'He was made man' [Review] Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank: The monstrosity of Christ: paradox or dialectic?

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German Idealism Meets Indian Vedanta and Kasmiri Saivism

Regarding each philosophy as a variation of that of Spinoza, this article compares the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel with the Indian Vedanta of Sa?kara and Ramanuja, as well as Abhinavagupta\u27s Kasmiri Saivism. It argues that only Hegel\u27s philosophy does not fail. For Śaṅkara, Ramanuja, Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, the experience of ultimate reality—Brahman for Śaṅkara and Ramanuja, Siva for Abhinavagupta, the Absolute for Schelling—is self-authenticating and so excludes the possibility of error. However, there is also no possibility of truth as no criterion distinguishes truth from error when individuals make contradictory claims. By contrast, Hegel\u27s Geist is an extended mind that potentially encompasses the human community. Geist develops historically. Experience is conceptual and concepts must be socially recognized to be legitimate. Experience is fallible, for Hegel, and better accounts are obtained through mutual criticism. Although disagreement represents an impassible impasse for Sa?kara, Ramanuja, Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, it is the road forward for Hegel

Interests without History: Some Difficulties for a Negative Aristotelianism

This paper focuses on 3 features of Freyenhagen's Aristotelian version of Adorno. (a) It challenges the strict negativism Freyenhagen finds in Adorno. If we have morally relevant interests in ourselves, it is implicit that we have a standard by which to understand what is both good and bad for us (our interests). Because strict negativism operates without reference to what is good, it seems to be detached from real interests too. Torture, it is argued, is, among other things, a violation of those interests. (b) Freyenhagen identifies the “impulse” in Adorno as an untutored yet moral reaction to morally demanding situations. The plausibility of this primitivism and its compatibility with Adorno's general worries about immediacy are considered. (c) The disruptive character of Adorno's version of the categorical imperative, its willingness to complicate action through wholesale reflection on the norms of what we are committing ourselves to, is set in contrast with Freyenhagen's Aristotelian claim that certain notions, such as “humanity,” cannot be intelligibly questioned

Philosophy of Action

There are a number of questions, the answers to which define specific theoretical approaches to Hegel’s philosophy of action. To begin with, does Hegel attempt to give a theory of free will that responds to the naturalistic skepticism so prevalent in the history of modern philosophy? Though some scholars hold that he is interested in providing such a theory, perhaps the majority view is that Hegel instead socializes his conception of the will such that the traditional naturalistic worries are no longer germane.1 A second question is: does Hegel have a theory of action as such that competes with those found in the history of modern philosophy and more particularly in the Anglophone literature from the mid-20th century onwards? Though perhaps the majority view is that Hegel does have such a theory of action, it is commonly held to be independent of any commitments to a conception of free will, and to take a form radically different from the other offerings in the literature in virtue of introducing and essentially retrospective rather than prospective relation between the agent and her action

Classical Political Economy Sifted Through Dialectical Reason: The Hegelian rereading

This article examines the analysis of the economic system developed by Hegel in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. It shows how this analysis amounts not to a reworking and development of the theses of classical political economy, but rather to their dialectical reinterpretation. This particular logic of apprehension grounds the specificity of the Hegelian view of the economic sphere and its irreducibility to classical theses. The article explains how this particular logic of apprehension leads Hegel to bring to the foreground the insufficiencies of the market-based mode of coordination of individual destinies, as well as the necessity that this mode of coordination be surpassed both by and in the rational state. The article, then, focuses on the specificity of the articulation that Hegel conceives between civil society and the state. It shows how Hegel, surpassing the liberalism-state interventionism opposition, sketches an institutional device ensuring the advent of an ethical economy.Ethical economy ; civil society ; Hegel ; classical political economy

The structure and method of Hegel\u27s Phenomenology

H. S. Harris is one of the great Hegel scholars of our era. I want to present a view different from his of how Hegel\u27s Phenomenology of Spirit is organized, what it is trying to do, and where it is trying to go. I hope my disagreements with Professor Harris will succeed in being dialectical; that is, that they will give rise to contradiction that allows for the generation of further insight. The proclaimed task of the Phenomenology is to educate, train, or culture ordinary consciousness, to raise it to the level of what Hegel calls science -or true knowledge.1 The Phenomenology is a movement from the simplest form of knowledge, senseI knowledge, all the way to abaolute knowing, that is, total, all-encompassing knowledge

Infinity

Prose by Eric Baugh. Finalist in the 2018 Manuscripts Prose Contest

Hegel and the Philosophy of Food

In this review of Robert Pippin?s recent book [Hegel?s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)], elements of Hegel?s Practical Philosophy are assessed both against opposed philosophical positions and by the guidance they offer in thinking through the practical matter of deciding what to eat

Impure Postmodernity -- Philosophy Today

Hegel, Heidegger, Postmodernity reconsidered after 20 years

Infinite vs. Singularity. Between Leibniz and Hegel

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the controversial problem of the relationship between the philosophy of Hegel and Leibniz. Beyond the thick curtain of historical references (which have been widely developed by scholars), it is in fact possible to assume some guideline concepts (i.e. those of \u2018singularity\u2019 and \u2018infinity\u2019) to reconstruct the deep theoretical influence which Leibniz played in Hegel\u2019s thought since the Jenaer Systementwurf of 1804/05