Mehr Verantwortung in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Wie sich GSVP und NATO besser ergänzen können. DGAP Analyse Oktober 2013 N° 10 = More responsibility in the security and defense policy. How Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO can complement each other better. DGAP Analysis October 2013 N° 10. Egmont Commentary, 15 October 2013

More responsibility in security and defense policy. How GSVP and NATO can complement each other bette

Kollidieren die Güter? Juridische und politische Reaktionen auf Zielkonflikte internationalisierter Sicherheitspolitk

Um äußere Sicherheit unter erschwerten objektiven Bedingungen wie gestiegenen Erwartungen nach wie vor hinreichend gewährleisten zu können, haben sich die Regierungen vor allem der OECD-Welt nach dem Ende des Systemantagonismus zu einer noch engeren Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen internationaler Sicherheitsorganisationen entschlossen, die auf einen Bedeutungsgewinn inter- und supranationaler Ebenen hinausläuft. Dieser Strukturwandel des Regierens verursacht indes Zielkonflikte zu Lasten anderer zentraler normativer Güter, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und demokratische Legitimität, die sich zu brisanten Kollisionen auswachsen könnten. So zieht internationalisierte Sicherheitspolitik oftmals gravierende Eingriffe in die Rechtssphäre des Individuums nach sich, und die nationalen Exekutiven lassen sich schlechter demokratisch kontrollieren. Das forschungsprogrammatisch motivierte Papier beschreibt Internationalisierung, diskutiert die Spannungen zwischen den drei Normkomplexen und identifiziert exemplarisch Reaktionen juridischer und politischer Akteure darauf. Im Kern wird argumentiert, dass sich die Aussicht auf eine demokratisch legitimierte und rechtsstaatlich verfasste internationalisierte Sicherheitspolitik nicht vorrangig an der Weiterentwicklung eines nationalen Blickwinkels mit seiner Input-Orientierung und der Vorstellung intakter Legitimationsketten ausrichten sollte, sondern verstärkt aus Alternativquellen demokratischer Legitimität oberhalb des Nationalstaats und aus Rechtsquellen unterschiedlicher Ebenen schöpfen sollte.To allow for the provision of external security against the background of more complex challenges and rising expectations after the Cold War, governments - particularly of the OECD - have decided to increase their cooperation within the framework of international security organizations such as the EU or NATO. This leads to a growing importance of the international level with novel responsibilities of advisory or implementing bodies, and the emergence of multilateral intervention politics. This transformation of national governance, however, gives rise to trade-offs with other normative goods, namely rule of law and democratic legitimacy. Since the internationalized security policy often causes severe intrusions into the sphere of law of individuals, national governments are thereby more difficult to control democratically. The paper describes the internationalization of security politics, discusses the issue of tensions amongst the three normative goods, and identifies a number of responses of judicial and political actors thereupo

The Path to the Top: Changes in the Attributes and Careers of Corporate Executives, 1980-2001

The analyses below compare the career histories and personal characteristics of the executives in the top ranks of the world's largest and most stable business operations, the Fortune 100, between 1980 and 2001. To our knowledge, there have been no prior studies of contemporary changes in the experience or attributes of executives beyond CEOs. In 2001, these executives were younger, more likely to be women, and less likely to have been Ivy League educated. Most important, they got to the executive suite about four years faster than in 1980 and did so by holding fewer jobs on the way to the top. (In particular, women in 2001 got to their executive jobs faster than their male counterparts --there were no women executives in the Fortune 100 in 1980). Executives in 2001 also spent about five years less in their current organization and were more likely to be hired from the outside than in 1980. Interestingly, the most stable firms the 26 that were in the Fortune 100 in both periods had just as much lifetime employment among executives in 2001 as in 1980, although changes in other aspects of careers were similar. Overall, the path to the executive suite and the attributes of the individuals who get there appear to have changed even in the largest and most stable business operations.

