Multi-level selection and the issue of environmental homogeneity

In this paper, I identify two general positions with respect to the relationship between environment and natural selection. These positions consist in claiming that selective claims need and, respectively, need not be relativized to homogenous environments. I then show that adopting one or the other position makes a difference with respect to the way in which the effects of selection are to be measured in certain cases in which the focal population is distributed over heterogeneous environments. Moreover, I show that these two positions lead to two different interpretations – the Pricean and contextualist ones – of a type of selection scenarios in which multiple groups varying in properties affect the change in the metapopulation mean of individual-level traits. Showing that these two interpretations stem from different attitudes towards environmental homogeneity allows me to argue: a) that, unlike the Pricean interpretation, the contextualist interpretation can only claim that drift or selection is responsible for the change in frequency of the focal trait in a given metapopulation if details about whether or not group formation is random are specified; b) that the traditional main objection against the Pricean interpretation – consisting in arguing that the latter takes certain side-effects of individual selection to be effects of group selection – is unconvincing. This leads me to suggest that the ongoing debate about which of the two interpretations is preferable should concentrate on different issues than previously thought

Multi-level selection and the issue of environmental homogeneity

In this paper, I identify two general positions with respect to the relationship between environment and natural selection. These positions consist in claiming that selective claims need and, respectively, need not be relativized to homogenous environments. I then show that adopting one or the other position makes a difference with respect to the way in which the effects of selection are to be measured in certain cases in which the focal population is distributed over heterogeneous environments. Moreover, I show that these two positions lead to two different interpretations – the Pricean and contextualist ones – of a type of selection scenarios in which multiple groups varying in properties affect the change in the metapopulation mean of individual-level traits. Showing that these two interpretations stem from different attitudes towards environmental homogeneity allows me to argue: a) that, unlike the Pricean interpretation, the contextualist interpretation can only claim that drift or selection is responsible for the change in frequency of the focal trait in a given metapopulation if details about whether or not group formation is random are specified; b) that the traditional main objection against the Pricean interpretation – consisting in arguing that the latter takes certain side-effects of individual selection to be effects of group selection – is unconvincing. This leads me to suggest that the ongoing debate about which of the two interpretations is preferable should concentrate on different issues than previously thought

An Analysis of Altruism Between Evolutionary Biology and Social Psychology

Altruism is an important topic to both social psychologists, and evolutionary biologists, though both disciplines will define altruism differently. For social psychology, altruism is an interaction between individuals, where individuals exhibit self-sacrifice for other individuals (MacDonald & She, 2015). Evolutionary biology defines altruism with respect to the individual’s interaction with its environment, where each individual will exhibit self-sacrifice for the sake of the community’s collective fitness as a whole (Earnshaw, 2014). Noting these two different definitions for altruism, this paper intends to critically analyze both the differences, and similarities of altruism through a variety of studied observing altruism between groups and individuals, and between human beings and other animals of the animal kingdom. Two studies cited in this paper, “Altruism Among Relatives And Non-Relatives” by Dr. Howard Rachlin, and Dr. Bryan Jones, and “Group selection and contextual analysis” by Dr. Eugene Earnshaw, use altruism differently for the sake of their tested hypothesis. For this paper, these two articles will be analyzed for their point of view with respect to altruism both for the individual, and for the community the individual would belong to. Utilizing other articles, testing a variety of hypothesis which all utilize altruism to some degree, this paper analyzes the physiological basis of altruism as well as how altruism acts as a positive density dependent trait to persist in a community. Altruism is also analyzed with respect to the individual interaction one would find between two individuals in a community, looking at the benefits one might acquire from exhibiting altruistic behavior. Finally, both definitions are brought together to note both the definitions and similarities between the two disciplines, ideally to eliminate any discrepancies that might exist between the two disciplines to promote collaboration