Maximum weight cycle packing in directed graphs, with application to kidney exchange programs

Centralized matching programs have been established in several countries to organize kidney exchanges between incompatible patient-donor pairs. At the heart of these programs are algorithms to solve kidney exchange problems, which can be modelled as cycle packing problems in a directed graph, involving cycles of length 2, 3, or even longer. Usually, the goal is to maximize the number of transplants, but sometimes the total benefit is maximized by considering the differences between suitable kidneys. These problems correspond to computing cycle packings of maximum size or maximum weight in directed graphs. Here we prove the APX-completeness of the problem of finding a maximum size exchange involving only 2-cycles and 3-cycles. We also present an approximation algorithm and an exact algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum weight exchange involving cycles of bounded length. The exact algorithm has been used to provide optimal solutions to real kidney exchange problems arising from the National Matching Scheme for Paired Donation run by NHS Blood and Transplant, and we describe practical experience based on this collaboration

"Almost stable" matchings in the Roommates problem

An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem (SR) need not admit a stable matching. This motivates the problem of finding a matching that is “as stable as possible”, i.e. admits the fewest number of blocking pairs. In this paper we prove that, given an SR instance with n agents, in which all preference lists are complete, the problem of finding a matching with the fewest number of blocking pairs is NP-hard and not approximable within n^{\frac{1}{2}-\varepsilon}, for any \varepsilon>0, unless P=NP. If the preference lists contain ties, we improve this result to n^{1-\varepsilon}. Also, we show that, given an integer K and an SR instance I in which all preference lists are complete, the problem of deciding whether I admits a matching with exactly K blocking pairs is NP-complete. By contrast, if K is constant, we give a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a matching with at most (or exactly) K blocking pairs, or reports that no such matching exists. Finally, we give upper and lower bounds for the minimum number of blocking pairs over all matchings in terms of some properties of a stable partition, given an SR instance I

Randomized Parameterized Algorithms for the Kidney Exchange Problem

In order to increase the potential kidney transplants between patients and their incompatible donors, kidney exchange programs have been created in many countries. In the programs, designing algorithms for the kidney exchange problem plays a critical role. The graph theory model of the kidney exchange problem is to find a maximum weight packing of vertex-disjoint cycles and chains for a given weighted digraph. In general, the length of cycles is not more than a given constant L (typically 2 L 5), and the objective function corresponds to maximizing the number of possible kidney transplants. In this paper, we study the parameterized complexity and randomized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem without chains from theory. We construct two different parameterized models of the kidney exchange problem for two cases L = 3 and L 3, and propose two randomized parameterized algorithms based on the random partitioning technique and the randomized algebraic technique, respectively

Size versus stability in the marriage problem

Given an instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete preference lists (smi), a maximum cardinality matching can be larger than a stable matching. In many large-scale applications of smi, we seek to match as many agents as possible. This motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality matching in I that admits the smallest number of blocking pairs (so is “as stable as possible”). We show that this problem is NP-hard and not approximable within n1−ε, for any ε>0, unless P=NP, where n is the number of men in I. Further, even if all preference lists are of length at most 3, we show that the problem remains NP-hard and not approximable within δ, for some δ>1. By contrast, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for the case where the preference lists of one sex are of length at most 2. We also extend these results to the cases where (i) preference lists may include ties, and (ii) we seek to minimize the number of agents involved in a blocking pair

Pareto optimality in the kidney exchange problem

summary:To overcome the shortage of cadaveric kidneys available for transplantation, several countries organize systematic kidney exchange programs. The kidney exchange problem can be modelled as a cooperative game between incompatible patient-donor pairs whose solutions are permutations of players representing cyclic donations. We show that the problems to decide whether a given permutation is not (weakly) Pareto optimal are NP-complete

Socially stable matchings in the hospitals / residents problem

In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking pairs, i.e., no pair of agents that prefer each other to their assigned matches. Such a situation is undesirable as it could lead to a deviation in which the blocking pair form a private arrangement outside the matching. This however assumes that the blocking pair have social ties or communication channels to facilitate the deviation. Relaxing the stability definition to take account of the potential lack of social ties between agents can yield larger stable matchings. In this paper, we define the Hospitals/Residents problem under Social Stability (HRSS) which takes into account social ties between agents by introducing a social network graph to the HR problem. Edges in the social network graph correspond to resident-hospital pairs in the HR instance that know one another. Pairs that do not have corresponding edges in the social network graph can belong to a matching M but they can never block M. Relative to a relaxed stability definition for HRSS, called social stability, we show that socially stable matchings can have different sizes and the problem of finding a maximum socially stable matching is NP-hard, though approximable within 3/2. Furthermore we give polynomial time algorithms for three special cases of the problem