Libet's experiment provides no evidence against strong libertarian free will because readiness potentials do not cause our actions

This article argues against Benjamin Libet's claim that his experiment has shown that our actions are caused by brain events which begin before we decide and before we even think about the action. It clarifies what exactly should be meant by the RP causing, initiating, or preparing an action. It argues that Libet's claim is incompatible with strong libertarian free will. It shows why Libet's experiment does not support his claim and why the experiments by Herrmann et al. and by Trevena \& Miller provide evidence against his claim. The empirical evidence is compatible with strong libertarian free will. Neither the readiness potential (RP, Bereitschaftspotential) nor the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) causes our actions

Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief

In this chapter we argue that some beliefs present a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief, according to which it is constitutive of belief that it is aimed at truth. We draw on empirical literature which shows that subjects form beliefs about the real world when they read fictional narratives, even when those narratives are presented as fiction, and subjects are warned that the narratives may contain falsehoods. We consider Nishi Shah’s teleologist’s dilemma and a response to it from Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen which appeals to weak truth regulation as a feature common to all belief. We argue that beliefs from fiction indicate that there is not a basic level of truth regulation common to all beliefs, and thus the teleologist’s dilemma remains. We consider two objections to our argument. First, that the attitudes gained through reading fiction are not beliefs, and thus teleologists are not required to account for them in their theory. We respond to this concern by defending a doxastic account of the attitudes gained from fiction. Second, that these beliefs are in fact appropriately truth-aimed, insofar as readers form beliefs upon what they take to be author testimony. We respond to this concern by suggesting that the conditions under which one can form justified beliefs upon testimony are not met in the cases we discuss. Lastly, we gesture towards a teleological account grounded in biological function, which is not vulnerable to our argument. We conclude that beliefs from fiction present a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief

The Relationship Between Risk, Incentive Pay, and Organizational Performance

In this study we extend agency based research by examining the role of risk in the structure of managerial compensation and its relationship to organization performance. Our results suggest that organizations facing higher risk do not place greater emphasis on short term incentives, they place less emphasis on it. Also, higher risk firms which rely on incentive pay exhibited poorer performance than high risk firms which de-emphasize incentive pay