3,392 research outputs found
Apperceptive patterning: Artefaction, extensional beliefs and cognitive scaffolding
In âPsychopower and Ordinary Madnessâ my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stieglerâs recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stieglerâs work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanismâor, more specifically, nonhumanismâto problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Baillyâs conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This paper continues this project but first directs a critical analytic lens at the Derridean practice of the ontologization of grammatization from which Stiegler emerges while also distinguishing how metalanguages operate in relation to object-oriented environmental interaction by way of inferentialism. Stalking continental (Kapp, Simondon, Leroi-Gourhan, etc.) and analytic traditions (e.g., Carnap, Chalmers, Clark, Sutton, Novaes, etc.), we move from artefacts to AI and Predictive Processing so as to link theories related to technicity with philosophy of mind. Simultaneously drawing forth Robert Brandomâs conceptualization of the roles that commitments play in retrospectively reconstructing the social experiences that lead to our endorsement(s) of norms, we compliment this account with Reza Negarestaniâs deprivatized account of intelligence while analyzing the equipollent role between language and media (both digital and analog)
Revealed Unawareness
I develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2009) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. I observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and only if her choices reveal that the event is "null" and the negation of the event is "null". Moreover, I characterize "impersonal" expected utility that is behaviorally indistinguishable from awareness-dependent subject expected utility and assigns probability zero to some subsets of states that are not necessarily events. I discuss in what sense impersonal expected utility can not represent unawareness.Unawareness, awareness, unforeseen contingencies, null, zero probability, subjective expected utility, Anscombe-Aumann, small worlds, extensionality of acts, event exchangeability
Revealed Unawareness
I develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2009) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. I observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and only if her choices reveal that the event is "null" and the negation of the event is "null". Moreover, I characterize "impersonal" expected utility that is behaviorally indistinguishable from awareness-dependent subject expected utility and assigns probability zero to some subsets of states that are not necessarily events. I discuss in what sense impersonal expected utility can not represent unawareness.Unawareness; awareness; unforeseen contingencies; null; zero probability; subjective expected utility; Anscombe-Aumann; small worlds; extensionality of acts; event exchangeability
Computation in Physical Systems: A Normative Mapping Account
The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes and pragmatic goals. Hence there is no independent or uniform fact to the matter, and I advance the âanti-realistâ conclusion that computational descriptions of physical systems are not founded upon deep ontological distinctions, but rather upon interest-relative human conventions. Hence physical computation is a âconventionalâ rather than a ânaturalâ kind
Epistemic cultures in the social sciences: the modeling dilemma - dissolved
'In diesem Artikel soll ein spezielles Problemgebiet gelöst werden, das als Modellierungs-Dilemma bezeichnet wird und das den prekĂ€ren Status vieler Annahmen im Bereich der Modellbildung in der Ăkonomie, der Soziologie oder auch der Politikwissenschaft zum Inhalt hat. Mit dem angebotenen Lösungsansatz sollen zudem gleich zwei neuartige Behauptungen verbunden sein. So können, so die erste Behauptung, die Sozialwissenschaften wenigstens durch zwei unterschiedliche und hochgradig ausdifferenzierte Modellierungsweisen charakterisiert werden, welche zudem komplementĂ€re Informationen bereitstellen und jeweils auf ihre Weise einen Beitrag zum VerstĂ€ndnis komplexer sozio-ökonomischer Ensembles leisten. Zweitens gehören diese beiden unterschiedlichen ModellzugĂ€nge mittlerweile zu jeweils unterschiedlichen epistemischen Kulturen, welche hinkĂŒnftig ko-evolutiv wichtige Ziel- und Brennpunkte fĂŒr die sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungen darstellen werden.' (Autorenreferat)'The main purpose of this paper lies in the solution of a specific problem area, referred to as modeling dilemma. In doing so, two major and, hopefully, innovative claims can be made: first, the social sciences can be characterized by at least two pragmatically highly differentiated modeling approaches to the socio-economic ensembles which, in different degrees, offer complementary classes of information and which, moreover, increase the understanding of the complexities of these socio-economic universes. Second, these two major modeling approaches have become, by now, part and parcel of separate epistemic cultures which will, in a process of co-evolution, form major basins of attraction for future practices within the social sciences.' (author's abstract)
Common Knowledge and Interactive Behaviors: A Survey
This paper surveys the notion of common knowledge taken from game theory and computer science. It studies and illustrates more generally the effects of interactive knowledge in economic and social problems. First of all, common knowledge is shown to be a central concept and often a necessary condition for coordination, equilibrium achievement, agreement, and consensus. We present how common knowledge can be practically generated, for example, by particular advertisements or leadership. Secondly, we prove that common knowledge can be harmful, essentially in various cooperation and negotiation problems, and more generally when there are con icts of interest. Finally, in some asymmetric relationships, common knowledge is shown to be preferable for some players, but not for all. The ambiguous welfare effects of higher-order knowledge on interactive behaviors leads us to analyze the role of decentralized communication in order to deal with dynamic or endogenous information structures.Interactive knowledge, common knowledge, information structure, communication.
Logical models for bounded reasoners
This dissertation aims at the logical modelling of aspects of human reasoning, informed by facts on the bounds of human cognition. We break down this challenge into three parts. In Part I, we discuss the place of logical systems for knowledge and belief in the Rationality Debate and we argue for systems that formalize an alternative picture of rationality -- one wherein empirical facts have a key role (Chapter 2). In Part II, we design logical models that encode explicitly the deductive reasoning of a single bounded agent and the variety of processes underlying it. This is achieved through the introduction of a dynamic, resource-sensitive, impossible-worlds semantics (Chapter 3). We then show that this type of semantics can be combined with plausibility models (Chapter 4) and that it can be instrumental in modelling the logical aspects of System 1 (âfastâ) and System 2 (âslowâ) cognitive processes (Chapter 5). In Part III, we move from single- to multi-agent frameworks. This unfolds in three directions: (a) the formation of beliefs about others (e.g. due to observation, memory, and communication), (b) the manipulation of beliefs (e.g. via acts of reasoning about oneself and others), and (c) the effect of the above on group reasoning. These questions are addressed, respectively, in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. We finally discuss directions for future work and we reflect on the contribution of the thesis as a whole (Chapter 9)
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