From conditional oughts to qualitative decision theory

The primary theme of this investigation is a decision theoretic account of conditional ought statements (e.g., 'You ought to do A, if C') that rectifies glaring deficiencies in classical deontic logic. The resulting account forms a sound basis for qualitative decision theory, thus providing a framework for qualitative planning under uncertainty. In particular, we show that adding causal relationships (in the form of a single graph) as part of an epistemic state is sufficient to facilitate the analysis of action sequences, their consequences, their interaction with observations, their expected utilities, and the synthesis of plans and strategies under uncertainty

Two Ways to Want?

I present unexplored and unaccounted for uses of 'wants'. I call them advisory uses, on which information inaccessible to the desirer herself helps determine what she wants. I show that extant theories by Stalnaker, Heim, and Levinson fail to predict these uses. They also fail to predict true indicative conditionals with 'wants' in the consequent. These problems are related: intuitively valid reasoning with modus ponens on the basis of the conditionals in question results in unembedded advisory uses. I consider two fixes, and end up endorsing a relativist semantics, according to which desire attributions express information-neutral propositions. On this view, 'wants' functions as a precisification of 'ought', which exhibits similar unembedded and compositional behavior. I conclude by sketching a pragmatic account of the purpose of desire attributions that explains why it made sense for them to evolve in this way

Deontic Logic and Natural Language

There has been a recent surge of work on deontic modality within philosophy of language. This work has put the deontic logic tradition in contact with natural language semantics, resulting in significant increase in sophistication on both ends. This chapter surveys the main motivations, achievements, and prospects of this work