Problemas con el empirismo estricto: lo públicamente observable y el empirismo experiencial interpretado por Alex Rosenberg y Galen Strawson

The use of the word ‘empirical’ in the sciences has created an area of confusion in which it is taken to mean ‘publicly observable’. Although it is understandable, given the success of the sciences, that the use and thought behind the word ‘empirical’ should be used in this manner, this mistake runs into the risk of overstating the reach of scientific enquiry and of denying personal experience altogether. By comparing the philosophies of Alex Rosenberg and Galen Strawson, it will be argued that private experience is an essential component of life that hints at the limitations of public observability.El uso de la palabra ‘empírico’ en la ciencia ha creado una cierta confusión, dado que se suele entender como ‘observable públicamente’. Por mucho que esta concepción de lo empírico haya sido útil en la ciencia, conlleva el riesgo de conferir demasiado poder explicativo a la investigación científica y de incluso negar el valor de la experiencia privada. Mediante una comparación entre las posiciones filosóficas de Alex Rosenberg y Galen Strawson argumentaremos que la experiencia privada constituye un componente esencial de la realidad que pone de relieve las limitaciones de lo públicamente observable

What Do Buddhists Think about Free Will?

A critical overview to the bulk of extant Buddhist theories of free will

Hume’s Theory of Causation: Is There More Than One?

It is traditionally assumed that there is only one theory of causality in Hume's writings. In this article it is shown that we can distinguish between an early and mature theory. It is argued that the mature theory, strongly influenced by Newton's physics, accords with the New Hume interpretation by asserting that real causal relations are not accessible to the human mind

There is No Problem of the Self

Because there is no agreed use of the term ‘self’, or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of ‘the self’ to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of ‘self’ are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves

Panpsychism And Mind-Dust

It is only recently that panpsychism has emerged as a viable position in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. As such, the exploration and defense of it is not yet on par with some competing views. The current project is a step towards a remedy to this unfortunate state of affairs. It concerns one of the most important objections to the view, which I label the \u27mind-dust\u27 objection in homage to William James. It is essentially the conceptual difficulty of how proto-experiential being at the micro-level is supposed to \u27sum\u27 in a way that forms the consciousness with which we are intimately aware. I argue that the objection is more forceful than some suppose, and attempt to explicate a way around it. A possible route to circumvent the problem, I explain, is to develop a suggestion made by Grover Maxwell almost forty years ago. The insight is to conceive of proto-experiences not as particles or bits but as fields of influence. The end result is a position that looks in many ways similar to the epistemic neutral monism of Bertrand Russell, but is also a novel version of panpsychism. The suggestion is simply this: it might be the case that we should think of the world as inherently and ontologically qualitative in nature. I call this resultant position panqualiaism and hope that it represents a step forward

What is ‘mental action’?

There has been a resurgence of interest lately within philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental act/bodily act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition, which arguably further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on ‘inner’ acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action

The Subject of Experience by Galen Strawson

In this collection of essays, Strawson investigates wide-ranging topics pertaining to the nature of the self: What do we mean by the term ‘self’? In what sense do selves exist? To what extent is continuity over time essential to selfhood? Must one be able to make a story of one’s life in order to be a coherent self? Must one be self-conscious in order to be conscious at all? and more. The fourteen essays here are not necessarily meant to be read in order. They do not offer a sustained argument, but rather a number of themes that appear in different places, like threads in a tapestry

A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality

Phenomenal intentionality theories have recently enjoyed significant attention. According to these theories, the intentionality of a mental representation (what it is about) crucially depends on its phenomenal features. We present a new puzzle for these theories, involving a phenomenon called ‘intentional identity’, or ‘co-intentionality’. Co-intentionality is a ubiquitous intentional phenomenon that involves tracking things even when there is no concrete thing being tracked. We suggest that phenomenal intentionality theories need to either develop new uniquely phenomenal resources for handling the puzzle, or restrict their explanatory ambitions

Panpsychism, Panprotopsychism, and Neutral Monism

This chapter provides an introduction to panpsychism, panprotopsychism, and neutral monism to an interdisciplinary audience