1,718 research outputs found
Cheating-Resilient Incentive Scheme for Mobile Crowdsensing Systems
Mobile Crowdsensing is a promising paradigm for ubiquitous sensing, which
explores the tremendous data collected by mobile smart devices with prominent
spatial-temporal coverage. As a fundamental property of Mobile Crowdsensing
Systems, temporally recruited mobile users can provide agile, fine-grained, and
economical sensing labors, however their self-interest cannot guarantee the
quality of the sensing data, even when there is a fair return. Therefore, a
mechanism is required for the system server to recruit well-behaving users for
credible sensing, and to stimulate and reward more contributive users based on
sensing truth discovery to further increase credible reporting. In this paper,
we develop a novel Cheating-Resilient Incentive (CRI) scheme for Mobile
Crowdsensing Systems, which achieves credibility-driven user recruitment and
payback maximization for honest users with quality data. Via theoretical
analysis, we demonstrate the correctness of our design. The performance of our
scheme is evaluated based on extensive realworld trace-driven simulations. Our
evaluation results show that our scheme is proven to be effective in terms of
both guaranteeing sensing accuracy and resisting potential cheating behaviors,
as demonstrated in practical scenarios, as well as those that are intentionally
harsher
Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey
The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the
spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of
the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the
past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense
strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide
a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine
attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the
preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection
techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear
and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects:
the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the
games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing
Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack
parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next,
from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify
the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the
state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure
CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research
challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral
Unifying Threats Against Information Integrity In Participatory Crowd Sensing
This article proposes a unified threat landscape for participatory crowd sensing (P-CS) systems. Specifically, it focuses on attacks from organized malicious actors that may use the knowledge of P-CS platform\u27s operations and exploit algorithmic weaknesses in AI-based methods of event trust, user reputation, decision-making, or recommendation models deployed to preserve information integrity in P-CS. We emphasize on intent driven malicious behaviors by advanced adversaries and how attacks are crafted to achieve those attack impacts. Three directions of the threat model are introduced, such as attack goals, types, and strategies. We expand on how various strategies are linked with different attack types and goals, underscoring formal definition, their relevance, and impact on the P-CS platform
Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests
Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers\u27 types (e.g., abilities or costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their respective types are also different. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for such scenarios using an asymmetric all-pay contest (or auction) model. Our design objective is an optimal mechanism, i.e., one that maximizes the crowdsourcing revenue minus cost. To achieve this, we furnish the contest with a prize tuple which is an array of reward functions each for a potential winner. We prove and characterize the unique equilibrium of this contest, and solve the optimal prize tuple. In addition, this study discovers a counter-intuitive property, called strategy autonomy (SA), which means that heterogeneous workers behave independently of one another as if they were in a homogeneous setting. In game-theoretical terms, it says that an asymmetric auction admits a symmetric equilibrium. Not only theoretically interesting, but SA also has important practical implications on mechanism complexity, energy efficiency, crowdsourcing revenue, and system scalability. By scrutinizing seven mechanisms, our extensive performance evaluation demonstrates the superior performance of our mechanism as well as offers insights into the SA property
Distributed Time-Sensitive Task Selection in Mobile Crowdsensing
With the rich set of embedded sensors installed in smartphones and the large
number of mobile users, we witness the emergence of many innovative commercial
mobile crowdsensing applications that combine the power of mobile technology
with crowdsourcing to deliver time-sensitive and location-dependent information
to their customers. Motivated by these real-world applications, we consider the
task selection problem for heterogeneous users with different initial
locations, movement costs, movement speeds, and reputation levels. Computing
the social surplus maximization task allocation turns out to be an NP-hard
problem. Hence we focus on the distributed case, and propose an asynchronous
and distributed task selection (ADTS) algorithm to help the users plan their
task selections on their own. We prove the convergence of the algorithm, and
further characterize the computation time for users' updates in the algorithm.
Simulation results suggest that the ADTS scheme achieves the highest Jain's
fairness index and coverage comparing with several benchmark algorithms, while
yielding similar user payoff to a greedy centralized benchmark. Finally, we
illustrate how mobile users coordinate under the ADTS scheme based on some
practical movement time data derived from Google Maps
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