DETERMINANTS OF CONSTRUCTION FIRMS' COMPLIANCE WITH HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The management of health and safety issues is very significant in the construction industry in South Africa in terms of accident rates and cost to contractors. The costs arise from both the cost of compliance with regulations and the cost of accidents and injuries. In spite of the fact that available evidence shows that construction-related accidents and injuries are on the increase in South Africa, many designers and contractors regard the cost of complying with regulations as unnecessary additional financial burdens. It is against this background that this study investigated the statutory regulations relating to health and safety in construction in South Africa and the level of compliance with the regulations and motivation for compliance by contractors. Data obtained from contractors in a questionnaire survey the Western Cape Province of South Africa were analysed using percentage scores and mean score analysis with the aid of the SPSS software. Although the validity of the findings is limited by sample size used in the survey, it is hoped that the findings will provide empirical basis for a more inclusive survey of H&S in the construction industry in South Africa. Keywords: health and safety, regulations, enforcement & compliance, construction industry, South Africa

Social Democracy and the “Developmental State” as Development Alternatives for South Africa

This paper investigates social democracy and the “developmental state” model as development alternatives for South Africa. This research is significant as it enhances the developmental debate in South Africa that is indispensable in light of South Africa’s poor socio-economic performance. A comparative-historical study is conducted, as well as an analysis of the socio-political situation in South Africa to determine each model’s compatibility with South Africa. State autonomy is assumed essential. Liberal democracy and the authoritarian “developmental state” model are rejected on theoretical and compatibility grounds. Social democracy is therefore investigated. It is concluded that this model is theoretically stronger, yet ideologically squeezed, and its execution is hindered by major stumbling blocks that are identified. Ultimately, it is shown that the economics is fairly simple, but the “primacy of politics” is essential.Social democracy, developmental state, South Africa, Political Economy, Public Economics,

No. 13: The Rise of African Tourism to South Africa

South Africans display considerable ambiguity if not outright hostility towards Africans from other countries (Crush 2000). The extent of xenophobia was officially recognized in the Immigration Act of 2002 which gives government a statutory obligation to eliminate the phenomenon in its own ranks and amongst the citizenry. Foreign Africans in South Africa are regularly stereotyped as criminals, job-stealers, consumers of scarce public resources and carriers of disease. There is very little recognition of the positive economic benefits of the presence of other Africans in the country. Africans come to South Africa for a variety of purposes and this needs to be clearly recognized by policy-makers and the public. Some of these purposes are of enormous economic benefit for South Africa and South Africans. Easily the vast majority of Africans who come to South Africa do so legally and for purposes that fall under the general heading of “tourism.” South Africa defines tourists broadly as those who come for a timelimited stay for leisure, to visit friends and relatives (VFR), to shop and for business. In 2003, tourists spent a total of R53.9 billion in South Africa (known as “Foreign Direct Spend”). In total, tourism contributed more than R100 billion of foreign direct spend to the economy (including foreign and domestic). The average length of stay was 10 days and the spend per tourist per day was R1 548. The tourism industry employed approximately 512 000 people (South African Tourism 2003). Another common stereotype in South Africa is that tourism is the preserve of visitors from Europe and North America. Nothing could be further from the truth. Certainly, there are distinct differences between the European and the African tourist, but African tourism is a growing and under-appreciated phenomenon. As such, it is part of a large global trend towards South–South tourism. This paper focuses on the nature, dimensions and impacts of African tourism to South Africa. Because this is part of a global trend, it is first helpful to look at the rise of South–South tourism more generally. The general objective of this policy brief is to examine issues and initiatives concerning the growth of South Africa as a destination for intra-regional tourism. The post-1994 political changes have opened up South Africa to a major flow of regional tourists. The work of the Southern African Migration Project (see eg. Crush 1997; Rogerson 1997; Peberdy and Crush 2001; Peberdy and Rogerson 2000, 2003) draws detailed attention to the new flows of international migrants to South Africa from other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, but no attention has been paid so far to the parallel (and linked) growth of tourism flows from subSaharan Africa. In the South African case, regional tourism is defined simply as tourism flows, by land or air, from other countries in sub-Saharan African. Two issues are discussed here. In the next section, current international debates concerning the development of regional tourism in the developing world are reviewed. In the following section, attention turns first to the significance of regional tourism for the tourism economy of post-apartheid South Africa and then to policy development for regional tourism. South Africa provides a useful case study of a national government’s policy awakening to the importance of regional tourism as a force for the development of a country’s tourism industry

Philanthropy and Equity: The Case of South Africa

This paper explores the potential role for philanthropy to promote greater equity in South Africa. It also aims to stimulate further discussion and debate about how philanthropic resources can best contribute to a more just and equitable South Africa, and encourage others engaged in philanthropy elsewhere in the world to reflect on South Africa's experience

