The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions

This paper shows how a popular system of federal revenue equalization grants can limit tax competition among subnational governments, correct fiscal externalities, and increase government spending. Remarkably, an equalization grant can implement efficient policy choices by regional governments, regardless of a wide variety of differences in regional tax capacity, tastes for public spending, and population. Thus, compared to other corrective devices, equalization achieves “robust” implementation. If aggregate tax bases are elastic, however, equalization leads to excessive taxation. Efficiency can be achieved by a modified formula that equalizes a fraction of local revenue deficiencies equal to the fraction of taxes that are shifted backward to factor suppliers.tax competition, intergovernmental grants

Connections and Performance in Bankers' Turnover: Better Wed over the Mixen than over the Moor

In this paper we study top executive turnover in Italian Banks over the period 1993-2001. We relate the probability of survival of top executives (Presidents, CEOs and General Managers) to bank performance and the manager’s local connections, controlling for (observable and unobservable) bank and manager characteristics by exploiting longitudinal information on bank-manager appointments. We measure the extent? of managers’ local connections by the distance between the province of the bank’s headquarters and the manager’s province of birth. We show that top managers tend to be local in the sense that the distribution of this distance is heavily skewed towards zero. On the basis of this evidence, we address two questions. First, we investigate whether connections affect the duration of the appointment at the bank. Second, we ask whether connections entrench managers at the expense of the bank’s performance. We find that connections generally increase the probabilities of managerssurviving at their banks, and that the positive effect of performance on tenure (as amply documented by the executive turnover literature) disappears once connections are taken into account. On the other hand, we provide evidence against the hypothesis that managerial connections contain information valuable for enhancing a bank’s performance. In particular, we find that highly connected boards cause the shorter survival of banks, and that those who benefit from connections are top managers themselves (mostly Presidents and General Managers). This suggests that connections may be collusion devices with which to maintain and share rents.connections, executive turnover, commercial and cooperative banks

H.P. MINSKY AND POLICIES TO COUNTERVAIL CRISES

The paper examines Minsky’s reflections on policies designed to act as a countervailing force against crises by fostering “responsible” Big Government, in which the role of the State is profoundly revised and directed towards full and stable non-inflationary employment, and also enabled to sustain consumption and economic growth over time. The aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of State-established structural direct job creation programs, enacted during severe recessions as a means of achieving full employment without disruptive consequences such as price instability, inefficiency of the public apparatus, unsustainable public and foreign debts. In-depth investigation of Minsky’s perspective highlights that well-focused full employment programs are important to counter inadequacy of effective demand; but if they are to be feasible and financially sustainable they must also improve the productivity of individuals and economic systems in the medium term.crises, policies, Big Government, ELR programs.

Mutual effects of land distribution and economic development : evidence from Asia, Africa, and Latin America

Land plays an important role in the economies of developing countries, and many theories connecting land inequality with different dimensions of economic development already exist. Even though efficacious land distribution allows societies to transition from poverty to a human capital-based developed economy, ongoing issues related to property rights, inequality, and the political economy of land distribution are unavoidable. The general objective of this paper is to explore the nexus between land distribution and economic development. The specific objectives are to: (i) identify which land distribution programs/activities contribute to economic development; (ii) investigate the role of stakeholders in land distribution programs that affect the growth of productivity; and (iii) assess the deficiencies of current land distribution policies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to explore how economic development theories contribute to decreasing income inequality. This paper provides an overview of land distribution history and the main economic development theories. It also highlights the links between land distribution and the main elements of economic development. Finally, it provides a comparative review of the most recent empirical works regarding the characteristics, limitations, and potential (mutual) effects of land distribution and economic development settings on developing countries worldwide

International Migration, Income Taxes and Transfers: A Welfare Analysis

An important issue in public policy debates is the effect of international migration on welfare in source and host countries. We address this issue by constructing a general equilibrium model of a two-class source or host country. Each country produces many traded and non-traded goods, uses income taxes and distributes the tax receipts equally to all individuals. The analysis examines the effects of permanent migration on class, and national welfare. We show, among other things, that marginal immigration hurts people already in the country regardless of whether or not non-traded goods exist. The presence of international capital mobility, however, may reverse the above result.international migration, taxes, transfers, welfare

Illiquidity and All Its Friends

The recent crisis was characterized by massive illiquidity. This paper reviews what we know and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: market freezes, fire sales, contagion, and ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. It first explains why liquidity cannot easily be apprehended through a single statistics, and asks whether liquidity should be regulated given that a capital adequacy requirement is already in place. The paper then analyzes market breakdowns due to either adverse selection or shortages of financial muscle, and explains why such breakdowns are endogenous to balance sheet choices and to information acquisition. It then looks at what economics can contribute to the debate on systemic risk and its containment. Finally, the paper takes a macroeconomic perspective, discusses shortages of aggregate liquidity and analyses how market value accounting and capital adequacy should react to asset prices. It concludes with a topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts and recapitalizations, and analyses optimal combinations thereof; it stresses the need for macroprudential policies.

Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment

This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions’ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and “potential stability” of a number of coalitions which are “potentially effective” in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even “potentially stable” even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.Climate Policy, Climate Coalition, Game Theory, Free Riding

Special Interests and Technological Change

We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise between the young and the old, because the former favor innovation while the latter prefer learning. We model the interaction between overlapping generations and policy makers as a dynamic common agency problem, where competing generations invest a certain amount of resources to lobby either for the maintenance of the current technology or the adoption of a new one. By focusing on truthful Markov perfect equilibria, we characterize the political equilibrium and show its dependence on the underlying demographic, technological and preference parameters.Technological change, Technology option, Pressure goups, Dynamic common agency

Communion : a development strategy for resettling existing territories

In many metropolitan areas, the traditional residential model produces an urban environment which constrains potentials for citizens to live in a manner which is fundamentally sustainable. Sustainability is increasingly measured in terms of the 3E criteria (UN) which is an impact-oriented assessment focusing on impacts to economy, ecology, and social equity. In this report I argue how each of these criteria may be more positively impacted through implementation of a “re-settlement strategy” that provides a guided means by which opportunities to establish more sustainably-conducive forms and functions are explored within existing residential areas. Specific interventions are described using the author’s home of the Near Southside residential area of Fort Worth, TX as the study area.Community and Regional Plannin

Stable Matchings for the Room-mates Problem

We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in S under the second matching prefer each other to their respective room-mates in the first matching, then no room-mate of an agent in S prefers the second matching to the first. This result is a strengthening of a result originally due to Knuth (1976). In a paper by Sasaki and Toda (1992) it is shown that if a marriage problem has more than one stable matchings, then given any one stable matching, it is possible to add agents and thereby obtain exactly one stable matching, whose restriction over the original set of agents, coincides with the given stable matching. We are able to extend this result here to the domain of room-mates problems. We also extend a result due to Roth and Sotomayor (1990) originally established for two-sided matching problems in the following manner: If in a room-mates problem, the number of agents increases, then given any stable matching for the old problem and any stable matching for the new one, there is at least one agent who is acceptable to this new agent who prefers the new matching to the old one and his room-mate under the new matching prefers the old matching to the new one. Sasaki and Toda (1992) shows that the solution correspondence which selects the set of all stable matchings, satisfies Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, Consistency and Converse Consistency on the domain of marriage problems. We show here that if a solution correspondence satisfying Consistency and Converse Consistency agrees with the solution correspondence comprising stable matchings for all room-mates problems involving four or fewer agents, then it must agree with the solution correspondence comprising stable matchings for all room-mates problems.Stable matchings, Room-mate problem