Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind

This material was originally published in Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives edited by Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, and has been reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.001.0001 and http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.001.0001/acprof-9780199359943. Under embargo until 3 November 2018. For permission to reuse this material, please visit http://global.oup.com/academic/rights. Sam Coleman, ‘Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind’, in Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, eds. Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), ISBN: 9780199359943 © Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.With reference to Chalmers's taxonomy of combination problems, I argue that while the subject combination problem reveals panpsychism as ultimately theoretically unmotivated, a rival neutral monist/panprotopsychist theory known as 'panqualityism' is much better placed to solve Chalmers's combination problems. In the final section I defend panqualityism against Chalmers's objection that it fails because of the possibility of 'awareness zombies'. I conclude that, in view of the advantages panpsychism and panqualityism share with respect to more mainstream theories of mind, panqualityism is our best hope for solving the problem of consciousness.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

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