55,220 research outputs found
Review of Making the Social World by John Searle (2010) (review revised 2019)
Before commenting in detail on making the Social World (MSW) I will first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will help greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW and other books by these two geniuses of descriptive psychology.
S makes no reference to Wâs prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). Sâs work is vastly easier to follow than Wâs, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W S and other books for more details.
Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from Sâs half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my reviews). Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with Wâs perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Another cartoon portrait of the mind from the reductionist metaphysicians--a review of Peter Carruthers âThe Opacity of Mindâ (2011) (review revised 2019)
Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life, but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). After summarizing the framework worked out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as extended by modern reasoning research, I show the inadequacies in Carrutherâs views, which pervade most discussions of behavior, including contemporary behavioral sciences. I maintain that his book is an amalgam of two books, one a summary of cognitive psychology and the other a summary of the standard philosophical confusions on the mind with some new jargon added. I suggest that the latter should be regarded as incoherent or as a cartoon view of life and that taking Wittgenstein at his word, we can practice successful self therapy by regarding the mind/body issue as a language/body issue.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (review revised 2019)
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior.
First one might note that putting âmetaâ in front of any word should be suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of âherâ and âhersâ and âsheâ or âhe/sheâ etc., where âtheyâ and âtheirsâ and âthemâ would do nicely. Likewise, the use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searleâs framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the import of Wâs anti-theoretical stance on p65. He needs to give more emphasis to âOn Certaintyâ, recently the subject of much effort by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva and others and summarized in my recent articles.
Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia dot edu and philpapers dot org , but for PMS Hacker see his papers on his Oxford page.
He gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen.
âThere must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Fregeâs reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackieâs error theory or Dummettâs intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quineâs account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarskiâs response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical âteleportationâ scenarios.â
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Art echo: MariÌa Zambrano and the Kouroi Relief
The aim of this paper is to examine the role of early Greek thought in the work of MariÌa Zambrano, a Spanish critic and philosopher who lived most of her life in exile (1939 - 1984). Zambrano incorporates Greek concepts into her writing as a means to question conventional Philosophy, not as an aim or teÌlos, but as an uncomfortable dwelling that paradoxically leads into suspension and doubt. Key concepts and artistic figures emerge in her seemingly illogical reasoning (ârazoÌn poeÌticaâ) such as those arising from her work on the Greek âKouroi.â Zambrano refuses fixity in Philosophy, where logic and method can be rigorously apprehended. She gracefully takes another turn: by elucidating ancient wisdom through allusive metaphors and ancient ruins, she resists direct pathways into History and Truth. Her style takes after her thinking and can often meander into the realms of enigma, mysticism, and other unconventional forms of thought such as intuition and dreams
Review of Wittgensteinâs Philosophical Investigations by David Stern (2004)(review revised 2019)
Overall Stern does a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is one of the top W scholars, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also), then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior.
As Stern is aware, throughout Wâs works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited and handwritten German notes, with âSatzâ being frequently incorrectly rendered as âpropositionâ (which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to our non-falsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct âsentenceâ, which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as âthese are my handsâ or âTyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million years agoâ.
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Robot Betrayal: a guide to the ethics of robotic deception
If a robot sends a deceptive signal to a human user, is this always and everywhere an unethical act, or might it sometimes be ethically desirable? Building upon previous work in robot ethics, this article tries to clarify and refine our understanding of the ethics of robotic deception. It does so by making three arguments. First, it argues that we need to distinguish between three main forms of robotic deception (external state deception; superficial state deception; and hidden state deception) in order to think clearly about its ethics. Second, it argues that the second type of deception â superficial state deception â is not best thought of as a form of deception, even though it is frequently criticised as such. And third, it argues that the third type of deception is best understood as a form of betrayal because doing so captures the unique ethical harm to which it gives rise, and justifies special ethical protections against its use
Action Plans and Socio-Economic Evolutionary Change
An important challenge to evolutionary economics consists of how to tackle with the dramatic tension between purposeful human action and the âblindnessâ of evolutionary processes. On the one hand, economic action, if rational, has to be planned (which implies purposeful ordering of the means used to achieve objectives). On the other hand, an evolutionary process involves both the emergence of novelties (both intended innovations and unintended consequences of actions) and properties that manifest at meso and macro levels. Some recent papers have insisted on these issues. However, few analytical tools are yet available to cope with both, the analysis of intended dynamic action and âblindâ evolution. In this paper we propose the so-called âaction plan approachâ, a theoretical framework which could be useful for this task. The development of tools that permit us to analyze how individuals construct their plans, the projective (conjectural) and interactive nature of action, and the learning processes involved in âplanning and actingâ, may help us identifying and understanding new sources of complexity of economic processes. The close relationship of the âaction plan approachâ with other systemic conceptual approaches is also highlighted.connections, action plans; novelty; intentionality; evolutionary economic process
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