Reference fallible endgame play

A reference model of fallible endgame play is defined in terms of a spectrum of endgame players whose play ranges in competence from the optimal to the anti-optimal choice of move. They may be used as suitably skilled practice partners, to assess a player, to differentiate between otherwise equi-optimal moves, to promote or expedite a game result, to run Monte-Carlo simulations, and to identify the difficulty of a position or a whole endgame

KQQKQQ and the Kasparov-World Game

The 1999 Kasparov-World game for the first time enabled anyone to join a team playing against a World Chess Champion via the web. It included a surprise in the opening, complex middle-game strategy and a deep ending. As the game headed for its mysterious finale, the World Team re-quested a KQQKQQ endgame table and was provided with two by the authors. This paper describes their work, compares the methods used, examines the issues raised and summarises the concepts involved for the benefit of future workers in the endgame field. It also notes the contribution of this endgame to chess itself

Chess Endgames and Neural Networks

The existence of endgame databases challenges us to extract higher-grade information and knowledge from their basic data content. Chess players, for example, would like simple and usable endgame theories if such holy grail exists: endgame experts would like to provide such insights and be inspired by computers to do so. Here, we investigate the use of artificial neural networks (NNs) to mine these databases and we report on a first use of NNs on KPK. The results encourage us to suggest further work on chess applications of neural networks and other data-mining techniques

Canonical correlation analysis based on information theory

AbstractIn this article, we propose a new canonical correlation method based on information theory. This method examines potential nonlinear relationships between p×1 vector Y-set and q×1 vector X-set. It finds canonical coefficient vectors a and b by maximizing a more general measure, the mutual information, between aTX and bTY. We use a permutation test to determine the pairs of the new canonical correlation variates, which requires no specific distributions for X and Y as long as one can estimate the densities of aTX and bTY nonparametrically. Examples illustrating the new method are presented

Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments

We provide a test of the role of social preferences and beliefs in voluntary cooperation and its decline. We elicit individuals’ cooperation preferences in one experiment and use them – as well as subjects’ elicited beliefs – to explain contributions to a public good played repeatedly. We find substantial heterogeneity in people’s preferences. With simulation methods based on this data, we show that the decline of cooperation can be driven by the fact that most people have a preference to contribute less than others, rather than by their changing beliefs of others’ contribution over time. Universal free riding is very likely despite the fact that most people are not selfish.public goods experiments, social preferences, conditional cooperation, free riding

Computers and Intuition

Algorithms and the Foundations of Software technolog

Public goods and ethnic divisions

The authors present a model that links heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a city to the amount and type of public good the city supplies. Results show that the shares of spending on productive public goods - education, roads, sewers, and trash pickup _ in U.S. cities (metro areas/urban counties) are inversely related to the city's (metro area's/county's) ethnic fragmentation, even after controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic determinants. They conclude that the ethnic conflict is an important determinant of local public finances. In cities where ethnic groups are polarized, and where politicians have ethnic constituencies, the share of spending that goes to public goods is low. Their results are driven mainly by how white-majority cities react to varying minority-groups sizes. Voters choose lower public goods when a significant fraction of tax revenues collected from one ethnic group is used to provide public goods shared with other ethnic groups.Public Sector Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,Public Health Promotion,Inequality,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Economic Theory&Research,Economic Stabilization