26,952 research outputs found
Learning the Structure and Parameters of Large-Population Graphical Games from Behavioral Data
We consider learning, from strictly behavioral data, the structure and
parameters of linear influence games (LIGs), a class of parametric graphical
games introduced by Irfan and Ortiz (2014). LIGs facilitate causal strategic
inference (CSI): Making inferences from causal interventions on stable behavior
in strategic settings. Applications include the identification of the most
influential individuals in large (social) networks. Such tasks can also support
policy-making analysis. Motivated by the computational work on LIGs, we cast
the learning problem as maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of a generative
model defined by pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). Our simple formulation
uncovers the fundamental interplay between goodness-of-fit and model
complexity: good models capture equilibrium behavior within the data while
controlling the true number of equilibria, including those unobserved. We
provide a generalization bound establishing the sample complexity for MLE in
our framework. We propose several algorithms including convex loss minimization
(CLM) and sigmoidal approximations. We prove that the number of exact PSNE in
LIGs is small, with high probability; thus, CLM is sound. We illustrate our
approach on synthetic data and real-world U.S. congressional voting records. We
briefly discuss our learning framework's generality and potential applicability
to general graphical games.Comment: Journal of Machine Learning Research. (accepted, pending
publication.) Last conference version: submitted March 30, 2012 to UAI 2012.
First conference version: entitled, Learning Influence Games, initially
submitted on June 1, 2010 to NIPS 201
Mean Field Equilibrium in Dynamic Games with Complementarities
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic
complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the
payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the
empirical distribution of the states of other players. Such games can be used
to model a diverse set of applications, including network security models,
recommender systems, and dynamic search in markets. Stochastic games are
generally difficult to analyze, and these difficulties are only exacerbated
when the number of players is large (as might be the case in the preceding
examples).
We consider an approximation methodology called mean field equilibrium to
study these games. In such an equilibrium, each player reacts to only the long
run average state of other players. We find necessary conditions for the
existence of a mean field equilibrium in such games. Furthermore, as a simple
consequence of this existence theorem, we obtain several natural monotonicity
properties. We show that there exist a "largest" and a "smallest" equilibrium
among all those where the equilibrium strategy used by a player is
nondecreasing, and we also show that players converge to each of these
equilibria via natural myopic learning dynamics; as we argue, these dynamics
are more reasonable than the standard best response dynamics. We also provide
sensitivity results, where we quantify how the equilibria of such games move in
response to changes in parameters of the game (e.g., the introduction of
incentives to players).Comment: 56 pages, 5 figure
Evolutionary Poisson Games for Controlling Large Population Behaviors
Emerging applications in engineering such as crowd-sourcing and
(mis)information propagation involve a large population of heterogeneous users
or agents in a complex network who strategically make dynamic decisions. In
this work, we establish an evolutionary Poisson game framework to capture the
random, dynamic and heterogeneous interactions of agents in a holistic fashion,
and design mechanisms to control their behaviors to achieve a system-wide
objective. We use the antivirus protection challenge in cyber security to
motivate the framework, where each user in the network can choose whether or
not to adopt the software. We introduce the notion of evolutionary Poisson
stable equilibrium for the game, and show its existence and uniqueness. Online
algorithms are developed using the techniques of stochastic approximation
coupled with the population dynamics, and they are shown to converge to the
optimal solution of the controller problem. Numerical examples are used to
illustrate and corroborate our results
Robust stochastic stability
A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.Learning in games, stochastic stability, radius-coradius theorems, logit-response dynamics, mutations, imitation
Natural Language Does Not Emerge 'Naturally' in Multi-Agent Dialog
A number of recent works have proposed techniques for end-to-end learning of
communication protocols among cooperative multi-agent populations, and have
simultaneously found the emergence of grounded human-interpretable language in
the protocols developed by the agents, all learned without any human
supervision!
In this paper, using a Task and Tell reference game between two agents as a
testbed, we present a sequence of 'negative' results culminating in a
'positive' one -- showing that while most agent-invented languages are
effective (i.e. achieve near-perfect task rewards), they are decidedly not
interpretable or compositional.
In essence, we find that natural language does not emerge 'naturally',
despite the semblance of ease of natural-language-emergence that one may gather
from recent literature. We discuss how it is possible to coax the invented
languages to become more and more human-like and compositional by increasing
restrictions on how two agents may communicate.Comment: 9 pages, 7 figures, 2 tables, accepted at EMNLP 2017 as short pape
Competitive Gradient Descent
We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria
of competitive two-player games. Our method is a natural generalization of
gradient descent to the two-player setting where the update is given by the
Nash equilibrium of a regularized bilinear local approximation of the
underlying game. It avoids oscillatory and divergent behaviors seen in
alternating gradient descent. Using numerical experiments and rigorous
analysis, we provide a detailed comparison to methods based on \emph{optimism}
and \emph{consensus} and show that our method avoids making any unnecessary
changes to the gradient dynamics while achieving exponential (local)
convergence for (locally) convex-concave zero sum games. Convergence and
stability properties of our method are robust to strong interactions between
the players, without adapting the stepsize, which is not the case with previous
methods. In our numerical experiments on non-convex-concave problems, existing
methods are prone to divergence and instability due to their sensitivity to
interactions among the players, whereas we never observe divergence of our
algorithm. The ability to choose larger stepsizes furthermore allows our
algorithm to achieve faster convergence, as measured by the number of model
evaluations.Comment: Appeared in NeurIPS 2019. This version corrects an error in theorem
2.2. Source code used for the numerical experiments can be found under
http://github.com/f-t-s/CGD. A high-level overview of this work can be found
under http://f-t-s.github.io/projects/cgd
- …