Sociological and Communication-Theoretical Perspectives on the Commercialization of the Sciences

Both self-organization and organization are important for the further development of the sciences: the two dynamics condition and enable each other. Commercial and public considerations can interact and "interpenetrate" in historical organization; different codes of communication are then "recombined." However, self-organization in the symbolically generalized codes of communication can be expected to operate at the global level. The Triple Helix model allows for both a neo-institutional appreciation in terms of historical networks of university-industry-government relations and a neo-evolutionary interpretation in terms of three functions: (i) novelty production, (i) wealth generation, and (iii) political control. Using this model, one can appreciate both subdynamics. The mutual information in three dimensions enables us to measure the trade-off between organization and self-organization as a possible synergy. The question of optimization between commercial and public interests in the different sciences can thus be made empirical.Comment: Science & Education (forthcoming

Environmental protection and the generalized system of preferences : a legal and appropriate linkage?

This article will question the legality of measures of environmental ‘conditionality’ in the Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] of the European Community [EC]. The GSP is a GATT/WTO authorized scheme which permits developed nations to grant non-reciprocal tariff preferences in favour of developing countries. The objectives of the GSP are primarily development-oriented in that it aims to increase the export earnings of developing countries, promote their industrialization and accelerate rates of economic growth. A recent case taken in the WTO examined the legal contours of the grant of tariff preferences and it is in the light of this that this article will examine the so-called ‘special incentive arrangements’ of the reformed EC GSP which offers additional tariff preferences to developing countries on the ‘condition’ that they adhere to specified standards of environmental protection

Presynaptic modulation as fast synaptic switching: state-dependent modulation of task performance

Neuromodulatory receptors in presynaptic position have the ability to suppress synaptic transmission for seconds to minutes when fully engaged. This effectively alters the synaptic strength of a connection. Much work on neuromodulation has rested on the assumption that these effects are uniform at every neuron. However, there is considerable evidence to suggest that presynaptic regulation may be in effect synapse-specific. This would define a second "weight modulation" matrix, which reflects presynaptic receptor efficacy at a given site. Here we explore functional consequences of this hypothesis. By analyzing and comparing the weight matrices of networks trained on different aspects of a task, we identify the potential for a low complexity "modulation matrix", which allows to switch between differently trained subtasks while retaining general performance characteristics for the task. This means that a given network can adapt itself to different task demands by regulating its release of neuromodulators. Specifically, we suggest that (a) a network can provide optimized responses for related classification tasks without the need to train entirely separate networks and (b) a network can blend a "memory mode" which aims at reproducing memorized patterns and a "novelty mode" which aims to facilitate classification of new patterns. We relate this work to the known effects of neuromodulators on brain-state dependent processing.Comment: 6 pages, 13 figure

Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms For Market Intermediation

A prevalent market structure in the Internet economy consists of buyers and sellers connected by a platform (such as Amazon or eBay) that acts as an intermediary and keeps a share of the revenue of each transaction. While the optimal mechanism that maximizes the intermediary's profit in such a setting may be quite complicated, the mechanisms observed in reality are generally much simpler, e.g., applying an affine function to the price of the transaction as the intermediary's fee. Loertscher and Niedermayer [2007] initiated the study of such fee-setting mechanisms in two-sided markets, and we continue this investigation by addressing the question of when an affine fee schedule is approximately optimal for worst-case seller distribution. On one hand our work supplies non-trivial sufficient conditions on the buyer side (i.e. linearity of marginal revenue function, or MHR property of value and value minus cost distributions) under which an affine fee schedule can obtain a constant fraction of the intermediary's optimal profit for all seller distributions. On the other hand we complement our result by showing that proper affine fee-setting mechanisms (e.g. those used in eBay and Amazon selling plans) are unable to extract a constant fraction of optimal profit in the worst-case seller distribution. As subsidiary results we also show there exists a constant gap between maximum surplus and maximum revenue under the aforementioned conditions. Most of the mechanisms that we propose are also prior-independent with respect to the seller, which signifies the practical implications of our result.Comment: To appear in WINE'14, the 10th conference on Web and Internet Economic

Consensus-based approach to peer-to-peer electricity markets with product differentiation

With the sustained deployment of distributed generation capacities and the more proactive role of consumers, power systems and their operation are drifting away from a conventional top-down hierarchical structure. Electricity market structures, however, have not yet embraced that evolution. Respecting the high-dimensional, distributed and dynamic nature of modern power systems would translate to designing peer-to-peer markets or, at least, to using such an underlying decentralized structure to enable a bottom-up approach to future electricity markets. A peer-to-peer market structure based on a Multi-Bilateral Economic Dispatch (MBED) formulation is introduced, allowing for multi-bilateral trading with product differentiation, for instance based on consumer preferences. A Relaxed Consensus+Innovation (RCI) approach is described to solve the MBED in fully decentralized manner. A set of realistic case studies and their analysis allow us showing that such peer-to-peer market structures can effectively yield market outcomes that are different from centralized market structures and optimal in terms of respecting consumers preferences while maximizing social welfare. Additionally, the RCI solving approach allows for a fully decentralized market clearing which converges with a negligible optimality gap, with a limited amount of information being shared.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Power System