14 research outputs found
On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement
We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we prove that:
1) BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2+ o(1)].
2) BA protocols resilient against n/4 corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most 1-Theta(1).
3) For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plausible combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2 + o(1)].
The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI).
The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS\u2717) that tolerates up to n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability
Communication Lower Bounds for Cryptographic Broadcast Protocols
Broadcast protocols enable a set of parties to agree on the input of a
designated sender, even facing attacks by malicious parties. In the
honest-majority setting, randomization and cryptography were harnessed to
achieve low-communication broadcast with sub-quadratic total communication and
balanced sub-linear cost per party. However, comparatively little is known in
the dishonest-majority setting. Here, the most communication-efficient
constructions are based on Dolev and Strong (SICOMP '83), and sub-quadratic
broadcast has not been achieved. On the other hand, the only nontrivial
communication lower bounds are restricted to deterministic
protocols, or against strong adaptive adversaries that can perform "after the
fact" removal of messages.
We provide new communication lower bounds in this space, which hold against
arbitrary cryptography and setup assumptions, as well as a simple protocol
showing near tightness of our first bound.
1) We demonstrate a tradeoff between resiliency and communication for
protocols secure against static corruptions. For example,
messages are needed when the number of honest
parties is ; messages are needed for
honest parties; and messages are needed for
honest parties.
Complementarily, we demonstrate broadcast with
total communication facing any constant fraction of static corruptions.
2) Our second bound considers corruptions and a weakly adaptive
adversary that cannot remove messages "after the fact." We show that any
broadcast protocol within this setting can be attacked to force an arbitrary
party to send messages to other parties. This rules out, for example,
broadcast facing 51% corruptions in which all non-sender parties have sublinear
communication locality.Comment: A preliminary version of this work appeared in DISC 202
Byzantine Agreement with Optimal Early Stopping, Optimal Resilience and Polynomial Complexity
We provide the first protocol that solves Byzantine agreement with optimal
early stopping ( rounds) and optimal resilience () using
polynomial message size and computation.
All previous approaches obtained sub-optimal results and used resolve rules
that looked only at the immediate children in the EIG (\emph{Exponential
Information Gathering}) tree. At the heart of our solution are new resolve
rules that look at multiple layers of the EIG tree.Comment: full version of STOC 2015 abstrac
Communication Lower Bounds for Cryptographic Broadcast Protocols
Broadcast protocols enable a set of parties to agree on the input of a designated sender, even facing attacks by malicious parties. In the honest-majority setting, a fruitful line of work harnessed randomization and cryptography to achieve low-communication broadcast protocols with sub-quadratic total communication and with balanced sub-linear communication cost per party.
However, comparatively little is known in the dishonest-majority setting. Here, the most communication-efficient constructions are based on the protocol of Dolev and Strong (SICOMP \u2783), and sub-quadratic broadcast has not been achieved even using randomization and cryptography. On the other hand, the only nontrivial communication lower bounds are restricted to deterministic protocols, or against strong adaptive adversaries that can perform after the fact removal of messages.
We provide new communication lower bounds in this space, which hold against arbitrary cryptography and setup assumptions, as well as a simple protocol showing near tightness of our first bound.
1) We demonstrate a tradeoff between resiliency and communication for randomized protocols secure against static corruptions. For example, messages are needed when the number of honest parties is ; messages are needed for honest parties; and messages are needed for honest parties.
Complementarily, we demonstrate broadcast with total communication facing any constant fraction of static corruptions.
