Bicriteria Network Design Problems

We study a general class of bicriteria network design problems. A generic problem in this class is as follows: Given an undirected graph and two minimization objectives (under different cost functions), with a budget specified on the first, find a <subgraph \from a given subgraph-class that minimizes the second objective subject to the budget on the first. We consider three different criteria - the total edge cost, the diameter and the maximum degree of the network. Here, we present the first polynomial-time approximation algorithms for a large class of bicriteria network design problems for the above mentioned criteria. The following general types of results are presented. First, we develop a framework for bicriteria problems and their approximations. Second, when the two criteria are the same %(note that the cost functions continue to be different) we present a ``black box'' parametric search technique. This black box takes in as input an (approximation) algorithm for the unicriterion situation and generates an approximation algorithm for the bicriteria case with only a constant factor loss in the performance guarantee. Third, when the two criteria are the diameter and the total edge costs we use a cluster-based approach to devise a approximation algorithms --- the solutions output violate both the criteria by a logarithmic factor. Finally, for the class of treewidth-bounded graphs, we provide pseudopolynomial-time algorithms for a number of bicriteria problems using dynamic programming. We show how these pseudopolynomial-time algorithms can be converted to fully polynomial-time approximation schemes using a scaling technique.Comment: 24 pages 1 figur

A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares

In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open problems to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests. In this work, we focus on undirected networks and analyze topological properties of the underlying graph so that an optimal Steiner forest can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium (by some separable cost sharing protocol) independent of the edge costs. We term a graph efficient if the above stated property holds. As our main result, we give a complete characterization of efficient undirected graphs for two-player network design games: an undirected graph is efficient if and only if it does not contain (at least) one out of few forbidden subgraphs. Our characterization implies that several graph classes are efficient: generalized series-parallel graphs, fan and wheel graphs and graphs with small cycles.Comment: 60 pages, 69 figures, OR 2017 Berlin, WINE 2017 Bangalor