Caught On Tape: Predicting Institutional Ownership With Order Flow

Many questions about institutional trading behavior can only be answered if one can track institutional equity ownership continuously, yet institutional ownership data are only available on quarterly reporting dates. We infer institutional trading behavior from the “tape”, the Transactions and Quotes database of the New York Stock Exchange, by regressing quarterly changes in reported institutional ownership on quarterly buy and sell volume in different trade size categories. We find that institutions in aggregate demand liquidity, in that total buy (sell) volume predicts increasing (decreasing) institutional ownership. Institutions also tend to trade in large or very small sizes, in that buy (sell) volume at these sizes predicts increasing (decreasing) institutional ownership, while the pattern reverses at intermediate trade sizes that are favored by individuals. Our regression method predicts institutional ownership significantly better than the simple cutoff rules used in previous research.institutions, individuals, trading behavior, execution

Caught on Tape: Predicting Institutional Ownership With Order Flow

Many questions about institutional trading can only be answered if one can track institutional equity ownership continuously. However, these data are only available on quarterly reporting dates. We infer institutional trading behavior from the "tape," the Transactions and Quotes database of the New York Stock Exchange, by regress- ing quarterly changes in reported institutional ownership on quarterly buy and sell volume in different trade size categories. Our regression method predicts institutional ownership signifcantly better than the simple cutoff rules used in previous research. We also find that total buy (sell) volume predicts increasing (decreasing) institutional ownership, consistent with institutions demanding liquidity in aggregate. Furthermore, institutions tend to trade in large or very small sizes: buy (sell) volume at these sizes predicts increasing (decreasing) institutional ownership, while the pattern reverses at intermediate trade sizes that appear favored by individuals. We then explore changes in institutional trading strategies. Institutions appear to prefer medium size trades on high volume days and large size trades on high volatility days.

Innovation and Institutional Ownership

We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes and disaggregating by type of owner we find that the effect of institutions on innovation does not appear to be due to endogenous selection.Career Concerns, Innovation, Institutional Ownership, Productivity and R&D

PENGARUH UKURAN PERUSAHAAN, LEVERAGE, DAN KEPEMILIKAN INSTITUSIONAL TERHADAP TAX AVOIDANCE DENGAN PROFITABILITAS SEBAGAI VARIABEL MODERASI (STUDI PADA PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA (BEI))

This study aims to examine the effect of firm size, leverage, and institutional ownership on tax avoidance in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) for the 2019-2021 period. The independent variables used are firm size, leverage, and institutional ownership. Meanwhile, the dependent variable used is tax avoidance, measured using the CETR measure and the connecting variable used is profitability. This study uses secondary data in the form of annual reports. Determining the research sample using the purposive sampling method and getting 90 samples based on certain criteria. The results of this study indicate that firm size has no effect on tax avoidance. Meanwhile, leverage and institutional ownership influence tax avoidance. Profitability is able to moderate firm size on tax avoidance, while profitability is not able to moderate leverage and institutional ownership on tax avoidance

CEO Duality and Accounting-Based Performance in Egyptian Listed Companies: A Re-examination of Agency Theory Predictions

According to agency theory, the interests of shareholders are safeguarded only where different people occupying the two positions of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairman of the board of directors. This implies that CEO duality (i.e. the CEO serves also as the board chairman) is negatively associated with corporate performance. However, empirical evidence is mixed with respect to this prediction of agency theory. This paper aims at re-examining the predictions of agency theory with regard to the negative association between CEO duality and corporate performance using the financial statements for the year 2006 of most actively traded companies in the Egyptian stock market. It examines the role of other corporate governance mechanisms (board size, top managerial ownership and institutional ownership) as moderating variables in the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance. Moderated Regression Analysis is used to analyse the empirical data. Our findings indicated that the hypothesized relationship between CEO duality, the moderating variables (top management ownership, board size and institutional ownership) and corporate performance has changed. We found that board size was the only moderating variable (a homologizer variable), top management ownership was a suppressor variable, and institutional ownership was simply another independent variable. For companies characterized by large boards and low top management ownership, corporate performance is negatively affected by CEO duality and positively impacted by institutional ownership

