How Should Financial Intermediation Services be Taxed?

This paper considers the optimal taxation of savings intermediation and payment services in a dynamic general equilibrium setting, when the government can also use consumption and income taxes. When payment services are used in strict proportion to final consumption, and the cost of intermediation services is …xed and the same across …rms, the optimal taxes are generally indeterminate. But, when …rms di¤er exogenously in the cost of intermediation services, the tax on savings intermediation should be zero. Also, when household time and payment services are substitutes in transactions, the optimal tax rate on payment services is determined by the returns to scale in the conditional demand for payment services, and is generally di¤erent to the optimal rate on consumption goods. In particular, with constant returns to scale, payment services should be untaxed. These results can be understood as applications of the Diamond-Mirrlees production e¢ciency theorem. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in equilibrium when banks have monopoly power, justifying a Pigouvian tax in this case.Financial intermediation services, tax design, banks, monitoring,payment services

How Should Financial Intermediation Services be Taxed?

This paper considers the optimal taxation of savings intermediation and payment services in a dynamic general equilibrium setting, when the government can also use consumption and income taxes. When payment services are used in strict proportion to final consumption, and the cost of intermediation services is fixed and the same across firms, the optimal taxes are generally indeterminate. But, when firms differ exogenously in the cost of intermediation services, the tax on savings intermediation should be zero. Also, when household time and payment services are substitutes in transactions, the optimal tax rate on payment services is determined by the returns to scale in the conditional demand for payment services, and is generally different to the optimal rate on consumption goods. In particular, with constant returns to scale, payment services should be untaxed. These results can be understood as applications of the Diamond-Mirrlees production efficiency theorem. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in equilibrium when banks have monopoly power, justifying a Pigouvian tax in this caseKeywords:financial intermediation services ; tax design ; banks ; monitoring ;payment services JEL Classification: G21 ; H21 ; H25

How should Financial Intermediation Services be Taxed?

This paper considers the optimal taxation of savings intermediation and payment services in a dynamic general equilibrium setting, when the government can also use consumption and income taxes. When payment services are used in strict proportion to final consumption, and the cost of intermediation services is fixed and the same across firms, the optimal taxes are generally indeterminate. But, when firms differ exogenously in the cost of intermediation services, the tax on savings intermediation should be zero. Also, when household time and payment services are substitutes in transactions, the optimal tax rate on payment services is determined by the returns to scale in the conditional demand for payment services, and is generally different to the optimal rate on consumption goods. In particular, with constant returns to scale, payment services should be untaxed. These results can be understood as applications of the Diamond-Mirrlees production efficiency theorem. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in equilibrium when banks have monopoly power, justifying a Pigouvian tax in this case.financial intermediation services, tax design, banks, monitoring, payment services

The Universal Basic Income: should it replace the existing social security system?

A universal basic income (UBI) would provide all citizens with a guaranteed income, irrespective of their earnings, age or household status. It would be financed from a flat-rate personal income tax. It would replace the existing work-based social security system with its plethora of benefit types, abatement rates and eligibility rules. However, when the trade-offs between the competing objectives of a tax/benefit scheme are considered, and the variety of individual and family circumstances that need to be addressed, the apparent simplicity of a UBI quickly disappears. The article shows that while the current tax/benefit system represents a ‘welfare mess’, and needs substantial restructuring, a UBI does not necessarily provide an adequate income for poverty relief, nor ensure labour force incentives, at an acceptable fiscal cost

48th Annual Midwest Estate, Tax & Business Planning Institute

Meeting proceedings of a seminar by the same name, held June 3-4, 2021

Is tax legislation effectively discouraging employee share ownership?

Thesis (M.Com. (Taxation))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Accountancy, 2017Share incentive schemes have been used for many years as a mechanism to compensate, retain and attract talent by offering employees a stake in the business. Share incentives, however, usually contribute an increasingly larger portion of executive pay in comparison with general employees. The motive for larger share incentive based compensation is on the foundation that management must have a skin in the game in order for their interest to be appropriately aligned with shareholders. The Treasury and the South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) have historically viewed share incentive schemes with suspicion. Treasury and SARS consider these schemes as salary conversion plans designed avoid tax. This has led to a litany of tax legislation that has sought to combat this so called avoidance. As things stand it appears the legislation is far too reaching and no longer reflects the commercial and economic reality of an increasingly entrepreneurial world. The aim of this research report is to ascertain whether the current tax policy is effectively discouraging employee share ownership. This paper will consider the impact of the current tax provisions on share incentive schemes for both the employees and their companies’. The United Kingdom offer tax advantages for employee share ownership plans thus the report will also include a comparison with the tax legislation governing share option schemes in the UK. The comparison will aid in recommending a more sensible and equitable way forward with regards to the taxation of share incentive schemes in South Africa. Key words: Share incentive plans, Section 8B, Section 8C, executive remuneration, equity based compensationGR201

The Mysteries of NFT Taxation and the Problem of Crypto Asset Tax Evasion

Cryptocurrencies have long captured the attention of the financial world, revolutionizing how the world does business by providing virtually costless transactions. More recently, however, a new digital token has taken its place on the world stage. Known as NFTs, non-fungible tokens have allowed for the reinvention of modern finance infrastructure consisting of sophisticated trading and loaning systems for different asset types. Despite cryptocurrencies’ and NFTs’ novelty and popularity, they are not immune to the U.S. Tax Code. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has provided guidance on the tax framework of cryptocurrencies, but the taxation of NFTs is still relatively unclear, leaving taxpayers to rely largely on the cryptocurrency tax framework to address NFT taxation. The cryptocurrency framework, however, does not fully address all issues that may arise in NFT taxation. Virtual currencies have drawn much excitement, sparking the popularity of cryptocurrencies and NFT investors but have also drawn the scrutiny and worry of tax regulators. The U.S. has been experiencing a significant tax gap between the money taxpayers make from the transactions of these crypto assets and the amount of taxes paid to the IRS. Specifically, to blame for this tax gap are the novelty of these crypto assets, their inherent anonymity, their cross-border nature, and their independence from governmental or financial institutions. This article discusses the taxation of cryptocurrencies, its influence on a potential NFT-specific tax framework, why crypto assets are the weapon of choice for tax evaders, and the possible solutions the U.S. can pursue to remedy crypto asset tax evasion

ARE THE NEW POLISH TAX RULES REGARDING PARTNERSHIPS LIMITED BY SHARES IN BREACH OF EU LAW? ANALYSIS OF AMENDMENTS TO THE POLISH INCOME TAX ACT 2014 IN THE LIGHT OF ECJ CASE LAW

With effect from 1 January 2014, the Polish Parliament introduced amendments to the Polish Corporate and Personal Income Tax Acts, which primarily affect the taxation of a partnership limited by shares (SKA) by including it into the category of corporate income tax subjects. Under the new regulations the general partners of an SKA should be treated in the same way as partners of any other Polish partnership and thus their income should be effectively taxed only once. In order to ensure the single-level taxation of general partner’s income a tax credit mechanism has been introduced. Though, the new Polish provisions permit the application of the tax credit mechanism only in relation to national cases. In the authors’ view this may constitute a restriction on freedom of establishment. This article analyses whether the new tax credit method is compatible with EU Law