Multi Attacker Collision Analysis In MANETs Using Conditional likilihood

Mobile ad hoc networks will aim to provide services to the wireless network without depending on any fixed infrastructure There are basically two approaches to motivate players: 1) by denying service to misbehaving players by means of a reputation mechanism or 2) by remunerating honest players, using for example a micropayment scheme. In these works, malicious players are modelled as never cooperative, without any further sophistication, since their main focus was discouraging selfish players. There is no degree of selfishness that can approximate the behaviour of malicious players. This work will focus on multi-attacker collusion in the regular/malicious player game. The Proposed System also model the regular/malicious player game as a multistage dynamic Bayesian signalling game to find the optimal strategy of regular and malicious players. Apart from that utility function, degree of selfishness of a player and degree of uncertainty are also considered

Information concealing games

Abstract — Consider the situation in which a decision maker (Actor) has to decide which of several available resources to use in the presence of an adversary (called Controller) that can prevent the Actor of receiving information on the state of some of the resources. The Controller has a limitation on the amount of information it can conceal. What information should it deny from the the Actor? How should the Actor choose a resource as a function of the statistics of the states of the resources and of the non-concealed information on the state of the others. We formulate this problem as a non-zero sum game and transform it into an equivalent zero-sum game. We then propose ways to compute the most harmful behavior of the Controller as well as the best choice of a resource for the Actor, and analyse their complexity. We identify cases in which the exact solution is computationally intractable, and provide approximate solutions with polynomial complexity. We present many motivating examples and explore numerically the performance of the approximations. I

Information concealing games

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