Alldred, P. (2003) Globalno razmisljanje, lokalno delovanje: price aktivistkinja, TEMIDA, 4 (6) p23-31

Anti-globalisation activists have been thoroughly demonised in the UK national media in the past year, receiving the kind of coverage usually reserved for ‘anarchists’ in the tabloid press. That is, the ‘mindless thugs’ caricature of young white men in black ‘hoodies’ intent on violence. Needless to say, this type of coverage isn’t often accompanied by any representation of protestors’ own views. In fact, when reports of protest can focus on ‘violence’, actual political grievances – the issues and the need for direct action responses to them - are ignored. Even more rare is the chance to hear women’s anger at the injustice of global capitalism and frustration at the broken promises of democracy. This piece presents the accounts of UK-based women activists against global and globalising capitalism. Contested though they are within ‘the movement’, at least the terms ‘anti-globalisation’ or ‘anti-capitalism’ say something about what is protested against, and understood together best represent the perspectives of women such as these

Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism

The authors show how microeconomic concepts and principles are applicable to the study of terrorism. The utility maximization model provides insights into both terrorist resource allocation choices and government counterterrorism efforts, while basic game theory helps characterize the strategic interdependencies among terrorists and governments.terrorism; rational choice model; income and substitution effects; Slutsky equation; game theory; prisoners’ dilemma; chicken; public goods

"Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't": Mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations

This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period signaling game. The terrorists, taking into account the government's counter-terrorism response to first period attacks, gain additional manpower from successful attacks and choose their strategy to maximize the available manpower at the end of period 2. The government tries to infer the terrorist organization's size from the terrorists' attack choice it observes in period 1 and adjusts its second period counter-terrorism spending according to the perceived threat of terrorism. Combining the signaling game and organizational growth approaches of previous contributions, this paper shows that, if a terrorist group follows a growth strategy, it has an incentive to appear weaker than it is by mimicking the behaviour of a smaller organization. Furthermore, depending on its beliefs about the extent of the terrorist threat it can be optimal for a government to spend more on second period counter-terrorism measures if it is not attacked than if it were attacked. The behaviour of contemporary terrorist groups suggests that the assumptions of a growth strategy and mimicking behaviour are justified

The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV, Issue 10

This repository item contains a single issue of The ISCIP Analyst, an analytical review journal published from 1996 to 2010 by the Boston University Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy

Considering a war with Iran

The paper is a strategic studies analyis of the war-fronts, weapon systems and political-military tactics of a U.S.-Iranian war, including the U.S. use of nuclear weapons

Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries

violence;international relations;international security;terrorism

Transnational Terrorism as a Spillover of Domestic Disputes in Other Countries

conflict, terrorism, civil war

Federalism as an effective antidote to terrorism

Many governments as well as terrorist experts see the use of military and police forces as the only way to effectively counter terrorism. The most effective negative sanctions are considered to be military strikes, aggressive actions (including kidnapping and killing) against individuals known or suspected of being terrorists, or against persons supporting and harboring terrorists. Overt and covert military and paramilitary action is also thought advisable to pre-empt and prevent actions by terrorist groups, as well as against states suspected of hosting or tolerating terrorists. This paper argues that decentralization constitutes a powerful antidote as it strongly reduces the incentives for terrorists to attack and because the expected damage suffered is much smaller than in a centralized society. It moreover strengthens society, as economic, political and social decentralization (or polycentricity) is an essential element of a free and vigorous society. This in turn makes a society less vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Indeed, terrorism has no chance of success against a society that actively guards its fundamental liberal institutions, of which decentralized decision-making forms an essential part