified for anaphora resolution, coordination and text interpretation.Comment: 12 pages. Presented at ERCIM Workshop on Constraints, Prague, Czech Republic, June 18-20, 200

A motion-decomposition approach to address gimbal lock in the 3-cylinder open chain mechanism description of a joint coordinate system at the glenohumeral joint

In this study, the standard-sequence properties of a joint coordinate system were implemented for the glenohumeral joint by the use of a set of instantaneous geometrical planes. These are: a plane that is bound by the humeral long axis and an orthogonal axis that is the cross product of the scapular anterior axis and this long axis, and a plane that is bounded by the long axis of the humerus and the cross product of the scapular lateral axis and this long axis. The relevant axes are updated after every decomposition of a motion component of a humeral position. Flexion, abduction and rotation are then implemented upon three of these axes and are applied in a step-wise uncoupling of an acquired humeral motion to extract the joint coordinate system angles. This technique was numerically applied to physiological kinematics data from the literature to convert them to the joint coordinate system and to visually reconstruct the motion on a set of glenohumeral bones for validation