5,152 research outputs found
Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution
A general framework of evolutionary dynamics under heterogeneous populations
is presented. The framework allows continuously many types of heterogeneous
agents, heterogeneity both in payoff functions and in revision protocols and
the entire joint distribution of strategies and types to influence the payoffs
of agents. We clarify regularity conditions for the unique existence of a
solution trajectory and for the existence of equilibrium. We confirm that
equilibrium stationarity in general and equilibrium stability in potential
games are extended from the homogeneous setting to the heterogeneous setting.
In particular, a wide class of admissible dynamics share the same set of
locally stable equilibria in a potential game through local maximization of the
potential
Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.Evolutionary game dynamics, ESS
Deterministic Equations for Stochastic Spatial Evolutionary Games
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial
domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their
neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic
approximations of the microscopic updating stochastic processes. This
generalizes the known mean-field ordinary differential equations and provide a
powerful tool to investigate the spatial effects in populations evolution. The
deterministic equations allow to identify many interesting features of the
evolution of strategy profiles in a population, such as standing and traveling
waves, and pattern formation, especially in replicator-type evolutions
Mean-Field-Type Games in Engineering
A mean-field-type game is a game in which the instantaneous payoffs and/or
the state dynamics functions involve not only the state and the action profile
but also the joint distributions of state-action pairs. This article presents
some engineering applications of mean-field-type games including road traffic
networks, multi-level building evacuation, millimeter wave wireless
communications, distributed power networks, virus spread over networks, virtual
machine resource management in cloud networks, synchronization of oscillators,
energy-efficient buildings, online meeting and mobile crowdsensing.Comment: 84 pages, 24 figures, 183 references. to appear in AIMS 201
An Evolutionary Strategy based on Partial Imitation for Solving Optimization Problems
In this work we introduce an evolutionary strategy to solve combinatorial
optimization tasks, i.e. problems characterized by a discrete search space. In
particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), i.e. a famous
problem whose search space grows exponentially, increasing the number of
cities, up to becoming NP-hard. The solutions of the TSP can be codified by
arrays of cities, and can be evaluated by fitness, computed according to a cost
function (e.g. the length of a path). Our method is based on the evolution of
an agent population by means of an imitative mechanism, we define `partial
imitation'. In particular, agents receive a random solution and then,
interacting among themselves, may imitate the solutions of agents with a higher
fitness. Since the imitation mechanism is only partial, agents copy only one
entry (randomly chosen) of another array (i.e. solution). In doing so, the
population converges towards a shared solution, behaving like a spin system
undergoing a cooling process, i.e. driven towards an ordered phase. We
highlight that the adopted `partial imitation' mechanism allows the population
to generate solutions over time, before reaching the final equilibrium. Results
of numerical simulations show that our method is able to find, in a finite
time, both optimal and suboptimal solutions, depending on the size of the
considered search space.Comment: 18 pages, 6 figure
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
We show that any evolutionary dynamic that satisfies three mild requirements—
continuity, positive correlation, and innovation—does not eliminate strictly dominated
strategies in all games. Likewise, we demonstrate that existing elimination results
for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the
dynamics
Evolutionary Stability of First Price Auctions
This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a first price sealed bid auction. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable under payoff monotonic dynamics for arbitrary initial popu- lations. In contrast, when the initial population includes a continuum of strategies around the equilibrium, the replicator dynamic does converge to the Nash equilibrium. Simulations are presented for the replicator and Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. They suggest that the convergence for the replicator dynamic is slow compared to the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics.
The projection dynamic, the replicator dynamic and the geometry of population games
Every population game defines a vector field on the set of strategy distributions X. The
projection dynamic maps each population game to a new vector field: namely, the one closest
to the payoff vector field among those that never point outward from X. We investigate the
geometric underpinnings of the projection dynamic, describe its basic game-theoretic properties,
and establish a number of close connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator
dynamic
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.Evolutionary game theory, evolutionary game dynamics, nonconvergnece, dominated strategies
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