Defesa europeia comum: Possibilidades e probabilidade de implementação

A cooperação militar já existe há muito tempo na Europa e funciona. De algum modo. No entanto, e por oposição ao seu peso económico no mundo, a União Europeia ainda está longe (e para sua própria insatisfação) de apresentar uma capacidade de ação europeia, que se esconde por detrás da ideia original e do conceito sonante "Exército Europeu". A atual situação política mundial com os novos cenários de ameaça mesmo às portas da Europa alerta especialmente para a necessidade de refletir sobre as possibilidades de uma defesa europeia comum. Perante este cenário, são analisados os problemas atuais a caminho de uma defesa europeia comum, esboçados e avaliados quatro cenários futuros possíveis e nos quais estão alicerçadas as ações propostas no sentido da constituição de uma defesa europeia comum. A análise evidencia que: (1) considerando a situação especial da UE enquanto união de estados não é forçoso que uma defesa comum se assemelhe a uma defesa nacional, (2) existem inúmeros problemas cuja resolução a médio prazo é bastante improvável devido à falta de disponibilidade dos vários estados em abdicar da sua soberania em matéria de política de defesa, (3) nem todos os cenários possíveis da futura constelação da defesa europeia podem ser considerados razoáveis ou passíveis de serem implementados, (4) existem inúmeras medidas a implementar que poderiam aproximar a UE de uma defesa europeia comum, independentemente da sua constelação final, (5) para avançar, deveriam ser dados passos no sentido da harmonização das diversas Forças Armadas nacionais, representando, assim, um passo intermédio no sentido de um exército europeu "tipo ideal", bem como o estado final de uma defesa comum, caso não fosse possível alcançar um maior entendimento entre os parceiros europeus. O objetivo de uma defesa europeia comum não pode, apesar de todos os muitos outros problemas com as quais a UE se vê confrontada atualmente, ser perdido de vista. Abstract: Military cooperation has existed in Europe for a long time and it works. To some extent. However, and as opposed to its economic weight in the world, the European Union is far from presenting (to its great dissatisfaction) the capacity for European action, which hides behind the original idea and the fine-sounding concept of a "European army". The global political status quo, featuring new threat scenarios in Europe's own backyard, raises awareness particularly to the need to reflect on the likelihood of a common European defence. Against this background, the current problems arising on the way to a common European defence are analysed, four possible future scenarios are traced and assessed, on which the actions proposed for the development of a common European defence are founded. This analysis highlights the following: (1) Given the EU's special status as a union of States, a common defence does not have to necessarily resemble national defence; (2) The are several problems the resolution of which is unlikely to happen in the medium term due to the fact that several States are unwilling to waive their sovereign rights regarding defence policy; (3) Not all possible scenarios of the future constellation of European defence can be found reasonable or implementable; (4) There are a number of implementable measures that could bring the EU closer to a common European defence, irrespective of the final constellation; (5) To progress steps should be taken to standardise the different national Armed Forces, thus representing an intermediate step along the way of an "ideal type" of European army and the final state of a common defence, if a consensus cannot be reached between the European partners. In spite of many other problems that the EU currently faces, the goal of a common European defence must not disappear from sight

The Chiral Model of Sakai-Sugimoto at Finite Baryon Density

In the context of holographic QCD we analyze Sakai-Sugimoto's chiral model at finite baryon density and zero temperature. The baryon number density is introduced through compact D4 wrapping S^4 at the tip of D8-\bar{D8}. Each baryon acts as a chiral point-like source distributed uniformly over R^3, and leads a non-vanishing U(1)_V potential on the brane. For fixed baryon charge density n_B we analyze the bulk energy density and pressure using the canonical formalism. The baryonic matter with point like sources is always in the spontaneously broken phase of chiral symmetry, whatever the density. The point-like nature of the sources and large N_c cause the matter to be repulsive as all baryon interactions are omega mediated. Through the induced DBI action on D8-\bar{D8}, we study the effects of the fixed baryon charge density n_B on the pion and vector meson masses and couplings. Issues related to vector dominance in matter in the context of holographic QCD are also discussed.Comment: V3: 39 pages, 16 figures, minor corrections, version to appear in JHEP. V2: references added, typos correcte