Normative Autonomy and Normative Co-ordination: Declarative Power, Representation, and Mandate

In this paper we provide a formal analysis of the idea of normative co-ordination. We argue that this idea is based on the assumption that agents can achieve flexible co-ordination by conferring normative positions to other agents. These positions include duties, permissions, and powers. In particular, we explain the idea of declarative power, which consists in the capacity of the power-holder of creating normative positions, involving other agents, simply by "proclaiming" such positions. In addition, we account also for the concepts of representation, namely the representative's capacity of acting in the name of his principal, and of mandate, which is the mandatee's duty to act as the mandator has requested. Finally, we show how the framework can be applied to represent the contract-net protocol. Some brief remarks on future research and applications conclude this contribution

From collective to individual commitments

A collective obligation is an obligation aimed at a group of agents. It is formalized in a framework of deontic logic, which gives the opportunity to express which (sub-)group has the responsibility to bring about a certain situation and to express the relation between groups of agents. However, the individual responsibility that follows from the goal to achieve the fulfillment of the collective obligation cannot be expressed. A consequence is that the individual responsible for a violation of a collective obligation cannot be indicated. To deal with this, the notion of commitment in the context of collective obligation is investigated