FOREIGN CAPITAL AND AFRICA’S ECONOMIC PROGRESS: FACTS FROM NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Foreign capital inflow is usually believed as a means of supplementing domestic capital. The paper examined the influence of foreign capital on Africa’s economic progress focusing on Nigeria and South Africa (1970-2004). Data sourced from IFS, CBN and others were analyzed with econometric techniques. Empirical facts from cointegration and Granger casualty tests are as follows: There is a long-run relationship between foreign capital and economic progress in South Africa but in Nigeria it is short-run oriented; Foreign capital Granger-causes economic progress in South Africa, while in Nigeria casualty runs on the reverse; a bi-directional causality exists between economic progress and domestic capital in South Africa, for Nigeria it is uni-directional running from domestic capital to economic progress; Labour force in both countries Granger-causes their economic progress. In the light of the above, foreign capital should be promoted in South Africa to enhance her economic progress while in Nigeria polices that can reduce the level of capital flight (e.g. dependable institutional framework etc) are essential for foreign capital to have long-run influence on her economic progress. The need for the countries to rely more on domestic capital is equally suggested as viable factors for their economic progress

Explaining post-apartheid South African human rights foreign policy: unsettled identity and conflicting interests

The end of apartheid in 1994 brought with it many expectations – both domestically and internationally – about the kind of state the new South Africa would be and the foreign policies it would pursue, with many expecting South Africa to pursue a human rights-based foreign policy. However, South Africa has pursued a much more paradoxical foreign policy, with significant gaps between its stated commitment to human rights principles and its action in support of those principles. This article seeks to explain these gaps. Delving into the literature on norms-based and interest-based explanations of state behavior, it argues that both approaches help to explain South Africa’s foreign policy actions. However, it is the unsettled nature of its identities and interests after 1994, as its leaders (in particular Thabo Mbeki) sought to reconcile a commitment to democracy and human rights with equally strong (if not greater) commitments to Afrocentrism and anti-imperialism, which provides the most interesting avenues for exploration

Traditional authority, institutional multiplicity and political transition in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Adherents of tradition argue that customary institutions in Africa and the traditional leaders that uphold them have a stabilizing influence, particularly given the inadequacies of many post-colonial African states. It is suggested that this remains the case for South Africa as well and that chieftaincy, though tainted by its association with segregation and apartheid, has nevertheless provided continuity of governance, particularly in rural areas where there were scant alternative structures. Opponents see the return to tradition as a regressive step that undermines progress towards democratic consolidation in Africa generally and in South Africa more particularly. In many respects these concerns are not new and reflect careful historical debate in South Africa that remains relevant in informing and understanding the contemporary period. With this in mind this paper explores the institution of ubukhosi, or chieftainship, in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), where resurgent tradition is particularly vociferous, but also part of a longer history exhibiting both continuities and discontinuities. Against this background it considers whether the recognition of traditional authorities and the powers and functions accorded to them in South Africa, and more particularly KZN, constitutes a potential faultline of crisis in South Africa's fragile emergent democracy or a site of stability in a politically volatile province. The question is framed by recourse to institutional theory and is answered by setting the contemporary experience of 'negotiating tradition' in KwaZulu-Natal against a background of apartheid government, resistance and political violence in the province

