9 research outputs found
3-Message Zero Knowledge Against Human Ignorance
The notion of Zero Knowledge has driven the field of cryptography since its conception over thirty years ago. It is well established that two-message zero-knowledge protocols for NP do not exist, and that four-message zero-knowledge arguments exist under the minimal assumption of one-way functions. Resolving the precise round complexity of zero-knowledge has been an outstanding open problem for far too long.
In this work, we present a three-message zero-knowledge argument system with soundness against uniform polynomial-time cheating provers. The main component in our construction is the recent delegation protocol for RAM computations (Kalai and Paneth, TCC 2016B and Brakerski, Holmgren and Kalai, ePrint 2016). Concretely, we rely on a three-message variant of their protocol based on a key-less collision-resistant hash functions secure against uniform adversaries as well as other standard primitives.
More generally, beyond uniform provers, our protocol provides a natural and meaningful security guarantee against real-world adversaries, which we formalize following Rogaway’s “human-ignorance” approach (VIETCRYPT 2006): in a nutshell, we give an explicit uniform reduction from any adversary breaking the soundness of our protocol to finding collisions in the underlying hash function.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CNS-1350619)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CNS-1413964
Indistinguishability Obfuscation: From Approximate to Exact
We show general transformations from subexponentially-secure approximate indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) where the obfuscated circuit agrees with the original circuit on a 1/2+ϵ fraction of inputs on a certain samplable distribution, into exact indistinguishability obfuscation where the obfuscated circuit and the original circuit agree on all inputs. As a step towards our results, which is of independent interest, we also obtain an approximate-to-exact transformation for functional encryption. At the core of our techniques is a method for “fooling” the obfuscator into giving us the correct answer, while preserving the indistinguishability-based security. This is achieved based on various types of secure computation protocols that can be obtained from different standard assumptions.
Put together with the recent results of Canetti, Kalai and Paneth (TCC 2015), Pass and Shelat (TCC 2016), and Mahmoody, Mohammed and Nemathaji (TCC 2016), we show how to convert indistinguishability obfuscation schemes in various ideal models into exact obfuscation schemes in the plain model.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-1350619)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-1414119
Constant-Round Concurrent Zero-Knowledge From Falsifiable Assumptions
We present a constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for \NP. Our protocol is sound against uniform polynomial-time attackers, and relies on the existence of families of collision-resistant hash functions, and a new (but in our eyes, natural) falsifiable intractability assumption: Roughly speaking, that Micali's non-interactive CS-proofs are sound for languages in
Indistinguishability Obfuscation: from Approximate to Exact
We show general transformations from subexponentially-secure approximate indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) where the obfuscated circuit agrees with the original circuit on a fraction of inputs, into exact indistinguishability obfuscation where the
obfuscated circuit and the original circuit agree on all inputs (except for a negligible probability over the coin tosses of the obfuscator). As a step towards our results, which is of independent interest, we also obtain an approximate-to-exact transformation for functional encryption. At the core of our techniques is a method for ``fooling\u27\u27 the obfuscator into giving us the correct answer, while preserving the indistinguishability-based security. This is achieved based on various types of secure computation protocols that can be obtained from different standard assumptions.
Put together with the recent results of Canetti, Kalai and Paneth (TCC 2015), Pass and Shelat (Eprint 2015), and Mahmoody, Mohammed and Nemathaji (Eprint 2015), we show how to convert indistinguishability obfuscation schemes in various ideal models into exact obfuscation schemes in the plain model
From Weak to Strong Zero-Knowledge and Applications
The notion of \emph{zero-knowledge} \cite{GMR85} is formalized by requiring that for every malicious efficient verifier , there exists an efficient simulator that can reconstruct the view of in a true interaction with the prover, in a way that is indistinguishable to \emph{every} polynomial-time distinguisher. \emph{Weak zero-knowledge} weakens this notions by switching the order of the quantifiers and only requires that for every distinguisher , there exists a (potentially different) simulator .
In this paper we consider various notions of zero-knowledge, and investigate whether their weak variants are equivalent to their strong variants. Although we show (under complexity assumption) that for the standard notion of zero-knowledge, its weak and strong counterparts are not equivalent, for meaningful variants of the standard notion, the weak and strong counterparts are indeed equivalent. Towards showing these equivalences, we introduce new non-black-box simulation techniques permitting us, for instance, to demonstrate that the classical 2-round graph non-isomorphism protocol of Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson \cite{GMW91} satisfies a ``distributional\u27\u27 variant of zero-knowledge.
