The procurement of professional planning services for roading projects under a competitive pricing regime : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Resource and Environmental Planning at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

The introduction of the Transit New Zealand Act changed the provisions for purchasing professional services for the development of roading projects. This change was consistent with the wider shift of the public sector towards greater transparency and accountability, and the separation of the roles of the funder, purchaser and provider of government services. The Act states that all professional services contracts for the development of roading projects are to be contracted out to the private sector by tender, with the selection of consultant determined by a Competitive Pricing Procedure (CPP). This study has been undertaken as a preliminary assessment of the factors that influence the implementation of competitive tendering for professional services and its impact on planning practice in New Zealand. The study is based on a literature review and original research. Surveys were undertaken with representatives from both the consultants and tendering authorities with experience in CPP, to obtain their views on different aspects of the tendering procedures adopted by Transfund New Zealand. Follow up interviews were also carried out with key representatives involved in the market to identify their responses to the survey results. It is concluded that there are significant differences in perception of the effectiveness of the implementation of the CPP between suppliers and purchasers, particularly with the planning services associated with roading projects. Consultants consider that they must put in the most competitive price in order to win a contract. This, they believe, compromises the quality of planning services by limiting the number of interested and affected parties that can be consulted, by favouring the simplest method of evaluation of environmental effects, and by discouraging the use of the best people for the job

Why do demand responsive transport systems fail?

In developed countries, Demand Responsive Transport (DRT) (loosely termed 'paratransit' in US parlance) emerged in the 1970s to serve the specialist niche market of people with mobility difficulties. DRT systems are starting become a mainstream public transport mode and this paper examines mainstream public transport DRT schemes from around the world that have failed, in order to identify the reasons for failure, and draw lessons to help prevent similar outcomes occurring. Research for the Intermode study developed detailed cases of 72 DRT projects. A number of key failed cases are reported together with a note of the lessons that each provides. This is followed by a generic analysis of failure factors based on a marketing approach. It is concluded that DRT projects are often not realistically costed or designed with a full understanding of the market they are to serve. There is a very dangerous temptation to offer too flexible a service and to include costly technological systems, when they may not be needed. An incremental approach, if possible, appears sensible. DRT also requires more marketing effort and skills than is traditional in conventional bus operations, but above all, it requires new skills in working in partnership. It is concluded that the latter area is where the root of DRT failure is often to be found

Regulatory reform, competition, and innovation - a case study of the Mexican road freight industry

Discussions of competition and regulatory reform typically focus on price and quantity effects. But improving certain infrastructure services can also stimulate entry, and competition in user industries downstream, allowing new firms to enter, incumbent users to offer new products, and rivalry to intensify. The authors present a case study of how innovations in road freight services affect selected downstream users of those services after regulatory reform. After a period of rigid regulation, and heavy government interference, Mexico in 1989 developed a new policy framework for road transport, with free entry, and market-based price setting. The result: faster, more reliable trucking has allowed user companies to offer new, previously unavailable products, and to reach new areas with existing products. Cheaper, more customer-responsive trucking services have allowed logistical innovations in user firms, and some user firms have decided not to keep their own fleets of trucks, but to outsource trucking services on the open market, thereby converting fixed costs to variable costs. For one fertilizer company, the benefits of reform included a ten percent improvement in operating margin. Successful reform requires careful planning and execution, and political support at high levels. Regulatory reform also profoundly changes the sectoral institution formerly responsible for the regulation. Enough resources should be provided to help organizations in the reformed industry make the transition to the post-reform environment - helping with such tasks as defining the organization's new role, and facilitating the redeployment of staff. The national competition agency can help greatly in laying the groundwork for reform by making a compelling case for the reform's expected benefits. After reform, the competition agency should also help with enforcement, to ensure that the cozy, cartel-like behavior stimulated by tight entry restrictions does not persist. In Mexico, three strong interventions were required to discipline attempted anti-competitive practices in the trucking industry in the years following reform.Common Carriers Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies,Roads&Highways,Transport and Trade Logistics,Banks&Banking Reform,Roads&Highways,Transport and Trade Logistics,Common Carriers Industry,ICT Policy and Strategies,Environmental Economics&Policies

You Can't Get There From Here: Government Failure in U.S. Transportation

Consumers, firms, and government spend $1.3 trillion on transportation, which accounts for roughly 17 percent of U.S. GDP. Transportation also absorbs about$1.2 trillion in travelers' and shippers' time--a valuable commodity excluded from GDP. Ttransportation policy is an important means for government to exert its influence on the economy. From regulating international air fares to providng bus service to owning and operating the roads, the government's presence in the U.S. transportation sector is pervasive. This paper argues, however, that the government's extensive involvement in transportation is undesirable and that it should greatly reduce its role in all aspects of transportation. By repeatedly failing to enact efficient policies to allocate transportation resources and by rigidly pursuing policies that have undermined the efficiency of every transportation mode and the welfare of most users--especially those with the lowest incomes---policymakers have assured that government failures are compromising the performance of the U.S. transportation sector far more than market failures. By ridding the transportaton sector of most observable government failures and by allowing innovation and state-of-the-art technology to flourish free of government interference, the private sector can vastly improve transportation and thereby advance our standard of living. The only real uncertainty is how long policymakers will resist change.

Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map

The main transportation issues facing cities today fall into familiar categories--congestion and public transit. For congestion, there is now a far richer menu of options that are understood, technically feasible, and perhaps politically feasible. One can now contemplate offering roads of different qualities and prices. Many selected road segments are now operated by the private sector. Road pricing is routinely considered in planning exercises, and field experiments have made it more familiar to urban voters. Concerns about environmental effects of urban trucking have resulted in serious interest in tolled truck-only express highways. As for public transit, there is a need for political mechanisms to allow each type of transit to specialize where it is strongest. The spread of “bus rapid transit†has opened new possibilities for providing the advantages of rail transit at lower cost. The prospect of pricing and privatizing highway facilities could reduce the amount of subsidy needed to maintain a healthy transit system. Privately operated public transit is making a comeback in other parts of the world. The single most positive step toward better urban transportation would be to encourage the spread of road pricing. A second step, more speculative because it has not been researched, would be to use more environmentally-friendly road designs that provide needed capacity but at modest speeds, and that would not necessarily serve all vehicles.Transportation policy; Road pricing; Privatization; Product differentiation

Government Failure in Urban Transportation

This paper assesses governmental performance in its investment, provision and regulation of urban transportation. Attention is given to public bus and rail transit and road transportation. Evidence based on urban transport in US cities reveals substantial allocative and technical inefficiencies that have led to large public transit deficits and severe highway congestion. I argue that it is futile to expect public officials to remedy the situation by pursuing more efficient policies such as congestion pricing and weighing costs and benefits when deciding transit service. The problem is that urban transportation policy is largely shaped by entrenched political forces that inhibit constructive change. The only realistic way to improve the system is to shield it from those influences and expose it to market forces by privatising it. This position is supported by empirical evidence based on simulations for the US and the UK’s early experience with privatisation.

A Planning Template for Nonwork Travel and Transit Oriented Development, MTI Report 01-12

The Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) at San José State University assigned a project team to design a planning template for transit-oriented development (TOD) that incorporates an understanding of nonwork travel, that is, trips for shopping, eating out, and engaging in recreational and cultural activities. Nonwork trips are growing in signifigance and now account for four of every five trips. At the same time, TOD has become a popular planning response to the impacts of metropolitan growth. Some planners believe that TOD will induce more pedestrian and transit trips and will reduce the average length and frequency of household auto travel. This effect is assumed to result from improved accessibility to employment and nonwork venues located in compact, mixed-use centers. Planning professionals in many MPOs also suggest that if multiple centers are linked by high quality transit, such as light or heavy rail, access is enabled to the broad range of nonwork activities. The project arrived at these essential findings: (1) Venues for nonwork activities are very numerous and geographically dispersed. 2) The spatial environment for nonwork activities is the result of growing prosperity, technical innovation, and a dynamic, competitive marketplace. (3) The consumer marketplace will provide many more places to go than mass transit can cost-effectively serve. (4) Current metropolitan planning methods and modeling tools focus on the work trip and do not adequately account for the complexity of nonwork trips and their linkage to work trips. These findings support the need for a new regional planning process to complement current methods. One recommended approach is that metropolitan communities establish a Nonwork Travel Improvement Planning Process using a multidisciplinary expert advisory group interacting with a core, Internet-enabled, professional transportation planning staff. An iterative interaction across varied but relevant skill sets could be achieved through a Backcasting Delphi process. The focus of the interaction would be on understanding the ramifications of consumer and retail industry behavior for TOD and other new transportation strategies, and then assessing the available strategies for cost-effectiveness in reducing the impacts of growth and automobility in a complex and uncertain metropolitan market

Options for Regional Decision Making in Metro Atlanta

Who loses if nothing is done? The city of Atlanta, with its central location, mature transit network, excess capacity in utilities, and reasonably aggressive public officials will probably thrive no matter what happens outside the I-285 perimeter. Communities outside the boundaries of the ten-county Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) area will enjoy the temporary fruits of being the next ring of new suburban development. Caught between the Atlanta magnet and the sprawling communities outside the ARC, ARC's suburban communities may bear the worst of the downside effects of the current regional decision-making structure. In the end, though, it is all of North Georgia that loses as congestion, pollution, rising taxes, and reduced quality of life diminish its attractiveness to economic development