14 research outputs found
A quantum-information-theoretic complement to a general-relativistic implementation of a beyond-Turing computer
There exists a growing literature on the so-called physical Church-Turing
thesis in a relativistic spacetime setting. The physical Church-Turing thesis
is the conjecture that no computing device that is physically realizable (even
in principle) can exceed the computational barriers of a Turing machine. By
suggesting a concrete implementation of a beyond-Turing computer in a spacetime
setting, Istv\'an N\'emeti and Gyula D\'avid (2006) have shown how an
appreciation of the physical Church-Turing thesis necessitates the confluence
of mathematical, computational, physical, and indeed cosmological ideas. In
this essay, I will honour Istv\'an's seventieth birthday, as well as his
longstanding interest in, and his seminal contributions to, this field going
back to as early as 1987 by modestly proposing how the concrete implementation
in N\'emeti and D\'avid (2006) might be complemented by a
quantum-information-theoretic communication protocol between the computing
device and the logician who sets the beyond-Turing computer a task such as
determining the consistency of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. This suggests that
even the foundations of quantum theory and, ultimately, quantum gravity may
play an important role in determining the validity of the physical
Church-Turing thesis.Comment: 27 pages, 5 figures. Forthcoming in Synthese. Matches published
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In Defense of a Constructive Truth Concept
I address some major critical arguments against a constructive truth concept and intuitionist logic. I put the notions of in principle possibilities and valid constructions (mathematical proofs) under scrutiny. I argue that the objections against a constructive account of truth miss target, thus they are not decisive. Eventually, constructivism is at least as cogent and natural a stance as realism
In Defense of a Constructive Truth Concept
I address some major critical arguments against a constructive truth concept and intuitionist logic. I put the notions of in principle possibilities and valid constructions (mathematical proofs) under scrutiny. I argue that the objections against a constructive account of truth miss target, thus they are not decisive. Eventually, constructivism is at least as cogent and natural a stance as realism
Abstract geometrical computation 7: geometrical accumulations and computably enumerable real numbers
ΠΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Ρ Π½ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ΅ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ (ΠΠ’ΠΠ-2019) : ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ°Π»Ρ XVIII ΠΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄ΡΠ½Π°ΡΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΠΌ. Π. Π€. Π’Π΅ΡΠΏΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²Π°, 26β30 ΠΈΡΠ½Ρ 2019 Π³. Π§. 1
Π‘Π±ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊ ΡΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠΈΡ ΠΈΠ·Π±ΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ°Π»Ρ XVIII ΠΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄ΡΠ½Π°ΡΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½ΠΈ Π.Π€. Π’Π΅ΡΠΏΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²Π° ΠΏΠΎ ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΡΡΠΈΠΌ Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡΠΌ: ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π»Π»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
, ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π½ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠΈ, ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ΅ ΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ΅ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅. ΠΠ»Ρ ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ² Π² ΠΎΠ±Π»Π°ΡΡΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π½ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠΉ ΠΈ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ.Π’Π΅ΠΊΡΡ Π½Π° ΡΡΡ. ΠΈ Π°Π½Π³Π». ΡΠ·