2) Our second bound considers corruptions and a weakly adaptive adversary that cannot remove messages after the fact. We show that any broadcast protocol within this setting can be attacked to force an arbitrary party to send messages to other parties. Our bound rules out, for example, broadcast facing corruptions, in which all non-sender parties have sublinear communication locality
Early Stopping for Any Number of Corruptions
Minimizing the round complexity of byzantine broadcast is a fundamental question in distributed computing and cryptography. In this work, we present the first early stopping byzantine broadcast protocol that tolerates up to malicious corruptions and terminates in rounds for any execution with actual corruptions. Our protocol is deterministic, adaptively secure, and works assuming a plain public key infrastructure. Prior early-stopping protocols all either require honest majority or tolerate only up to malicious corruptions while requiring either trusted setup or strong number theoretic hardness assumptions. As our key contribution, we show a novel tool called a polariser that allows us to transfer certificate-based strategies from the honest majority setting to settings with a dishonest majority
MWPoW+: a strong consensus protocol for intra-shard consensus in blockchain sharding
Blockchain sharding splits a blockchain into several shards where consensus is reached at the shard level rather than over the entire blockchain. It improves transaction throughput and reduces the computational resources required of individual nodes. But a derivation of trustworthy consensus within a shard becomes an issue as the longest-chain based mechanisms used in conventional blockchains can no longer be used. Instead, a vote-based consensus mechanism must be employed. However, existing vote-based Byzantine false tolerance consensus protocols do not offer sufficient security guarantees for sharded blockchains. First, when used to support consensus where only one block is allowed at a time (binary consensus), these protocols are susceptible to progress-hindering attacks, i.e., unable to reach a consensus. Second, when used to support a stronger type of consensus where multiple concurrent blocks are allowed (strong consensus), their tolerance of adversary nodes is low. This paper proposes a new consensus protocol to address all these issues. We call the new protocol MWPoW+ as its basic framework is based on the existing Multiple Winner Proof of Work (MWPoW) protocol but includes new mechanisms to address the issues mentioned above. MWPoW+ is a vote-based protocol for strong consensus, asynchronous in consensus derivation but synchronous in communication. We prove that it can tolerate up to f < n/2 adversary nodes in a shard using a binary consensus protocol, and does not suffer from progress-hindering attacks
Breaking the -Bit Barrier: Byzantine Agreement with Polylog Bits Per Party
Byzantine agreement (BA), the task of parties to agree on one of their
input bits in the face of malicious agents, is a powerful primitive that lies
at the core of a vast range of distributed protocols. Interestingly, in
protocols with the best overall communication, the demands of the parties are
highly unbalanced: the amortized cost is bits per party, but some
parties must send bits. In best known balanced protocols, the
overall communication is sub-optimal, with each party communicating . In this work, we ask whether asymmetry is inherent for optimizing
total communication. Our contributions in this line are as follows:
1) We define a cryptographic primitive, succinctly reconstructed distributed
signatures (SRDS), that suffices for constructing balanced BA. We
provide two constructions of SRDS from different cryptographic and Public-Key
Infrastructure (PKI) assumptions.
2) The SRDS-based BA follows a paradigm of boosting from "almost-everywhere"
agreement to full agreement, and does so in a single round. We prove that PKI
setup and cryptographic assumptions are necessary for such protocols in which
every party sends messages.
3) We further explore connections between a natural approach toward attaining
SRDS and average-case succinct non-interactive argument systems (SNARGs) for a
particular type of NP-Complete problems (generalizing Subset-Sum and
Subset-Product).
Our results provide new approaches forward, as well as limitations and
barriers, towards minimizing per-party communication of BA. In particular, we
construct the first two BA protocols with balanced communication,
offering a tradeoff between setup and cryptographic assumptions, and answering
an open question presented by King and Saia (DISC'09)
Completeness Theorems for Adaptively Secure Broadcast
The advent of blockchain protocols has reignited the interest in adaptively secure broadcast, as it is by now well understood that broadcasting over a diffusion network allows an adaptive adversary to corrupt the sender depending on the message it attempts to send and change it. Hirt and Zikas [Eurocrypt \u2710] proved that this is an inherent limitation of broadcast in the simulation-based setting---i.e., that this task is impossible against an adaptive adversary corrupting a strict majority of the parties (a task that is achievable against a static adversary).
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we show that, contrary to previous perception, the above limitation of adaptively secure broadcast is not an artifact of simulation-based security, but rather an inherent issue of adaptive security. In particular, we show that: (1) it also applies to the property-based broadcast definition adapted for adaptive adversaries, and (2) unlike other impossibilities in adaptive security, this impossibility cannot be circumvented by adding a programmable random oracle, in neither setting, property-based or simulation-based.
Second, we turn to the resource-restricted cryptography (RRC) paradigm [Garay et al., Eurocrypt \u2720], which has proven useful in circumventing impossibility results, and ask whether it also affects the above negative result. We answer this question in the affirmative, by showing that time-lock puzzles (TLPs)---which can be viewed as an instance of RRC---indeed allow for achieving the property-based definition and circumvent the impossibility of adaptively secure broadcast. The natural question is then, do TLPs also allow for simulation-based adaptively secure broadcast against corrupted majorities? We answer this question in the negative. Nonetheless, we show that a positive result can be achieved via a non-committing analogue of TLPs in the programmable random-oracle model.
Importantly, and as a contribution of independent interest, we also present the first (limited) composition theorem in the resource-restricted setting, which is needed for the complexity-based, non-idealized treatment of TLPs in the context of other protocols