UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE LOGISTICS: UTILIZING NETWORKED NON-STANDARD APPROACHES AND DECEPTION

Throughout history, many military campaigns, conventional or irregular, have failed when they were not well supported logistically. “ARSOF 2022,” written by Charles Cleveland and appearing in the spring 2013 issue of Special Warfare, states that United States Army Special Operations Forces will be the lead component to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) in the future. However, a 2013 RAND Arroyo Center study, Non-Standard Logistics Support for Unconventional Warfare: Sourcebook for Planning and Capability Development, written by Matthew E Boyer et al. on “non-standard logistics” identified significant gaps in existing doctrine, authorities, training, and other areas that support such operations. While providing recommendations, RAND did not provide specific solutions to the shortcomings. This thesis proposes a general model to conduct UW resupply, and operationalizes this model in the form of a UW logistics planning and execution cycle. The six-step cycle (RANDOM), begins with receipt of mission (R). Next, a multi-categorical UW logistics feasibility assessment (A) occurs. Following this assessment, a non-standard (N) resupply approach is chosen, and a supporting military deception plan (D) is incorporated into the approach. The resupply operation (O) is then executed, and feedback from various sources allows modifications (M) and improvements to the cycle for future resupply operations. This thesis concludes with recommendations for leaders and planners alike and offers a solution to the current lack of existing doctrine surrounding this topic.Major, United States ArmyApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Major Naval Operations

In generic terms, a major naval operation can be understood as a series of related major and minor naval tactical actions conducted by several naval combat arms and combat arms of other services, in terms of time and place, and aimed to accomplish an operational (and sometimes limited strategic) objective in a given maritime theater.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1030/thumbnail.jp

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

The Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms sets forth standard US military and associated terminology to encompass the joint activity of the Armed Forces of the United States. These military and associated terms, together with their definitions, constitute approved Department of Defense (DOD) terminology for general use by all DOD components

Managing Uncertainty: Lessons from Xenophon\u27s Retreat

Propositions on dynamic capabilities and organizational politics are developed from management literature and are then evaluated using case analysis. The goal is to identify complementary aspects of these perspectives to change from an ancient example that can offer insights for management thought and practice today. Initially chronicled by Xenophon, roughly 10,000 Greek mercenaries spent over two years confronting demanding circumstances as they fought their way into and out of ancient Persia. The mercenaries\u27 response to changing circumstances offers a unique case for integrating literature on responses to uncertainty that range between rational and haphazard explanations. The analysis suggests uncertainty management is a complex phenomenon imperfectly represented by existing models

Optimization of Airfield Parking and Fuel Asset Dispersal to Maximize Survivability and Mission Capability Level

While the US focus for the majority of the past two decades has been on combatting insurgency and promoting stability in Southwest Asia, strategic focus is beginning to shift toward concerns of conflict with a near-peer state. Such conflict brings with it the risk of ballistic missile attack on air bases. With 26 conflicts worldwide in the past 100 years including attacks on air bases, new doctrine and modeling capacity are needed to enable the Department of Defense to continue use of vulnerable bases during conflict involving ballistic missiles. Several models have been developed to date for Air Force strategic planning use, but these models have limited use on a tactical level or for civil engineer use. This thesis presents the development of a novel model capable of identifying base layout characteristics for aprons and fuel depots to maximize dispersal and minimize impact on sortie generation times during normal operations. This model is implemented using multi-objective genetic algorithms to identify solutions that provide optimal tradeoffs between competing objectives and is assessed using an application example. These capabilities are expected to assist military engineers in the layout of parking plans and fuel depots that ensure maximum resilience while providing minimal impact to the user while enabling continued sortie generation in a contested region

A RESPONSE BY THE FOOD INDUSTRY TO THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

Identifies the broad parameters of the synthetic food situation and enumerates marketing problem confronting manufacturers of synthetic food products.Marketing,

The Other Side of the Hill: Combat Intelligence in the Canadian Corps, 1914–1918

For some, a discussion on military intelligence and the First World War is the ultimate oxymoron. They might ask: when and where did generals display any use of intelligence? That the Battle of the Somme continued beyond the first day, they might argue, demonstrates a complete lack of military intelligence, or any other type of intelligence for that matter. If there ever was a war, they might add, where donkeylike officers led lion-like soldiers to slaughter against barbed wire, machine guns, and trenches, then the Great War was it. The oft told story of how Sir Launcelot Kiggell, Sir Douglas Haig’s chief of staff, upon seeing the Passchendaele battlefield and its sea of mud and carnage, reportedly wept, “My God! Did we send men to fight in that?” only to be answered by an aid: “It’s worse further up,” has lent credence to the position that the British high command was, indeed, incompetent. The myth that British generals were donkeys is an old one, and not likely to disappear completely anytime soon—at least in popular imagination. However, a study of combat intelligence should help to dispel this myth, for when intelligence was used wisely—as it usually was in the Canadian Corps—it increased the likelihood of success in the field. It did this by dispersing some of the fog of war and the resulting battlefield confusion. Good intelligence gave planners the details necessary for preparing the incredibly complex set-piece battles that were the hallmark of First World War combat. Such meticulous care and precision preparation ensured that there were fewer surprises on Zero Day, the day of attack, then otherwise would have been the case. By cutting through the fog of war, intelligence reduced the assaulting troops’ dependence on circumstance and luck, while restoring to commanders some degree of control over events in what was an otherwise highly chaotic environment. This was no small matter, especially on battlefields where communications were painfully slow, erratic and unreliable. Officers and men of the Great War faced conditions and technological advances that had completely altered warfare from what they had expected and trained for. To compensate, the Canadians, and others, used combat intelligence to help overcome such obstacles as poor communications, heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, entrenchments and barbed wire, and came to see it as a crucial element in waging successful trench warfare

The Future Role of Strategic Landpower

Recent Russian aggression in Ukraine has reenergized military strategists and senior leaders to evaluate the role of strategic Landpower. American leadership in the European theater has mobilized allies and partners to reconsider force postures for responding to possible aggression against NATO members. Although Russian revisionist activity remains a threat in Europe, the challenges in the Pacific for strategic Landpower must also be considered. At the same time, the homeland, the Arctic, climate change, and the results of new and emerging technology also challenge the application of strategic Landpower. This publication serves as part of an enduring effort to evaluate strategic Landpower’s role, authorities, and resources for accomplishing the national strategic goals the Joint Force may face in the next conflict. This study considers multinational partners, allies, and senior leaders that can contribute to overcoming these enduring challenges. The insights derived from this study, which can be applied to both the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, should help leaders to consider these challenges, which may last a generation. Deterrence demands credible strategic response options integrated across warfighting functions. This valuable edition will continue the dialogue about addressing these issues as well as other emerging ones.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1959/thumbnail.jp