Selling Privacy at Auction

We initiate the study of markets for private data, though the lens of differential privacy. Although the purchase and sale of private data has already begun on a large scale, a theory of privacy as a commodity is missing. In this paper, we propose to build such a theory. Specifically, we consider a setting in which a data analyst wishes to buy information from a population from which he can estimate some statistic. The analyst wishes to obtain an accurate estimate cheaply. On the other hand, the owners of the private data experience some cost for their loss of privacy, and must be compensated for this loss. Agents are selfish, and wish to maximize their profit, so our goal is to design truthful mechanisms. Our main result is that such auctions can naturally be viewed and optimally solved as variants of multi-unit procurement auctions. Based on this result, we derive auctions for two natural settings which are optimal up to small constant factors: 1. In the setting in which the data analyst has a fixed accuracy goal, we show that an application of the classic Vickrey auction achieves the analyst's accuracy goal while minimizing his total payment. 2. In the setting in which the data analyst has a fixed budget, we give a mechanism which maximizes the accuracy of the resulting estimate while guaranteeing that the resulting sum payments do not exceed the analysts budget. In both cases, our comparison class is the set of envy-free mechanisms, which correspond to the natural class of fixed-price mechanisms in our setting. In both of these results, we ignore the privacy cost due to possible correlations between an individuals private data and his valuation for privacy itself. We then show that generically, no individually rational mechanism can compensate individuals for the privacy loss incurred due to their reported valuations for privacy.Comment: Extended Abstract appeared in the proceedings of EC 201

Privacy Games: Optimal User-Centric Data Obfuscation

In this paper, we design user-centric obfuscation mechanisms that impose the minimum utility loss for guaranteeing user's privacy. We optimize utility subject to a joint guarantee of differential privacy (indistinguishability) and distortion privacy (inference error). This double shield of protection limits the information leakage through obfuscation mechanism as well as the posterior inference. We show that the privacy achieved through joint differential-distortion mechanisms against optimal attacks is as large as the maximum privacy that can be achieved by either of these mechanisms separately. Their utility cost is also not larger than what either of the differential or distortion mechanisms imposes. We model the optimization problem as a leader-follower game between the designer of obfuscation mechanism and the potential adversary, and design adaptive mechanisms that anticipate and protect against optimal inference algorithms. Thus, the obfuscation mechanism is optimal against any inference algorithm

The Optimal Mechanism in Differential Privacy

We derive the optimal $\epsilon$-differentially private mechanism for single real-valued query function under a very general utility-maximization (or cost-minimization) framework. The class of noise probability distributions in the optimal mechanism has {\em staircase-shaped} probability density functions which are symmetric (around the origin), monotonically decreasing and geometrically decaying. The staircase mechanism can be viewed as a {\em geometric mixture of uniform probability distributions}, providing a simple algorithmic description for the mechanism. Furthermore, the staircase mechanism naturally generalizes to discrete query output settings as well as more abstract settings. We explicitly derive the optimal noise probability distributions with minimum expectation of noise amplitude and power. Comparing the optimal performances with those of the Laplacian mechanism, we show that in the high privacy regime ($\epsilon$ is small), Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal as $\epsilon \to 0$; in the low privacy regime ($\epsilon$ is large), the minimum expectation of noise amplitude and minimum noise power are $\Theta(\Delta e^{-\frac{\epsilon}{2}})$ and $\Theta(\Delta^2 e^{-\frac{2\epsilon}{3}})$ as $\epsilon \to +\infty$, while the expectation of noise amplitude and power using the Laplacian mechanism are $\frac{\Delta}{\epsilon}$ and $\frac{2\Delta^2}{\epsilon^2}$, where $\Delta$ is the sensitivity of the query function. We conclude that the gains are more pronounced in the low privacy regime.Comment: 40 pages, 5 figures. Part of this work was presented in DIMACS Workshop on Recent Work on Differential Privacy across Computer Science, October 24 - 26, 201