112 research outputs found
Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?
Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth
of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under
any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of
general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be
interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical
truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical,
Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of
Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts
of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a
constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version
is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht
How Far Can We Go Through Social System?
The paper elaborates an endeavor on applying the algorithmic information-theoretic computational complexity to meta-social-sciences. It is motivated by the effort on seeking the impact of the well-known incompleteness theorem to the scientific methodology approaching social phenomena. The paper uses the binary string as the model of social phenomena to gain understanding on some problems faced in the philosophy of social sciences or some traps in sociological theories. The paper ends on showing the great opportunity in recent social researches and some boundaries that limit them
How Far Can We Go Through Social System?
The paper elaborates an endeavor on applying the algorithmic information-theoretic computational complexity to meta-social-sciences. It is motivated by the effort on seeking the impact of the well-known incompleteness theorem to the scientific methodology approaching social phenomena. The paper uses the binary string as the model of social phenomena to gain understanding on some problems faced in the philosophy of social sciences or some traps in sociological theories. The paper ends on showing the great opportunity in recent social researches and some boundaries that limit them.meta-sociology, algorithmic information theory, incompleteness theorem, sociological theory, sociological methods
Freedom, Anarchy and Conformism in Academic Research
In this paper I attempt to make a case for promoting the courage of rebels within the citadels of orthodoxy in academic research environments. Wicksell in Macroeconomics, Brouwer in the Foundations of Mathematics, Turing in Computability Theory, Sraffa in the Theories of Value and Distribution are, in my own fields of research, paradigmatic examples of rebels, adventurers and non-conformists of the highest caliber in scientific research within University environments. In what sense, and how, can such rebels, adventurers and non-conformists be fostered in the current University research environment dominated by the cult of 'picking winners'? This is the motivational question lying behind the historical outlines of the work of Brouwer, Hilbert, Bishop, Veronese, Gödel, Turing and Sraffa that I describe in this paper. The debate between freedom in research and teaching, and the naked imposition of 'correct' thinking, on potential dissenters of the mind, is of serious concern in this age of austerity of material facilities. It is a debate that has occupied some of the finest minds working at the deepest levels of foundational issues in mathematics, metamathematics and economic theory. By making some of the issues explicit, I hope it is possible to encourage dissenters to remain courageous in the face of current dogmasNon-conformist research, economic theory, mathematical economics, 'Hilbert's Dogma', Hilbert's Program, computability theory
The Quantum Strategy of Completeness: On the Self-Foundation of Mathematics
Gentzenâs approach by transfinite induction and that of intuitionist Heyting arithmetic to completeness and the self-foundation of mathematics are compared and opposed to the Gödel incompleteness results as to Peano arithmetic. Quantum mechanics involves infinity by Hilbert space, but it is finitist as any experimental science. The absence of hidden variables in it interpretable as its completeness should resurrect Hilbertâs finitism at the cost of relevant modification of the latter already hinted by intuitionism and Gentzenâs approaches for completeness. This paper investigates both conditions and philosophical background necessary for that modification. The main conclusion is that the concept of infinity as underlying contemporary mathematics cannot be reduced to a single Peano arithmetic, but to at least two ones independent of each other. Intuitionism, quantum mechanics, and Gentzenâs approaches to completeness an even Hilbertâs finitism can be unified from that viewpoint. Mathematics may found itself by a way of finitism complemented by choice. The concept of information as the quantity of choices underlies that viewpoint. Quantum mechanics interpretable in terms of information and quantum information is inseparable from mathematics and its foundation
The Implications of Gödel's Theorem
After a brief and informal explanation of the Gödelâs theorem as a version of the Epimenidesâ paradox applied to Elementary Number Theory formulated in first-order logic, Lucas shows some of the most relevant consequences of this theorem, such as the impossibility to define truth in terms of provability and so the failure of Verificationist and Intuitionist arguments. He shows moreover how Gödelâs theorem proves that first-order arithmetic admits non-standard models, that Hilbertâs programme is untenable and that second-order logic is not mechanical. There are furthermore some more general consequences: the difference between being reasonable and following a rule and the possibility that one manâs insight differs from anotherâs without being wrong. Finally some consequences concerning moral and political philosophy can arise from Gödelâs theorem, because it suggests that â instead of some fundamental principle from which all else follows deductively â we can seek for different arguments in different situations
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