E-COMMERCE IN AGRICULTURE: DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY, AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS

Marketing,

Fair task allocation in transportation

Task allocation problems have traditionally focused on cost optimization. However, more and more attention is being given to cases in which cost should not always be the sole or major consideration. In this paper we study a fair task allocation problem in transportation where an optimal allocation not only has low cost but more importantly, it distributes tasks as even as possible among heterogeneous participants who have different capacities and costs to execute tasks. To tackle this fair minimum cost allocation problem we analyze and solve it in two parts using two novel polynomial-time algorithms. We show that despite the new fairness criterion, the proposed algorithms can solve the fair minimum cost allocation problem optimally in polynomial time. In addition, we conduct an extensive set of experiments to investigate the trade-off between cost minimization and fairness. Our experimental results demonstrate the benefit of factoring fairness into task allocation. Among the majority of test instances, fairness comes with a very small price in terms of cost

Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts

The first part of the paper reports the results from a sequence of laboratory experiments comparing the bidding behavior for multiple contracts in three different sealed bid auction mechanisms; first-price simultaneous, first-price sequential and first-price combinatorial bidding. The design of the experiment is based on experiences from a public procurement auction of road markings in Sweden. Bidders are asymmetric in their cost functions; some exhibit decreasing average costs of winning more than one contract, whereas other bidders have increasing average cost functions. The combinatorial bidding mechanism is demonstrated to be most efficient. The second part of the paper describes how the lab experiment was followed up by a field test of a combinatorial procurement auction of road markings.Multiple units, non-constant costs, asymmetric redemption values, alternative procurement mechanisms

Airport slot allocation

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Competition Between Auctions

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.auctions, bidding, competition, auction formats, auction houses

Improved opportunity cost algorithm for carrier selection in combinatorial auctions

Transportation costs constitute up to thirty percent of the total costs involved in a supply chain. Outsourcing the transportation service requirements to third party logistics providers have been widely adopted, as they are economically more rational than owning and operating a service. Transportation service procurement has been traditionally done through an auctioning process where the auctioneer (shipper) auctions lanes (distinct delivery routes) to bidders (carriers). Individual lanes were being auctioned separately disallowing the carriers to express complements and substitutes. Using combinatorial auctions mechanism to auction all available lanes together would allow the carriers to take advantage of the lane bundles, their existing service schedule, probability of securing other lanes and available capacity to offer services at lower rates and be more competitive. The winners of the auction are the set of non-overlapping bids that minimize the cost for the shippers. The winner determination problem to be solved in determining the optimal allocation of the services in such kind of combinatorial auctions is a NP-hard problem. Many heuristics like approximate linear programming, stochastic local search have proposed to find an approximate solution to the problem in a reasonable amount of time. Akcoglu et al [22] developed the opportunity cost algorithm using the “local ratio technique” to compute a greedy solution to the problem. A recalculation modification to the opportunity cost algorithm has been formulated where opportunity costs are recalculated every time for the set of remaining bids after eliminating the bid chosen to be a part of the winning solution and its conflicts have eliminated. Another method that formulates the winning solution based on the maximum total revenue values calculated for each bid using the opportunity cost algorithm has also been researched

The impact of bidding aggregation levels on truckload rates

Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2010.Cataloged from student submitted PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-80).The objective of this thesis was to determine if line-haul rates are impacted by bid type, and if aggregation of bidding lanes can reduce costs for both shippers and carriers. Using regression analysis, we developed a model to isolate and test the cost effects that influence line-haul rate for long-haul shipments. We have determined that aggregation of low-volume lanes from point-to-point lanes to aggregated lanes can provide costs savings when lanes with origins and destinations in close proximity to each other can be bundled. In addition, bidding out region-to-region lanes can supplement point-to-point lanes by reducing the need to turn to the spot market. The model shows that bundling lanes can provide significant cost savings to a shipper because contract lanes of any type are on average less costly than spot moves. This thesis provides guidelines and suggestions for aggregation when creating bids during the first stage of the truckload procurement process.by Julia M. Collins and R. Ryan Quinlan.M.Eng.in Logistic