Institutional Effects in a Simple Model of Educational Production

This paper presents a model of educational production that tries to make sense of recent evidence on effects of institutional arrangements on student performance. In a simple principal-agent framework, students choose their learning effort to maximize their net benefits, while the government chooses educational spending to maximize its net benefits. In the jointly determined equilibrium, schooling quality is shown to depend on several institutionally determined parameters. The impact on student performance of institutions such as central examinations, centralization versus school autonomy, teachers\u27 influence, parental influence, and competition from private schools is analyzed. Furthermore, the model can rationalize why positive resource effects may be lacking in educational production

An Investigation into Game Based Learning Using High Level Programming Languages

Game-related education within mobile learning spheres is a matter of great debate for university students across the globe. It is the case that programming languages often pose a sizeable challenge for university students. This research paper aims to develop a game based learning platform “iPlayCode”, designed to offer a new and exciting method of learning programming language. Xcode 5.0.2 was used to develop the game by using the cocos2d-x development tool and the Adobe Photoshop graphic design tool. In addition, iOS 7.0.3 (11B508) Simulator was used to test the application and the application was deployed in different models of mobile devices such as the iPhone and iPad. The application outcomes are presented by a mobile game that teaches programming languages in an easy, attractive and effective way

Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining

A persistently troubling question in the legal-economic literature is why cases proceed to trial. Litigation is a negative-sum proposition for the litigants-the longer the process continues, the lower their aggregate wealth. Although civil litigation is resolved by settlement in an estimated 95 percent of all disputes, what accounts for the failure of the remaining 5 percent to settle prior to trial

An Interactive Game Approach to Learning in Historical Geology and Paleontology

This article describes an interactive game that can be used in conjunction with traditional laboratory work, group discussions, student presentations, and writing exercises. It provides an enjoyable and motivating dimension to a university seminar/lab course in Historical Geology and Paleontology. A simple spelling-bee-type game evolves over ten weeks into a room-sized board game based on the geologic time scale. The game helps students learn fossil morphology, identification, classification, and paleoecology while illustrating the occurrences of important fossil groups, sea level fluctuations, and orogenic events through time. It also serves as an effective means for evaluating student progress in the laboratory. Although the game content is designed for geology majors in a university setting, the time scale game board can easily be adapted to a secondary school environment. Educational levels: Graduate or professional

Hidden Benefits of Reward: A Field Experiment on Motivation and Monetary Incentives

We conducted a field experiment in a controlled work environment to investigate the effect of motivational talk and its interaction with monetary incentives. We find that motivational talk significantly improves performance only when accompanied by performance pay. Moreover, performance pay slightly reduces performance unless it is accompanied by motivational talk. These effects also carry over to the quality of work. Performance pay alone leads to more mistakes. Adding motivational talk makes the difference. In treatments with performance pay, motivational talk increases output by about 20 percent and reduces the ratio of mistakes by more than 40 percent

The UN in the lab

We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Defense and Prevention. Defense consists of investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack, and generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists. In contrast, Prevention, which consists of investing in resources that reduce the ability of the terrorist organization to mount an attack, creates a positive externality by reducing the overall threat of terrorism for all. This interaction is captured using a simple 3×3 “Nested Prisoner’s Dilemma” game, with a single Nash equilibrium where both countries choose Defense. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN) can be utilized to facilitate coordination by implementing agreements to share the burden of Prevention. We introduce an institution that implements a burden-sharing policy for Prevention, and investigate experimentally whether subjects coordinate on a cooperative strategy more frequently under different levels of cost sharing. In all treatments, burden sharing leaves the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure and Nash equilibrium of the game unchanged. We compare three levels of burden sharing to a baseline in a between-subjects design, and find that burden sharing generates a non-linear effect on the choice of the efficient Prevention strategy and overall performance. Only an institution supporting a high level of mandatory burden sharing generates a significant improvement in the use of the Prevention strategy

CHARDA: Causal Hybrid Automata Recovery via Dynamic Analysis

We propose and evaluate a new technique for learning hybrid automata automatically by observing the runtime behavior of a dynamical system. Working from a sequence of continuous state values and predicates about the environment, CHARDA recovers the distinct dynamic modes, learns a model for each mode from a given set of templates, and postulates causal guard conditions which trigger transitions between modes. Our main contribution is the use of information-theoretic measures (1)~as a cost function for data segmentation and model selection to penalize over-fitting and (2)~to determine the likely causes of each transition. CHARDA is easily extended with different classes of model templates, fitting methods, or predicates. In our experiments on a complex videogame character, CHARDA successfully discovers a reasonable over-approximation of the character's true behaviors. Our results also compare favorably against recent work in automatically learning probabilistic timed automata in an aircraft domain: CHARDA exactly learns the modes of these simpler automata.Comment: 7 pages, 2 figures. Accepted for IJCAI 201

Forecasting Player Behavioral Data and Simulating in-Game Events

Understanding player behavior is fundamental in game data science. Video games evolve as players interact with the game, so being able to foresee player experience would help to ensure a successful game development. In particular, game developers need to evaluate beforehand the impact of in-game events. Simulation optimization of these events is crucial to increase player engagement and maximize monetization. We present an experimental analysis of several methods to forecast game-related variables, with two main aims: to obtain accurate predictions of in-app purchases and playtime in an operational production environment, and to perform simulations of in-game events in order to maximize sales and playtime. Our ultimate purpose is to take a step towards the data-driven development of games. The results suggest that, even though the performance of traditional approaches such as ARIMA is still better, the outcomes of state-of-the-art techniques like deep learning are promising. Deep learning comes up as a well-suited general model that could be used to forecast a variety of time series with different dynamic behaviors

Institutional Effects in a Simple Model of Educational Production

The paper presents a model of educational production which tries to make sense of recent evidence on effects of institutional arrangements on student performance. In a simple principal-agent framework, students choose their learning effort to maximize their net benefits, while the government chooses educational spending to maximize its net benefits. In the jointly determined equilibrium, schooling quality is shown to depend on several institutionally determined parameters. The impact on student performance of institutions such as central examinations, centralization versus school autonomy, teachers' influence, parental influence, and competition from private schools is analyzed. Furthermore, the model can rationalize why positive resource effects may be lacking in educational production.