No. 58: The Disengagement of the South African Medical Diaspora

Conventional wisdom holds that the ‘brain drain’ of health professionals from Africa is deeply damaging to the continent. Recently, a group of North American and European neo-liberal economists has challenged this conventional wisdom, variously arguing that the negative impacts are highly exaggerated and the compensating benefits many. The benefits include various forms of “diaspora engagement” in which those who have left then engage through sending remittances, direct investment, knowledge and skills transfer, return migration and involvement in diaspora associations. A previous SAMP study of Zimbabwean physicians outside the country provided clear evidence for the “diaspora engagement” hypothesis (see No 56 in this series). This paper examines the case of South African physicians who have left South Africa. South Africa provides an ideal case for examining the conflicting viewpoints on the health brain drain given the significant loss of physicians the country has experienced over the past two decades. A 2000 global survey of the location of physicians found that as many as 7,363 South African-trained doctors (or 21% of the total number in practice) were living and practising abroad. In 2005, the OECD estimated that more than 13,000 South African trained physicians were working in OECD countries, of whom 7,718 were in the United Kingdom, 2,215 in the United States, 1,877 in Canada and 1,022 in New Zealand. More recent data from Canada indicates that there were 2,193 South African physicians in that country in 2009. The research reported in this paper consists of a survey of 415 South African doctors in Canada conducted in 2009-10 (representing almost 20% of the total number working in Canada.) More than half of the survey respondents (58%) had acquired Canadian citizenship since leaving South Africa. Of the rest, around one quarter (26%) were permanent residents in Canada and only 16% were on work permits. At the same time, 70% still hold South African citizenship. This raised the possibility that they want to retain their South African citizenship because they feel a strong affinity with South Africa. Nearly 90% agreed with the statement that “being from South Africa is an important part of how I view myself” and 81% with the statement that “I feel strong ties with people from South Africa.” The vast majority (over 80%) buy or make South African foods, listen to South African music and want their children to know about South Africa. Some 80% regularly consult South African newspapers online. As many as 60% want their children to learn a South African language. Forty percent say that their best friends in Canada are South Africans. Family links with South Africa also remain strong. As many as 81% have siblings still living in South Africa and 71% still have parents there. About 95% of the respondents had visited South Africa since migrating to Canada. More than 75% visit South Africa at least every 2-3 years, with 28% visiting once a year. However, despite all this evidence of a persistent South African identity and the maintenance of strong links with the country, the vast majority (80%) disagreed with the statement that they had “an important role to play in the development of South Africa.” Only 16% said they are likely to send money for development projects in South Africa, 15% said they would participate in educational and other exchanges with South Africa, while 13% would participate in fundraising projects in South Africa. Only 10% said they would invest in a business in South Africa and just 8% might work for a period of time in South Africa. By most standards, the physicians surveyed were high income earners. As many as two-thirds earn above CAN$200,000 (ZAR 1.6 million) per annum and fewer than 5$100,000 (ZAR 800,000) annually. In general, remitting is often positively correlated with income: the more a migrant earns the greater the amount that they tend to remit. However, despite their high earnings South African physicians in Canada are not significant remitters: Only half (52%) had sent money to South Africa in the previous year and only 19% can be considered regular remitters who send money to South Africa at least once a month. A considerable number do not remit regularly (21% do so less than once a year) and 28% have never sent remittances to South Africa. Less than a third (27%) had sent more than CAN$5,000 (ZAR40,000) to South Africa. The median amount sent by remitters was only CAN$4,250 (ZAR 33,000) per annum, which falls to only CAN$1,000 (ZAR8,000) per annum for the whole sample. Such small amounts are unlikely to yield significant development outcomes in the country of origin or compensate the country for the loss of skills incurred in the brain drain. The majority of the remitters (82$1,000 (ZAR8,000) annually. The mean value of goods sent by the physicians was CAN$340 (ZAR2,430) annually. In other words, the amounts remitted by South African physicians are small in comparison to their incomes and remitting is infrequent. The South African physicians differ markedly in their remitting behaviour from physicians from other African countries and from African diasporas in general. Further evidence of the disengagement of the South African physician diaspora is provided by patterns of property ownership and other investments in South Africa. As many as 57% of the physicians maintain an active bank account in South Africa but these are funds ostensibly for use during their visits. Only 25% have substantial savings in their bank accounts. At the same time 17% own property, 35% have investments and 27% have a house in South Africa. However, these are generally acquired before leaving. Only 5% had bought a house or property in South Africa and only 4% had invested in a South African business in the year prior to the survey. The vast majority of those still holding these assets in South Africa are recent (post 2000) immigrants to Canada. There is a consistent pattern of decline in South African asset ownership over time as the physicians sell their property, close their bank accounts and disinvest. In order to gauge the potential for return migration, the respondents were asked whether they had considered returning to South Africa. About 36% have never considered the possibility of returning while 21% had given it hardly any thought. About 43% indicated that they have considered returning to South Africa. However, only 7% said they are likely to return within the next two years and another 10% within the next five years. Few had taken any concrete steps to return. Less than 2% had applied for a job in South Africa in the previous year. While this group of South African professionals are proud to think of themselves as South African and take a relatively keen interest in events in that country, they are disengaged from any serious diasporic interest in and commitment (beyond contact with and some limited support for family members who remain). Almost without exception, they paint a very negative picture of life in South Africa and they do not see any role for themselves in helping address South Africa’s deep social and economic inequalities and needs. Neo-liberal economists and proponents of diaspora engagement will find little to support their arguments in the views of this particular component of the South African diaspora

Troubling Signs for South African Democracy under the ANC

Thirteen years ago, South Africa underwent a peaceful transition from white minority rule to majority rule. Today, the country is a stable multiparty democracy. It has the largest and the most sophisticated economy in Africa, which generates almost 40 percent of all the wealth produced on the African continent south of the Sahara. The African National Congress government, which came to power in 1994, deserves credit for stabilizing the economy and returning it to a steady, albeit slow, growth path. The ANC's democratic record is less impressive. The government has transformed the state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation into an ANC propaganda machine that has banned some of the government's most prominent critics from appearing on it. The culture of political correctness stifles public debate over the direction of South Africa's economic and social policies. Those who dare to criticize the government are often labeled as racist. Moreover, the ANC is considering new laws that would undermine judicial independence. It is increasingly apparent that the ANC wishes to dominate the social and institutional life of South Africa in the same way that it dominates the country's political life. Fortunately, the ANC continues to put great value on its international reputation and tends to be hypersensitive to international criticism. When the government does not act in accordance with the spirit of liberal democracy, members of international civil society groups, the diplomatic corps, and the business community should voice their concern. Constructive criticism could change the ANC's behavior and positively influence political developments in South Africa