9,725 research outputs found

    Game-Theoretic Security for Two-Party Protocols

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    Asharov, Canetti, and Hazay (Eurocrypt 2011) studied how game-theoretic concepts can be used to capture the cryptographic properties of correctness, privacy, and fairness in two-party protocols for fail- stop adversaries. In this work, we further study the characterization of the cryptographic properties of specific two-party protocols, oblivious transfer (OT) and commitment, in terms of game theory. Specif- ically, for each protocol, OT and commitment, we define a two-party game between rational sender and receiver together with their utility functions. Then, we prove that a given protocol satisfies cryptographic properties if and only if the strategy of following the protocol is in a Nash equilibrium. Compared to the previous work of Asharov et al., our characterization has several advantages: The game is played by multiple rational parties; All the cryptographic properties of OT/commitment are characterized by a single game; Security for malicious adversaries is considered; Utility functions are specified in general forms based on the preferences of the parties; A solution concept employed is a plain Nash equilibrium. Based on the above equivalence between game-theoretic and cryptographic security, we introduce a new game-theoretic security by considering several unsatisfactory points in the utility functions of the game-theoretic framework. Then, we show that it is equivalent to the cryptographic security against risk- averse adversaries, who behave maliciously, but does not act in a way that can cause the other party’s successful attacks. Our results indicate that the security against risk-averse adversaries may be more natural from the perspective of game theory

    A Rational Approach to Cryptographic Protocols

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    This work initiates an analysis of several cryptographic protocols from a rational point of view using a game-theoretical approach, which allows us to represent not only the protocols but also possible misbehaviours of parties. Concretely, several concepts of two-person games and of two-party cryptographic protocols are here combined in order to model the latters as the formers. One of the main advantages of analysing a cryptographic protocol in the game-theory setting is the possibility of describing improved and stronger cryptographic solutions because possible adversarial behaviours may be taken into account directly. With those tools, protocols can be studied in a malicious model in order to find equilibrium conditions that make possible to protect honest parties against all possible strategies of adversaries

    Universally Composable Security With Local Adversaries

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    The traditional approach to formalizing ideal-model based definitions of security for multi-party protocols models adversaries (both real and ideal) as centralized entities that control all parties that deviate from the protocol. While this centralized-adversary modeling suffices for capturing basic security properties such as secrecy of local inputs and correctness of outputs against coordinated attacks, it turns out to be inadequate for capturing security properties that involve restricting the sharing of information between separate adversarial entities. Indeed, to capture collusion-freeness and and game-theoretic solution concepts, Alwen et.al. [Crypto, 2012] propose a new ideal-model based definitional framework that involves a de-centralized adversary. We propose an alternative framework to that of Alwen et. al. We then observe that our framework allows capturing not only collusion-freeness and game-theoretic solution concepts, but also several other properties that involve the restriction of information flow among adversarial entities. These include some natural flavors of anonymity, deniability, timing separation, and information confinement. We also demonstrate the inability of existing formalisms to capture these properties. We then prove strong composition properties for the proposed framework, and use these properties to demonstrate the security, within the new framework, of two very different protocols for securely evaluating any function of the parties’ inputs

    Quantum Cryptography Beyond Quantum Key Distribution

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    Quantum cryptography is the art and science of exploiting quantum mechanical effects in order to perform cryptographic tasks. While the most well-known example of this discipline is quantum key distribution (QKD), there exist many other applications such as quantum money, randomness generation, secure two- and multi-party computation and delegated quantum computation. Quantum cryptography also studies the limitations and challenges resulting from quantum adversaries---including the impossibility of quantum bit commitment, the difficulty of quantum rewinding and the definition of quantum security models for classical primitives. In this review article, aimed primarily at cryptographers unfamiliar with the quantum world, we survey the area of theoretical quantum cryptography, with an emphasis on the constructions and limitations beyond the realm of QKD.Comment: 45 pages, over 245 reference
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