Inapproximability of combinatorial public projects

We study the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP) in which n agents are assigned a subset of m resources of size k so as to maximize the social welfare. Combinatorial public projects are an abstraction of many resource-assignment problems (Internet-related network design, elections, etc.). It is known that if all agents have submodular valuations then a constant approximation is achievable in polynomial time. However, submodularity is a strong assumption that does not always hold in practice. We show that (unlike similar problems such as combinatorial auctions) even slight relaxations of the submodularity assumption result in non-constant lower bounds for approximation

Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension

Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) studies the delicate interplay between computational efficiency, truthfulness, and optimality. We focus on AMD's paradigmatic problem: combinatorial auctions. We present a new generalization of the VC dimension to multivalued collections of functions, which encompasses the classical VC dimension, Natarajan dimension, and Steele dimension. We present a corresponding generalization of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma and harness this VC machinery to establish inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms. Our results essentially unify all inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions to date and establish new separation gaps between truthful and non-truthful algorithms

Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard

State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with $m$ items achieve approximation guarantees of $O((\log \log m)^3)$ [Assadi and Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulness, however, requires bidders to compute an NP-hard demand-query. Some computational complexity of this form is unavoidable, as it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to guarantee even an $m^{1/2-\varepsilon}$-approximation for any $\varepsilon > 0$ [Dobzinski and Vondr\'ak, 2016]. Together, these establish a stark distinction between computationally-efficient and communication-efficient truthful mechanisms. We show that this distinction disappears with a mild relaxation of truthfulness, which we term implementation in advised strategies, and that has been previously studied in relation to "Implementation in Undominated Strategies" [Babaioff et al, 2009]. Specifically, advice maps a tentative strategy either to that same strategy itself, or one that dominates it. We say that a player follows advice as long as they never play actions which are dominated by advice. A poly-time mechanism guarantees an $\alpha$-approximation in implementation in advised strategies if there exists poly-time advice for each player such that an $\alpha$-approximation is achieved whenever all players follow advice. Using an appropriate bicriterion notion of approximate demand queries (which can be computed in poly-time), we establish that (a slight modification of) the [Assadi and Singla, 2019] mechanism achieves the same $O((\log \log m)^3)$-approximation in implementation in advised strategies

Dagstuhl Reports : Volume 1, Issue 2, February 2011

Online Privacy: Towards Informational Self-Determination on the Internet (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 11061) : Simone Fischer-Hübner, Chris Hoofnagle, Kai Rannenberg, Michael Waidner, Ioannis Krontiris and Michael Marhöfer Self-Repairing Programs (Dagstuhl Seminar 11062) : Mauro Pezzé, Martin C. Rinard, Westley Weimer and Andreas Zeller Theory and Applications of Graph Searching Problems (Dagstuhl Seminar 11071) : Fedor V. Fomin, Pierre Fraigniaud, Stephan Kreutzer and Dimitrios M. Thilikos Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Sequence Processing (Dagstuhl Seminar 11081) : Maxime Crochemore, Lila Kari, Mehryar Mohri and Dirk Nowotka Packing and Scheduling Algorithms for Information and Communication Services (Dagstuhl Seminar 11091) Klaus Jansen, Claire Mathieu, Hadas Shachnai and Neal E. Youn

On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions

We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some valuation functions $v_1(\cdot)$ and $v_2(\cdot)$ over subsets of $m$ items, and their goal is to partition the items into $S, \bar{S}$ in a way that maximizes the welfare, $v_1(S) + v_2(\bar{S})$. We study both the allocation problem, which asks for a welfare-maximizing partition and the decision problem, which asks whether or not there exists a partition guaranteeing certain welfare, for binary XOS valuations. For interactive protocols with $poly(m)$ communication, a tight 3/4-approximation is known for both [Fei06,DS06]. For interactive protocols, the allocation problem is provably harder than the decision problem: any solution to the allocation problem implies a solution to the decision problem with one additional round and $\log m$ additional bits of communication via a trivial reduction. Surprisingly, the allocation problem is provably easier for simultaneous protocols. Specifically, we show: 1) There exists a simultaneous, randomized protocol with polynomial communication that selects a partition whose expected welfare is at least $3/4$ of the optimum. This matches the guarantee of the best interactive, randomized protocol with polynomial communication. 2) For all $\varepsilon > 0$, any simultaneous, randomized protocol that decides whether the welfare of the optimal partition is $\geq 1$ or $\leq 3/4 - 1/108+\varepsilon$ correctly with probability $> 1/2 + 1/ poly(m)$ requires exponential communication. This provides a separation between the attainable approximation guarantees via interactive ($3/4$) versus simultaneous ($\leq 3/4-1/108$) protocols with polynomial communication. In other words, this trivial reduction from decision to allocation problems provably requires the extra round of communication