Aplicaciones del Equilibrio de Nash a situaciones reales

El conocido como “Equilibrio de Nash” se ha aplicado y adaptado ampliamente en la economía y otras ciencias del comportamiento. De hecho, la teoría de los juegos, con el equilibrio de Nash como pieza central, se ha convertido en la teoría unificadora más destacada de las ciencias sociales. En este proyecto se introduce al lector en el campo de los juegos, explicando los conceptos que ha de conocer para sacar provecho a la lectura. Se explican los orígenes y la utilidad de la teoría de juegos, así como sus aplicaciones a la vida real, centrándonos en la política y las ciencias sociales. Se ha realizado una simulación de un juego aplicado a la actual crisis de Afganistán.The so-called "Nash equilibrium" has been widely applied and adapted in economics and other behavioral sciences. In fact, game theory, with Nash equilibrium as its centerpiece, has become the most prominent unifying theory in the social sciences. This thesis introduces the reader to the field of games, explaining the concepts he or she needs to know to benefit from the reading. The origins and usefulness of game theory are explained, as well as its applications to real life, focusing on politics and the social sciences. A simulation of a game applied to the current crisis in Afghanistan has been carried out.Universidad de Sevilla. Grado en Ingeniería de Tecnologías Industriale

Sharing and Cooperation in Markets and Organizations: Axiomatic Foundations for the Laws of Coalition Formation in Selected Scenarios

Interactions involving multiple parties and necessitating their agreement are pervasive in both market and non-market settings. As the number of participants increases, these situations become progressively complex to describe and analyze. Despite the prolific nature of such scenarios, a comprehensive conceptual framework addressing such settings is often lacking. The focus of this dissertation lies in a distinct type of multilateral interaction, where a commitment of a group, or a coalition, of participants is required for achieving a positive surplus. The analysis encompasses three scenarios, namely, government formation in parliamentary democracies, bilateral trading on a market with multiple buyers and sellers, and resource allocation in the US presidential campaign. This dissertation proposes an approach that provides axiomatic foundations for a theory of coalition formation in these settings, and, for two of these scenarios, simultaneously provides an empirically accurate forecast methodology