Multi-Utilitarian Bargaining Solutions.

This paper introduces and analyzes the class of multi-utilitarian solutions for cooperative bargaining problems. We show that generalized Gini solutions and inequality averse Choquet bargaining solutions are particular cases of this new multi-valued solution concept and provide a complete characterization of inequality averse multi-utilitarian solutions in which an invariance property consisting of a weakening of both the linear invariance axiom in Blackorby et al. (1994) and the restricted invariance axiom in Ok and Zhou (2000). Moreover, by relaxing the assumptions involved in the characterization, the class is extended to include equality averse multi-utilitarian solutions which are also studied in the paper.Axiomatic bargaining theory, multi-valued bargaining solutions, generalized Gini solutions, inequality adverse Choquet solutions.

EVEN ALLOCATIONS FOR GENERALISED RATIONING PROBLEMS

We study an extension of the standard rationing problem, consisting of the allocation of utility losses. We assume neither linearly transferable utilities nor risk averse agents. As a consequence, the utility possibility sets need not be convex or smooth. This problem is referred to as the generalised rationing problem. We introduce the notion of even allocations as a solution concept that extends the random arrival rule to this general scenario. Moreover, we show that, when the feasible set is convex, this solution can be characterised by a suitable reformulation of the axioms that define the Nash bargaining solution.Rationing Problems, Non-Transferable Utilities, Nash Bargaining Solution, Clarke Cones.

Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games: John Nash and beyond

This essay surveys the literature on the axiomatic model of bargaining formulated by Nash ("The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 28, 1950, 155-162).Nash's bargaining model, Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, Egalitarian solution

Is there any scope for corporatism in stabilization policies?

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. We show that if negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are nevertheless commonly observed in this context, we discuss possible explanations that reconcile the theory with actual observations. The policy implications of these explanations are also discussed.Social pacts; axiomatic bargaining; unions; issue linkage

Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion

This study presents an investor/entrepreneur model in which the entrepreneur has opportunities to manipulate the workings of the project via hidden arrangements. We provide the optimal contracts in the presence and absence of such hidden arrangements. The contracts specify the shareholding arrangement between investor and entrepreneur. Moreover, we render an exact condition necessary for the credit market to form

Essays on Uncertainty in Public Economics and Cooperative Bargaining

This dissertation consists of two parts. The theme connecting the two parts is the role of uncertainty. The first part focuses on the role of uncertainty in cooperative bargaining and public decision making. I provide an axiomatic characterization of the normalized utilitarian solution to bargaining problems involving uncertainty. In addition to three basic axioms that are common in the bargaining literature, I propose the axiom of weak linearity to characterize the solution. In the second part I study uncertainty in non-cooperative games by designing a principal agent model of public bailouts. The first essay in this part sets up the model and shows that the moral hazard problem, namely the Samaritan\u27s dilemma, exists without an altruistic principal. The second essay in this part builds upon the previous essay and focuses on the informational elements in a bailout game. Mainly, I show the existence of a separating equilibrium, where public bailouts serve as a mechanism to reveal essential information to outsiders and in which the good-type agents can benefit from rejecting a bailout offer

Wage moderating effects of corporatism: Decentralized versus centralized wage setting in a union, firm, government context

Trade Unions;Corporatism;labour economics

Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Participation and Search Unemployment

This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in two exogenous dimensions: their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. The government only observes wage levels. Under a Maximin objective, if the elasticity of participation decreases along the distribution of skills, at the optimum, the average tax rate is increasing, marginal tax rates are positive everywhere, while wages, unemployment rates and participation rates are distorted downwards compared to their laissez-faire values. A simulation exercise confirms some of these properties under a general utilitarian objective. Taking account of the wage-cum-labor demand margin deeply changes the equity-efficiency trade-off.non-linear taxation, redistribution, adverse selection, random participation, unemployment, labor market frictions

Optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment

This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in two exogenous dimensions : Their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. The government only observed wage levels. Under a Maximin objective, if the elasticity of participation decreases along the distribution of skills, at the optimum, the average tax rate is increasing, marginal tax rates are positive everywhere, while wages, unemployment rates and participation rates are distorted downwards compared to their laissez-farie values. A simulation exercise confirms some of these properties under a general utilitarian objective. Taking account of the wage-cum-labor demand margin deeply changes the equity-efficiency trade-off.Non-linear taxation, Redistribution, Adverse selection, Random participation, Unemployment, Labor market frictions

Risky social choice with approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being

We develop a model of social choice over lotteries, where people's psychological characteristics are mutable, their preferences may be incomplete, and approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being are possible. Formally, we suppose individual preferences are described by a von~Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preference order on a space of lotteries over psychophysical states; the social planner must construct a vNM preference order on lotteries over social states. First we consider a model when the individual vNM preference order is incomplete (so not all interpersonal comparisons are possible). Then we consider a model where the individual vNM preference order is complete, but unknown to the planner, and thus modeled by a random variable. In both cases, we obtain characterizations of a utilitarian social welfare function.interpersonal comparisons; social welfare; social choice; utility; utilitarian; von Neumann-Morgenstern; risk