Problems for Infinitism

Infinitism in epistemic justification is the thesis that the structure of justification consists in infinite, non-repeating series. Although superficially an implausible position, it is capable of presenting strong arguments in its favour, and has been growing in popularity. After briefly introducing the concept and the motivations for it, I will present a common objection (the finite minds problem) as well as a powerful reply which couches Infinitism in dispositional terms. I will then attempt to undermine this counter-objection by drawing parallels between it and the problems raised against semantic dispositionalism by Kripke’s exegesis of Wittgenstein’s private language argument

Infinitism, finitude and normativity

Abstract: I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original finite-mind objection, can be redeployed to address the two new objections. Peter Klein presents the most carefully articulated version of epistemological infinitism on offer. Klein’s infinitist theory of epistemic justification has steadily evolved over the past decade. The basic idea is this. For a proposition Q to be justified for you is for there to be available to you an appropriately structured, infinite series of reasons supporting Q. For you to justifiedly believe Q is for you to have appropriately produced enough of the reasons from that series in order to satisfy the contextually determined standards of justification. We can state the basic idea more precisely. Where every distinct This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. Please cite the published version if possible. 1 Infinitism, finitude and normativity | 2 subscripted ‘R ’ names a different reason, and good reasons are nonoverridden: Infinitist propositional justification (IPJ): The proposition Q is propositionally justified for you just in case there is available to you at least one infinite non-repeating series of propositions (or reasons) such that R1 is a good reason to believe Q, R2 is a good reason to believe R1, R3 is a good reason to believe R2,..., Rm + 1 is a good reason to believe Rm, for any arbitraril

Infinite Descent

Once one accepts that certain things metaphysically depend upon, or are metaphysically explained by, other things, it is natural to begin to wonder whether these chains of dependence or explanation must come to an end. This essay surveys the work that has been done on this issue—the issue of grounding and infinite descent. I frame the discussion around two questions: (1) What is infinite descent of ground? and (2) Is infinite descent of ground possible? In addressing the second question, I will consider a number of arguments that have been made for and against the possibility of infinite descent of ground. When relevant, I connect the discussion to two important views about the way reality can be structured by grounding: metaphysical foundationalism and metaphysical infinitism

Knowledge-First Theories of Justification

Knowledge-first theories of justification give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this entry is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and in what follows I offer an opinionated survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the last two decades since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits. I first trace several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. I then go on to examine existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways of giving knowledge priority in the theory of justification than I cover here, but the resulting survey will be instructive as it highlights potential shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory

How to justify propositions when facing skeptical challenges

Los desafíos escépticos cuestionan la justificación de las proposiciones que aceptamos. Pero es posible justificar en términos probabilísticos cada una de las proposiciones empíricas aceptadas. Para eso, su probabilidad condicional al resto de las proposiciones aceptadas, deberá ser mayor que su probabilidad absoluta. Esta justificación es circular, pero virtuosa. Sin embargo, carece de eficacia dialéctica frente al escéptico.Skeptical challenges question that the propositions one accepts are justified. But it is possible to justify each one of them in probabilistic terms. In order to do that, their probability, conditional to the rest of the accepted propositions, must be higher than their absolute probability. This justification is circular, but virtuous. Nevertheless, it has no dialectical efficiency against the skeptic