46 research outputs found
Generalized Implicit Factorization Problem
The Implicit Factorization Problem was first introduced by May and
Ritzenhofen at PKC'09. This problem aims to factorize two RSA moduli
and when their prime factors share a certain number
of least significant bits (LSBs). They proposed a lattice-based algorithm to
tackle this problem and extended it to cover RSA moduli. Since then,
several variations of the Implicit Factorization Problem have been studied,
including the cases where and share some most significant bits
(MSBs), middle bits, or both MSBs and LSBs at the same position.
In this paper, we explore a more general case of the Implicit Factorization
Problem, where the shared bits are located at different and unknown positions
for different primes. We propose a lattice-based algorithm and analyze its
efficiency under certain conditions. We also present experimental results to
support our analysis
Factoring Unbalanced Moduli with Known Bits
Let be an RSA modulus. This note describes a LLL-based method allowing to factor given contiguous bits of , irrespective to their position. A second method is presented, which needs fewer bits but whose length depends on the position of the known bit pattern. Finally, we introduce a somewhat surprising ad hoc method where two different known bit chunks, totalling bits suffice to factor
Finding Small Solutions of the Equation and Its Applications to Cryptanalysis of the RSA Cryptosystem
In this paper, we study the condition of finding small solutions of the equation . The framework is derived from Wiener\u27s small private exponent attack on RSA and May-Ritzenhofen\u27s investigation about the implicit factorization problem, both of which can be generalized to solve the above equation. We show that these two methods, together with Coppersmith\u27s method, are equivalent for solving in the general case. Then based on Coppersmith\u27s method, we present two improvements for solving in some special cases. The first improvement pays attention to the case where either or is large enough. As the applications of this improvement, we propose some new cryptanalysis of RSA, such as new results about the generalized implicit factorization problem, attacks with known bits of the prime factor, and so on. The motivation of these applications comes from oracle based complexity of factorization problems. The second improvement assumes that the value of is known. We present two attacks on RSA as its applications. One focuses on the case with known bits of the private exponent together with the prime factor, and the other considers the case with a small difference of the two prime factors. Our new attacks on RSA improve the previous corresponding results respectively, and the correctness of the approach is verified by experiments
Solving Linear Equations Modulo Unknown Divisors: Revisited
We revisit the problem of finding small solutions to a collection of linear equations modulo an unknown divisor for a known composite integer .
In CaLC 2001, Howgrave-Graham introduced an efficient algorithm for solving univariate linear equations; since then, two forms of multivariate generalizations have been considered in the context of cryptanalysis: modular multivariate linear equations by Herrmann and May (Asiacrypt\u2708) and simultaneous modular univariate linear equations by Cohn and Heninger (ANTS\u2712). Their algorithms have many important applications in cryptanalysis, such as factoring with known bits problem, fault attacks on RSA signatures, analysis of approximate GCD problem, etc.
In this paper, by introducing multiple parameters, we propose several generalizations of the above equations. The motivation behind these extensions is that some attacks on RSA variants can be reduced to solving these generalized equations, and previous algorithms do not apply. We present new approaches to solve them, and compared with previous methods, our new algorithms are more flexible and especially suitable for some cases. Applying our algorithms, we obtain the best analytical/experimental results for some attacks on RSA and its variants, specifically,
\begin{itemize}
\item We improve May\u27s results (PKC\u2704) on small secret exponent attack on RSA variant with moduli ().
\item We experimentally improve Boneh et al.\u27s algorithm (Crypto\u2798) on factoring () with known bits problem.
\item We significantly improve Jochemsz-May\u27 attack (Asiacrypt\u2706) on Common Prime RSA.
\item We extend Nitaj\u27s result (Africacrypt\u2712) on weak encryption exponents of RSA and CRT-RSA.
\end{itemize
The Hidden Number Problem with Small Unknown Multipliers: Cryptanalyzing MEGA in Six Queries and Other Applications
In recent work, Backendal, Haller, and Paterson identified several exploitable vulnerabilities in the cloud storage provider MEGA. They demonstrated an RSA key recovery attack in which a malicious server could recover a client\u27s private RSA key after 512 client login attempts. We show how to exploit additional information revealed by MEGA\u27s protocol vulnerabilities to give an attack that requires only six client logins to recover the secret key.
Our optimized attack combines several cryptanalytic techniques. In particular, we formulate and give a solution to a variant of the hidden number problem with small unknown multipliers, which may be of independent interest. We show that our lattice construction for this problem can be used to give improved results for the implicit factorization problem of May and Ritzenhofen
Applications of Neural Network-Based AI in Cryptography
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a modern technology that allows plenty of advantages in daily life, such as predicting weather, finding directions, classifying images and videos, even automatically generating code, text, and videos. Other essential technologies such as blockchain and cybersecurity also benefit from AI. As a core component used in blockchain and cybersecurity, cryptography can benefit from AI in order to enhance the confidentiality and integrity of cyberspace. In this paper, we review the algorithms underlying four prominent cryptographic cryptosystems, namely the Advanced Encryption Standard, the Rivest--Shamir--Adleman, Learning With Errors, and the Ascon family of cryptographic algorithms for authenticated encryption. Where possible, we pinpoint areas where AI can be used to help improve their security
Elliptic Curve Cryptography on Modern Processor Architectures
Abstract
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has been adopted by the US National Security Agency (NSA) in Suite "B" as part of its "Cryptographic Modernisation Program ". Additionally,
it has been favoured by an entire host of mobile devices due to its superior performance characteristics. ECC is also the building block on which the exciting field of pairing/identity based cryptography is based. This widespread use means that there is potentially a lot to be gained by researching efficient implementations on modern processors such as IBM's Cell Broadband Engine and Philip's next generation smart card cores. ECC operations can be thought of as a pyramid of building blocks, from instructions on a core, modular operations on a finite field, point addition & doubling, elliptic curve scalar
multiplication to application level protocols. In this thesis we examine an implementation of these components for ECC focusing on a range of optimising techniques for the Cell's SPU and the MIPS smart card. We show significant performance improvements that can be achieved through of adoption of EC
Frodo: Take off the ring! Practical, quantum-secure key exchange from LWE
Lattice-based cryptography offers some of the most attractive primitives believed to be resistant to quantum computers. Following increasing interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key exchange protocols based on hard problems in ideal lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem. While ideal lattices facilitate major efficiency and storage benefits over their nonideal counterparts, the additional ring structure that enables these advantages also raises concerns about the assumed difficulty of the underlying problems. Thus, a question of significant interest to cryptographers, and especially to those currently placing bets on primitives that will withstand quantum adversaries, is how much of an advantage the additional ring structure actually gives in practice. Despite conventional wisdom that generic lattices might be too slow and unwieldy, we demonstrate that LWE-based key exchange is quite practical: our constant time implementation requires around 1.3ms computation time for each party; compared to the recent NewHope R-LWE scheme, communication sizes increase by a factor of 4.7×, but remain under 12 KiB in each direction. Our protocol is competitive when used for serving web pages over TLS; when partnered with ECDSA signatures, latencies increase by less than a factor of 1.6×, and (even under heavy load) server throughput only decreases by factors of 1.5× and 1.2× when serving typical 1 KiB and 100 KiB pages, respectively. To achieve these practical results, our protocol takes advantage of several innovations. These include techniques to optimize communication bandwidth, dynamic generation of public parameters (which also offers additional security against backdoors), carefully chosen error distributions, and tight security parameters