Public Land: How Much Is Enough?

59 p. ; 29 cmhttps://scholar.law.colorado.edu/books_reports_studies/1050/thumbnail.jp

Public Land: How Much Is Enough?

59 p. ; 29 cmhttps://scholar.law.colorado.edu/books_reports_studies/1050/thumbnail.jp

How much is enough? Explaining the continuous transparency conflict in TTIP

Transparency has been a central issue in the debate regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), especially on the side of the European Union (EU). The lack of transparency in the negotiating process has been one of the main criticisms of civil society organizations (CSOs). The European Commission (EC) has tried to gain support for the negotiations through various ‘transparency initiatives’. Nonetheless, criticism by CSOs with regard to TTIP in general and the lack of transparency in specific remained prevalent. In this article, we explain this gap between various transparency initiatives implemented by the EC in TTIP and the expectations on the side of European CSOs. We perform a content analysis of position papers on transparency produced by CSOs, mainly in response to a European Ombudsman consultation, complemented by a number of official documents and targeted interviews. We find that the gap between the TTIP transparency initiatives and the expectations of CSOs can be explained by different views on what constitutes legitimate trade governance, and the role of transparency, participation, and accountability herein

Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?

This Article considers the federal banking regulation regime implemented in response to the widespread bank failures of the 1980s and early 1990s. The first section of the Article examines the moral hazard problem created by the presence of the deposit insurance scheme and the market discipline debate that has attempted to correct the moral hazard problem. The Author argues that the law has evolved to make bank holding companies the primary enforcers of market discipline. The Article’s second section examines the specific regulatory changes that have been designed to create an incentive for bank holding companies to impose discipline on bank management. The source of strength doctrine, regulatory agreements, capital restoration plans, the elaboration of a general fiduciary duty to regulators, equitable subordination, cross-guarantee provisions, preferences, and fraudulent conveyances all are part of a strategy to make bank holding companies more responsible for bank failure. The third section of the Article looks at the potential effects of the regulatory scheme. The Author argues that the regulatory attempts to make bank holding companies the enforcers of market discipline are misguides because they will not achieve their intend effect. Instead, the banking industry will be saddled with excessive regulations that will place it at a competitive disadvantage relative to the other players in the financial services industry

Defined Benefit Plan Funding: How Much Is Too Much?

Ideally, the role of policymakers is to make laws which effectuate change consistent with public interest. However, in order for policy makers to meet this demand, it is necessary for them to identify distinct issues and their respective causes and long term effects. In furtherance of this goal, as it relates to the issue of accelerated funding of qualified defined benefit plans, this Article will address the following questions: (1) whether it is practical to separate the concept of accelerated funding from impending plan termination, (2) whether the removal of excess assets from terminating plans can be deterred in ways which offset tax-subsidized gains attributable to overfunded amounts rather than in ways which discourage accelerated funding, and (3) whether, in the absence of concerns relating to plan termination, accelerated funding is consistent with pension policy

Defined Benefit Plan Funding: How Much Is Too Much?

Ideally, the role of policymakers is to make laws which effectuate change consistent with public interest. However, in order for policy makers to meet this demand, it is necessary for them to identify distinct issues and their respective causes and long term effects. In furtherance of this goal, as it relates to the issue of accelerated funding of qualified defined benefit plans, this Article will address the following questions: (1) whether it is practical to separate the concept of accelerated funding from impending plan termination, (2) whether the removal of excess assets from terminating plans can be deterred in ways which offset tax-subsidized gains attributable to overfunded amounts rather than in ways which discourage accelerated funding, and (3) whether, in the absence of concerns relating to plan termination, accelerated funding is consistent with pension policy