The correlation argument for reductionism

Reductionists say things like all mental properties are physical properties; all normative properties are natural properties. I argue that the only way to resist reductionism is to deny that causation is difference making (thus making the epistemology of causation a mystery) or to deny that properties are individuated by their causal powers (thus making properties a mystery); that is to say, unless one is happy to deny supervenience or to trivialize the debate over reductionism. To show this, I argue that if properties are individuated by their causal powers, then, surprisingly, properties are individuated by necessary coexemplification.</jats:p

On the explanatory depth and pragmatic value of coarse-grained, probabilistic, causal explanations

This article considers the thesis that a more proportional relationship between a cause and its effect yields a more abstract causal explanation of that effect, thereby producing a deeper explanation. This thesis has important implications for choosing the optimal granularity of explanation for a given explanandum. In this article, I argue that this thesis is not generally true of probabilistic causal relationships. In light of this finding, I propose a pragmatic measure of explanatory depth. This measure uses a decision-theoretic model of information pricing to determine the optimal granularity of explanation for a given explanandum, agent, and decision problem