Our equivalence theorem has other applications beyond the notion of zero-knowledge. For instance, it directly implies the \emph{dense model theorem} of Reingold et al (STOC \u2708), and the leakage lemma of Gentry-Wichs (STOC \u2711), and provides a modular and arguably simpler proof of these results (while at the same time recasting these result in the language of zero-knowledge)
Publicly Verifiable Software Watermarking
Software Watermarking is the process of transforming a program into a functionally equivalent ``marked\u27\u27 program in such a way that it is computationally hard to remove the mark without destroying functionality. Barak, Goldreich, Impagliazzo, Rudich, Sahai, Vadhan and Yang (CRYPTO 2001) defined software watermarking and showed that the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation implies that software watermarking is impossible. Given the recent candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation, this result paints a bleak picture for the possibility of meaningful watermarking.
We show that slightly relaxing the functionality requirement gives us strong positive results for watermarking. Namely, instead of requiring the marked program to agree with the original unmarked program on {\em all inputs}, we require only that they agree on a large fraction of inputs. With this relaxation in mind, our contributions are as follows.
1. We define publicly verifiable watermarking where marking a program requires a secret key, but anyone can verify that a program is marked. The handful of existing watermarking schemes are secretly verifiable, and moreover, satisfy only a weak definition where the adversary is restricted in the type of unmarked programs it is allowed to produce (Naccache, Shamir and Stern, PKC 1999; Nishimaki, EUROCRYPT 2013). Moreover, our definition requires security against chosen program attacks, where an adversary has access to an oracle that marks programs of her choice.
2. We construct a publicly verifiable watermarking scheme for any family of puncturable pseudo-random functions (PPRF), assuming indistinguishability obfuscation and injective one-way functions.
Complementing our positive result, we show that there are pseudo-random functions which cannot be watermarked, even in a very weak setting. As a corollary, we demonstrate the first family of PRFs that are not point-puncturable
Constant-Round Concurrent Zero-knowledge from Indistinguishability Obfuscation
We present a constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for NP. Our protocol relies on the existence of families of collision-resistant hash functions, one-way permutations, and indistinguishability obfuscators for P/poly (with slightly super-polynomial security)
Non-black-box Simulation in the Fully Concurrent Setting, Revisited
We give a new proof of the existence of -round public-coin concurrent zero-knowledge arguments for NP, where is an arbitrary constant. The security is proven in the plain model under the assumption that collision-resistant hash functions exist. (The existence of such concurrent zero-knowledge arguments was previously proven by Goyal (STOC\u2713) in the plain model under the same assumption.) In the proof, we use a new variant of the non-black-box simulation technique of Barak (FOCS\u2701). An important property of our simulation technique is that the simulator runs in a straight-line manner in the fully concurrent setting. Compared with the simulation technique of Goyal, which also has such a property, the analysis of our simulation technique is (arguably) simpler
On the Impossibility of Approximate Obfuscation and Applications to Resettable Cryptography
The traditional notion of {\em program obfuscation} requires that an obfuscation of a program computes the exact same function as , but beyond that, the code of should not leak any information about . This strong notion of {\em virtual black-box} security was shown by Barak et al. (CRYPTO 2001) to be impossible to achieve, for certain {\em unobfuscatable function families}. The same work raised the question of {\em approximate obfuscation}, where the obfuscated is only required to approximate ; that is, only agrees with on some input distribution.
We show that, assuming {\em trapdoor permutations}, there exist families of {\em robust unobfuscatable functions} for which even approximate obfuscation is impossible. That is, obfuscation is impossible even if the obfuscated only agrees with with probability slightly more than , on a uniformly sampled input (below -agreement, the function obfuscated by is not uniquely defined). Additionally, we show that, assuming only one-way functions, we can rule out approximate obfuscation where is not allowed to err, but may refuse to compute with probability close to .
We then demonstrate the power of robust unobfuscatable functions by exhibiting new implications to resettable protocols that so far have been out of our reach. Concretely, we obtain a new non-black-box simulation technique that reduces the assumptions required for resettably-sound zero-knowledge protocols to {\em one-way functions}, as well as reduce round-complexity. We also present a new simplified construction of simultaneously resettable zero-knowledge protocols that does not rely on collision-resistent hashing. Finally, we construct a three-message simultaneously resettable \WI {\em argument of knowledge} (with a non-black-box knowledge extractor). Our constructions are based on a special kind of ``resettable slots that are useful for a non-black-box simulator, but not for a resetting prover