Valuing the Recreational Benefits From the Creation of Nature Reserves in Irish Forests

Data from a large-scale contingent valuation study are used to investigate the effects of forest attributes on willingness to pay for forest recreation in Ireland. In particular, the presence of a nature reserve in the forest is found to significantly increase the visitors' willingness to pay. A random utility model is used to estimate the welfare change associated with the creation of nature reserves in all the Irish forests currently without one. The yearly impact on visitors' economic welfare of new nature reserves approaches half a million pounds per annum, exclusive of non recreational values.Non-market valuation, Contingent valuation, Forest attributes analysis, Nature reserves.

Incentive Payment Programs for Environmental Protection: A Framework for Eliciting and Estimating Landowners' Willingness to Participate

This paper considers the role of incentive payment programs in eliciting, estimating, and predicting landowners’ conservation enrollments. Using both program participation and the amount of land enrolled, we develop two econometric approaches for predicting enrollments. The first is a multivariate censored regression model that handles zero enrollments and heterogeneity in the opportunity cost of enrollments by combining an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of enrollments with alternative-specific correlation and random parameters. The second is a beta-binomial model, which recognizes that in practice elicited enrollments are essentially integer valued. We apply these approaches to Finland, where the protection of private nonindustrial forests is an important environmental policy problem. We compare both econometric approaches via cross-validation and find that the beta-binomial model predicts as well as the multivariate censored model yet has fewer parameters. The beta-binomial model also facilitates policy predictions and simulations, which we use to illustrate the framework.protection, endangered, voluntary, incentive, tobit, beta-binomial, stated preferences

Forming Probably Stable Communities with Limited Interactions

A community needs to be partitioned into disjoint groups; each community member has an underlying preference over the groups that they would want to be a member of. We are interested in finding a stable community structure: one where no subset of members $S$ wants to deviate from the current structure. We model this setting as a hedonic game, where players are connected by an underlying interaction network, and can only consider joining groups that are connected subgraphs of the underlying graph. We analyze the relation between network structure, and one's capability to infer statistically stable (also known as PAC stable) player partitions from data. We show that when the interaction network is a forest, one can efficiently infer PAC stable coalition structures. Furthermore, when the underlying interaction graph is not a forest, efficient PAC stabilizability is no longer achievable. Thus, our results completely characterize when one can leverage the underlying graph structure in order to compute PAC stable outcomes for hedonic games. Finally, given an unknown underlying interaction network, we show that it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists a forest consistent with data samples from the network.Comment: 11 pages, full version of accepted AAAI-19 pape

Valuing Ecosystem Services from Private Forests

Non-market valuation, ecosystem services, Environmental Economics and Policy,