ANALISIS PENGARUH PENERAPAN GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN TERHADAP KINERJA PERUSAHAAN

Corporate Governance is the process and structure used to direct and manage the business affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interest ofother stakeholders. This research aims to examine the effect ofgood corporate governance and ownership structure on corporate performance ofCorporate Governance Perception Index participator. This research uses CGPI index, managerial ownership and institutional ownership as independent variables and ROE and Tobin's Q as dependent variables . The object ofthis research is CGPI Rating Reports year 2006 and 2007 and annual report year 2006 and 2007. This research employs a multiple regression to test the hypothesis. The results of this study are: (1) there is no significant relationship between corporate governance index and corporateperformance. (2) there is no significant relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance. (3) there is significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and return on equity (ROE), but no significant relationship between institutional ownership and Tobin's Q Keywords: Good Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, Corporate Performanc

Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Performance: Empirical Evidence from Indonesian Companies

Prior research on the relationships of institutional ownership and corporate social responsibility has focused on North American (U.S. and Canada) and European companies. With the passage of Indonesian Law No. 40 in 2007, Indonesian companies are now obligated to conduct CSP. As these companies objected to the passage of this law, awareness of how CSP may benefit Indonesian companies in terms of its positive impact on institutional investors needs to be in- vestigated. Thus, this paper examines the relationships of IO and CSP for Indonesian compa- nies. Unfortunately, contrary to the results for North American and European companies, we found no relationships between institutional ownership and corporate social responsibility for Indonesian companies. This finding suggests that most institutional investors do not include CSP as part of their investment decisions. Keywords: Institutional ownership, Corporate social performance (CSP), corporate social responsibility (CSR), Indonesian companie

Analisis Faktor-Faktor Yang Mempengaruhi Kebijakan Dividen

This research aims to analyze factors which influence dividend policy. Variables include company life cycle, investment opportunity set, earnings, size, managerial ownership and institutional ownership. This research is used quantitative approach by using multiple linear regression. For samples is the manufacturing company that allocated dividend for period 2004-2008 which listed on PT Bursa Efek Indonesia. The number of observation are equal to 125. Research finding indicates that size, earnings and managerial ownership doesn't affect significantly to dividend policy. Company life cycle gives significantly negative affect to dividend policy, investment opportunity set and institutional ownership significantly positive affect to dividend policy

Institutional-Grade Properties: Performance and Ownership

Quality commercial properties differ in operating performance not only on physical characteristics but in type of ownership, management, and control. For 1996?001 data on Atlanta apartments, a primary market for multiple types of investors, there is varying operating performance by ownership. Larger-scale owners and local property managers earn higher effective rents.

A Tale of Two Provinces: The Institutional Environment and Foreign Ownership in China

In this paper, we use a unique dataset covering joint ventures in two provinces of China, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, to test the effect of the institutional environment for domestic private firms on ownership structures of FDI projects. Unlike many studies on this subject, we approach the issue from the perspective of local firms seeking FDI rather than from the perspective of foreign firms seeking to invest in China. Applying the prevailing bargaining framework in studies on ownership structures of FDI projects, we find that a more liberal institutional environment for domestic private firms is associated with less foreign ownership of the joint ventures operating there. Several mechanisms can contribute to this outcome. One is that a more liberal institutional environment may enhance the bargaining power of those domestic firms negotiating with foreign firms to form alliances (the capability effect). The other mechanism is that a more liberal institutional environment may reduce some of the auxiliary benefits associated with FDI—such as greater property rights granted to foreign investors—and thereby attenuate incentive to form alliances with foreign firms (the incentive effect).http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40053/3/wp667.pd