The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law: An Economic Approach

This paper presents an economic analysis of the relationship between Intellectual Property (IP) Law and Competition Law. Contrary to some of the recent debate, our analysis emphasises the separation of IP Law and Competition Law: IP law should concern itself with assigning and defending intellectual property rights, while Competition Law should concern itself with the use of those rights. This separation extends to the enforcement of the law as well, where we argue that once property rights have been assigned, no further distinction based on intellectual or non-intellectual property should be made. While the IP/Competition Law interface has some specificity due to the types of behaviours that tend to arise more frequently where IP is concerned, we argue for a set of principles for Competition Policy that include restraint, a commitment not to revisit ex post the rights granted by IP law, and a commitment to make large changes in property right regimes only when very large changes in ex post regulation occur.

Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?

Our objective in this paper is to review what economists have said about incentive schemes to promote R&D, including intellectual property. While we focus on environments in which other forms of protection are not available, we note that other protections can obviate the need for any formal reward system. In Section II, we compare intellectual property to alternative incentive schemes. In Section III we review optimal design issues for intellectual property, especially the question of patent breadth, and in Section IV we turn to the special problems that arise when innovation is cumulative. In Section V, we summarize the arguments for and against intellectual property. We comment on whether the design recommendations of economists can actually be implemented, and argue that IP regimes should be designed so that the subject matter of each one has relatively homogeneous needs for protection.

Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) and Multidrug Resistance (MDR): Overview of Current Approaches, Consortia and Intellectual Property Issues

The supply of new diagnostics and treatments is insufficient to keep up with the increase in antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and multidrug resistance (MDR) as older medicines are used more widely and microbes develop resistance to them. At the same time, significant quantities of antibiotics are used on patients and animals that do not need them, while others who do need them lack access. Effective responses to AMR/MDR require effort by both the public and private sectors to develop and disseminate new diagnostics, vaccines and treatments on a global scale, as well as to adapt them to local needs. This calls for good governance to identify priorities, raise awareness and ensure effective stewardship at global, regional and national levels to minimize the development of resistance. Failure to act appropriately in one country will adversely impact all countries as resistance travels fast. Based on a review of recent literature, this WIPO Global Challenges Report includes a broad overview of current approaches and consortia designed to meet the challenge of research and development (R&D) investment for new treatments. It also examines patent applications by both the public and the private sectors as an indicator of innovative activity. This report finds that there is a need to address the unique market challenges and specific uncertainties associated with the development of new diagnostics and treatments, where current approaches are not optimal. An effective global framework that achieves the necessary political support while ensuring effective local implementation is crucial. There is an opportunity to complement this work by formulating mechanisms that drive innovation for results to incentivize success, while feeding expertise and experience into stewardship and access efforts. Intellectual property (IP) could be used in a constructive manner as one element in any reward or prize system for AMR/MDR R&D – both in terms of providing an incentive and governance

Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights

This paper compares reward systems to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender incentives to innovate without creating the monopoly power of intellectual property rights, but a principal difficulty with rewards is the information required for their determination. We conclude in our model that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward systems, and that an optional reward system under which innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights is superior to intellectual property rights.